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CIVIL COMMITMENT IN COLORADO
INTRODUCTION

Man often attempts to remove from his society that which he cannot
comprehend. Consequently the history of those suffering from the infirmities
of mental illness has been one of condemnation and confinement. Yet as
man began to understand the complexities of mental illness and realize that
factors such as environment and experience contributed to the development
of personality and behavior, he became less quick to condemn and more
anxious to help. Significant developments in new fields of learning such
as sociology, psychology, and psychiatry have helped to create a society which
is more receptive to the problems of mental health.
In recent years, society's response to persons with mental health problems
has undergone dose scrutiny and careful reevaluation by lawmaking bodies,
by concerned professionals, and by the academic community. The major
challenge facing the legal profession has been to develop standards for
determining when and how a mentally afflicted individual's legal status may
be altered in order that custody and treatment may be imposed upon him
against his will. Concepts of due process have become determinative guidelines in framing and evaluating the basic procedures by which society may
alter the legal status and restrict the rights of individuals whose mental
condition and behavior deviate substantially from accepted norms. In this
issue, two articles present contrasting, although not inconsistent, views
of due process in the civil commitment process in Colorado.
Probate Court Judge David Brofman's article reviews the basic commitment procedures and compares them with procedures in earlier years in Colorado, which were basically punishment-oriented. His theme is that presently
the rights of the mentally ill are fully and adequately protected by statute,
by Colorado supreme court decision, and by district and probate court
procedure. Yet he notes the comparatively meager portion of the nation's
resources which are being channeled toward mental health problems in
general.
Carl Johnson's article concludes that the present procedures do not
provide adequate safeguards, in large measure because of inadequate resources
which are channeled toward the problems of civil commitment. He presents
extensive analysis and research which consider the civil commitment process
in light of his three major purposes: (1) to compare the formal law-as set
forth in the statutes and court opinions - and the law as it is administered in
day-to-day practice; (2) to gain an insight into and evaluate the standards of
"due process" and fairness inherent in the practices under the present formal
law with a view to suggesting changes and improvements in the present commitment and adjudication procedures; and (3) to provide the practicing
attorney with a basic rudimentary description of the present commitment and
adjudication procedures in Colorado and their administration. The author's
recommendations and concrete proposals for change may be evaluated in
terms of his legal and empirical research and in the context of the perspective
provided by Judge Brofman.

CIVIL COMMITMENT OF THE MENTALLY ILL
IN THE DENVER PROBATE COURT
By DAVID BROFMANt*
INTRODUCTION

has been a long hard road from the days when the subjects
of "lunacy inquisitions" in Colorado were called "defendants"'
to today's standards of treatment, care and legal protection of
the mentally ill. Not until 1957 was the terminology in the chapter
of the Colorado statutes dealing with the mentally ill modernized
and language such as "lunatics and other mental defectives" or
"lunatics," deleted.'
Only 15 years ago volunteers in mental health literally had
legislative doors slammed in their faces when they sought enactment of relatively minor changes in the nomenclature which would
have deleted the offensive and outdated statutory language referring to the mentally ill.3 The efforts of these volunteers con4
tinued, however, and in 1957 the modern terminology was adopted.
Procedures for the voluntary treatment of the mentally ill
were proposed by citizens' groups and were adopted by the legislature in 1957.' However, efforts to obtain treatment on a voluntary basis were thwarted by institution directors who refused
to accept patients seeking voluntary hospitalization.' A similar
problem was faced earlier in this century, and then, as now,
volunteers were the leaders in the reforms sought. As a result
of the earlier citizen efforts to provide care for Colorado's
mentally ill, an act was adopted by the voters in 1916, providing
tLL.B. University of Denver (Westminster Law School), 1929. Judge, Probate Court,
City and County of Denver.
* The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Paul Hunter, student, University
of Denver College of Law and law clerk for Probate Court Judge, in the preparation
of this manuscript.
1 Hawkyard v. People, 115 Colo. 35, 169 P.2d 178 (1946).
2 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 71-1-1 to 71-1-33 (Supp. 1960).
3 Six volunteers waited two hours after their appointment time for the chairman of
the legislative committee. When he arrived, they were unpolitely dismissed because
he was too busy to see them.
4 As an example, the "lunacy commission" referred to in CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 71-1-2 (1953) became the "medical commission" in COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
71-1-6 (Supp. 1960).
5 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-2 (Supp. 1960).

6 Probate court and city attorney personnel recall the firm refusal of the then superintendent of the Colorado State Hospital to accept such patients.
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for the care and treatment of the insane.' The act, which was
initiated by petition, provided that the Colorado Board of Corrections (the agency entrusted with the responsibility of administering mental care institutions at the time) could not limit the
number of persons cared for at the "Colorado Insane Asylum"
or elsewhere. It became the law when approved by Colorado
voters by a four-to-one margin, and by Denver County voters
by ten-to-one.s
In 1960 the volunteers again presented their case to the Colorado lawmakers. A joint session of the legislature and a packed
gallery heard William C. Menninger, M.D., of the famed Menninger Foundation in Topeka, Kansas, relate the needs for
effective, humane care and treatment of the mentally ill in
Colorado.' So great was the impact of this and previous educational
efforts that the 1965 bill amending the short term involuntary
hospitalization and commitment procedures was sponsored by 59
of the 100 members of the session.' °
The rights of the mentally ill were further protected when
the legislature in 1957 adopted a statute insuring the right of the
patient to communicate with the court, relatives, and attorneys in
any form."
Through the years, largely through the efforts of concerned
and dedicated volunteers, the plight of the mentally ill in Colorado
has been recognized by the legislature, and action has been taken
to provide care, treatment, funds, facilities, and protection of the
legal rights of the mentally ill.
The volunteer efforts in the mental health field continue. In
the Denver Probate Court, there is constant coordination and consultation between court officials, members of the city attorney's
staff, law enforcement personnel, physicians, clergymen, teachers,
civic groups, welfare and social workers, visiting nurses, attorneys,
and others, in the processing of cases and consideration of ways of
improving the care and protection of the mentally ill.
I. THE CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCESS

The Denver Probate Court has exclusive original jurisdiction
to hear and determine matters arising in the City and County of
7 Colo. Sess. Laws 1917, ch. 79, 21st Sess. of the Gen. Ass'y of the State of Colo. The

act was approved at the general election held November 7, 1916.
8 Id.
9 Address by Dr. Menninger to the Colorado State Legislature, January 8, 1960.
10Colo. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 186, 1st Sess. of 45th Gen. Ass'y of the State of Colo.
(codified in scattered sections of COLO. REV. STAT. ANN., chapter 71) (Supp. 1965).
n CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-23 (Supp. 1960), as amended (Supp. 1965).
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Denver under Chapter 71 of the Colorado Revised Statutes. 12
The mental health division of the court, which is presently staffed
by two assistant city attorneys and three probate court personnel,
has responsibility for processing and investigating commitment
proceedings commenced in the court. In 1968, the division handled
13
a total of 2,074 actions.
The statute provides for four basic commitment procedures:
1) voluntary hospitalization, 4 2) emergency custody, 5 3) short
term involuntary hospitalization,'" and 4) involuntary commitment.' 7 The probate court has statutory jurisdiction in each of
these proceedings except voluntary hospitalization.' 8 AWhile the
statute does not require that voluntary hospitalization be processed
by the court, the staff of the mental health division can and does
assist in such proceedings pursuant to court policy. In addition
to the emergency, short term, and involuntary commitment proceedings, over which it has original jurisdiction, the court handles
a number of cases referred from the county and district courts.'"
The statute provides that no examination shall be made of any
person charged with a criminal offense by a medical commission
appointed under the civil commitment provisions unless or until
the criminal offense shall be tried or dismissed; this provision,
however, allows the judge of the court having jurisdiction of the
pending criminal action to request the probate court to proceed
under the civil commitment provisions.2"
A. Voluntary Hospitalization
1. Admission to Hospital
In 1957, the Colorado legislature enacted the basic voluntary
hospitalization provision which is in the statute today. Under this
provision, any person age 18 or over who is mentally ill or
mentally deficient, and who so requests, may be admitted by any
hospital for observation, diagnosis, care, and treatment. 2' This
"2id. § 71-1-1(2)(f) (Supp. 1965).
1968 ANNUAL REPORT, PROBATE COURT FOR THE CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER
2-3.
14COLO.REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-2 (1963), as amended (Supp. 1965).
151d. § 71-1-3 (1963), as amended (Supp. 1965).
16 Id. § 71-1-4 (1965), as amended (Supp. 1969).
17
1d. § 71-1-5 (Supp. 1965), as amended (Supp. 1969).
18Id. § 37-20-3 (Supp. 1965), as amended (Supp. 1967); id.§ 71-1-1(2) (f) (Supp.
1965).
191d. § 71-1-10 (Supp. 1965). This section provides for a transfer of jurisdiction
"whenever it shall appear necessary and desirable for the convenience of the respondent or for any other reasons.
Id.
20ld. § 71-1-25 (Supp. 1965).
21id. § 71-1-2(1) (Supp. 1960), as amended (1963).
13
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procedure is commonly used in the treatment of alcoholics." A
person under 18 years of age may be admitted upon application
28
of his parent or legal guardian.
2. Release

Any person who is voluntarily hospitalized under this section
can be released in one of several ways. He will be discharged if
he has recovered, or if hospitalization is no longer advisable,
feasible, or beneficial. 24 The statute also provides that a patient
shall be discharged upon his request or that of his legal guardian,
parent, spouce, or adult next of kin; such release is to occur within
5 days after a written request is filed with the administrative office
of the hospital.2 5 Release may be conditioned upon the consent of
the patient if he was committed at his own request and another
person requests his release; 26 release of a minor may be conditioned
upon the consent of his parent or legal guardian, if he was com27
mitted at the request of another person.
If the administrative officer of the hospital or the attending
physician is of the opinion that release of the patient would be
unsafe or dangerous he may, within 5 days from filing of the
release request, file a written opinion to that effect with the
court. 28 The court then proceeds under the short term involuntary
hospitalization provisions or the involuntary commitment pro29
visions of the statute.
B. Emergency Procedure
1. Custody

A sheriff or police officer who has a good faith belief that a
person is mentally ill or deficient, and is apt to injure himself or
others if allowed to remain at liberty, may place that person in
custody pending an order of the court. The officer must immediately file with the court a statement setting forth the circumstances and the reasons for his conclusions as to the mental
30
condition of the person whom he has placed in custody.
22 Use of the voluntary hospitalization procedure is considered to be an effective method

of treatment by the Denver authorities.
2 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-2(1)
24
ld. § 71-1-2(2) (1963).
25

(1963).

Id. § 71-1-2(3)(a) (1963).

26Id.

§ 71-1-2(3)(b) (1963).

2
7Id.

§ 71-1-2(3)(c)

(1963).

§ 71-1-2(3)(d) (Supp. 1965).
2Id.
§§ 71-1-4 et req. (Supp. 1965) and §§ 71-1-5 et seq. (Supp. 1965). These
sections provide further explanation of the procedure followed by the court.
0
3 Id. 71-1-3 (1963), as amended (Supp. 1965).
2Id.
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An 18-bed ward is available at Denver General Hospital for
the hospitalization of patients whose behavior is so aggressive that
they cannot be safely contained elsewhere in the hospital."' A
patient who is not dangerous may not be held in jail pending action
by the court,82 although if criminal charges are pending or a
criminal investigation is underway, a person might be confined
in jail under that action.
2. Court Action

Within 24 hours from the filing of the report by the officer
(excluding Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays) the court must
enter an order discharging the person in custody or confining him
for observation, diagnosis, or treatment under the short term involuntary hospitalization provisions or referring the matter to a
medical commission appointed under the involuntary commitment
3
provisions of the statute. 3
C. Short Term Involuntary Hospitalization
1. Petition
Any reputable person may file with the court a petition
alleging that it would be in the best interests of a respondent that
he be hospitalized for observation, diagnosis, and treatment for
mental illness. The petition must be accompanied by a statement
from a licensed physician that it would be in the best interest of
the respondent that he be hospitalized. This provision, which was
added by the legislature in 1961," 4 is probably the most important
protection afforded the respondent by the statute. In his statement,
the doctor must set forth the reasons for his opinion and give the
dates on which he examined the respondent. The petition must
also be accompanied by a statement from the city attorney that
probable cause appears to exist for the issuance of an order of
hospitalization."5
31 R. GLASSCOTE,

J.

Susspx,

E.

CUMMING, & L.

HEALTH CENTER: AN INTERIM APPRAISAL
32

SMITH, THE COMMUNITY

MENTAL

119 (1969).

COLO. REV. STAT. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-5(2) (Supp. 1965).

Until the final determination of the inquiry into his mental condition, the
respondent shall be placed in the custody of some relative or other proper
person, or the department of institutions for placement in a state hopistal,
or in the custody of any other hospital not under the supervision of said
department or some other convenient or suitable place to be designated by
the court, for examination, diagnosis, observation, care and treatment; provided, no person held under the provisions of this section shall be confined
in a common jail unless there be sufficient showing that he is violent and
dangerous to himself or others or that there is no other adequate place of
custody available in the county.
33
34

Id.
Id. § 71-1-3(3)

(1963).

Id. §

(1963), as amended (Supp. 1965).

35 Id.

71-1-4(1)
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Proceedings may also be initiated by filing with the court a
statement by a physician or administrative officer of a hospital,
as provided for in the voluntary hospitalization provision. 0
Additionally, upon a satisfactory showing to the court that
emergency circumstances exist which make it essential that the
respondent be immediately hospitalized, and that it would be
unsafe or dangerous for him to remain at large pending (1) an
examination by a physician or (2) a statement by the city attorney
that probable cause appears to exist for the issuance of an order
of hospitalization, the court may waive the requirement for either
or both and issue an order for hospitalization. 7
2. Order

for Short Term Involuntary Hospitalization and
Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem.
Whenever a request is filed for an order of short term hospitalization, the court will appoint an attorney as guardian ad
litem for the respondent. It is the duty of the guardian ad litern
to make such investigation as is necessary to protect the interests
of the respondent, and to make certain that the respondent is or
has been advised of his right to a hearing on the order of hospitalization. The guardian ad litern should report the results of
his investigation to the court as soon as possible, but he must do
so not more than 5 days after the entry of the order of hospitalization, unless he receives an extension of time by the court.38
If the court is of the opinion that the estate of the respondent is
subject to waste or theft during the period of involuntary hospitalization or involuntary commitment, the court may assign the
guardian ad litem the additional duty of inventorying and securing
the assets pending adjudication of the respondent.3 9 The court
may also, under a provision added by the 1969 Colorado legislature, determine that a responsible person other than the guardian ad litern be appointed to perform these functions, and such
person will act under the direction of the guardian ad litem. This
person's duty is to secure the assets of the estate against waste and
theft pending adjudication of the respondent, and to make a
report of these assets to the court within 5 days of his appointment."
Upon satisfactory showing of need, or upon recommendation
of a medical commission appointed under the provisions of this
36

37
38
39

ld. § 71-1-2 (1963).

Id. § 71-1-4(1) (Supp. 1965).

Id.§ 71-1-4(3) (Supp. 1965).

1d. § 71-1-8(4) (Supp. 1969).
40
Id.§ 71-1-35 (Supp. 1969).
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section, the court may issue an order committing the respondent
to the department of institutions for placement in a state institution, or committing him to some other hospital for hospitalization,
examination, diagnosis, observation, care, and treatment for a
period not to exceed 3 months. 4 1 When the director of the hospital or the attending physician files a written statement that a
longer period of hospitalization is necessary, the court may extend
the period not to exceed a total of 6 months from the date of the
original order.42 The court's order directs the sheriff or some
responsible person to deliver the respondent to the hospital.4 3
3. Service
A copy of the petition and order must be personally served
on the respondent by the person taking him to the hospital.44 In
addition, a written notice is given to the respondent that a hearing
on his hospitalization may be had before the court or a medical
commission, upon written request directed by the court.4" The
guardian ad litem is also to be provided with a copy of the order
of hospitalization within 2 days after its entry.46
4. Review
The respondent or his guardian ad litem may at any time file
a written request that the commitment be reviewed by the court,
or by a medical commission; a similar request may be made that
the treatment be on an outpatient basis or in a nursing home,
rather than in a hospital.4 7 If the original order of hospitalization
was entered upon the recommendation of a medical commission,
review must be by the court and not by a commission.4"
41

Id. § 71-1-4(4) (Supp. 1965).
Id. § 71-1-4(8) (Supp. 1965).
43
1d. § 71-1-4(5) (Supp. 1965).
42

441d.
45 Id. The failure to clearly prove proper service of notice on the respondent has
resulted in a reversal of an order of adjudication. See Iwerks v. People, 130 Colo.
86, 273 P.2d 133 (1954). Other cases indicating the court's strong position that
the statutory requirements be strictly construed include: Young v. Brofman, 139
Colo. 296, 338 P.2d 286 (1959) ; Rickey v. People, 129 Colo. 174, 267 P.2d 1021
(1954); Kendall v. People, 126 Colo. 573, 252 P.2d 91 (1952) ; Okerberg v.
People, 119 Colo. 529, 205 P.2d 224 (1949).
46 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-4(3) (Supp. 1965). Interpreting a prior statute
containing a notice provision identical to the present one, the Colorado Supreme
Court held in the case of Hultquist v. People, 77 Colo. 310, 236 P. 997 (1925)
that the giving of this notice was mandatory and could not be waived by the guardian
ad liem. According to the court, the purpose of the 2 days' notice was to enable
the attorney appointed as guardian ad litem to make an adequate investigation and
preparation to protect the interests of the respondent at the medical commission
hearing. Id. at 316, 236 P. at 998.
47

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-4(6) (Supp. 1965).

48 Id.
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If court review is requested, the matter shall be set for hearing
within 10 days, and notice must be given to the respondent, his
guardian ad litem, and the city attorney.4 9 If the respondent desires
counsel, he may retain an attorney to represent him in the review
proceedings. If he is unable to pay for counsel, the court will
appoint the guardian ad litem to represent the respondent in the
proceedings.5 0
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court may enter an
order of hospitalization, discharge the respondent, refer the matter
to a medical commission, or enter any other suitable order."'
Upon motion of the guardian ad litem or upon the court's own
motion, the court will issue an order requiring the doctor attending
the respondent to file a written report with the court within 10
days as to the results of his examination to date. 2 The court may
thereafter proceed in accordance with the involuntary commitment
procedures, discharge the respondent if the examining doctor
recommends, or allow the original order of hospitalization to continue in full force and effect.53
Whenever it appears to the court by reason of medical reports
or other satisfactory showing that the respondent has received
maximum benefit from hospitalization and treatment, and that
the respondent is mentally competent, and that it will be in his
best interests to be discharged, the court will enter an order terminating the hospitalization.

54

5. Further Proceedings
If the director of the hospital files a report with the court
stating that the respondent is in need of continued hospitalization
beyond the maximum 6-month period provided for in this section
of the statute, the court proceeds under the provisions of the involuntary commitment section, usually on its own motion.55
6. Sealing of Records
The records in all short term involuntary hospitalization cases
are maintained separately and, upon discharge of the respondent
from the hospital, the record is sealed and the respondent's name
is omitted from the index of cases until and unless the respondent
49 Id.
50

id. § 71-1-8 (1963). The Colorado Public Defender has had the responsibility in this
area since January 1, 1970. Id. § 39-21-3(2)(a)

51

1d. § 71-1-4(6)
52
1d. § 71-1-4(7)

(Supp. 1965).
(Supp. 1965).

53 Id.
54
5

1d. § 71-1-4(10)

51d. § 71-1-4(11)

(Supp. 1965).
(Supp. 1965).

(Supp. 1969).
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has been adjudicated under the involuntary commitment procedures
or unless the court for good cause orders the record opened. 6 The
reason the restriction on the file does not occur until termination of
the hospitalization is to permit interested persons to locate the
respondent. 7
D. Involuntary Commitment
1. Petition, Guardian Ad Litem and Custody
The petition which is filed for involuntary commitment is
58
similar to that filed for short term involuntary hospitalization.
The petition must contain a request for a hearing before a medical
commission, and must be accompanied by a physician's statement?.
Upon receipt of the petition, or upon its own motion (if the court
has good cause to believe that a person is mentally ill or mentally
deficient), the court may issue an order directing a designated
person to take the respondent into custody, pending determination
of his mental condition.6
A guardian ad litem must be appointed,61 as in the short term
involuntary hospitalization proceedings. 62 The guardian ad litein
must be served with a copy of the petition and order directing
custody at least 2 days prior to any hearing before a medical
commission, and within 5 days after issuance of the custody order.6"
The guardian ad litem's duties in the involuntary commitment
procedure are in many respects the same as in the short term
involuntary hospitalization procedure, including the inventorying
and safeguarding of the respondent's assets, if such latter duty is
assigned by the court. 4 As in the short term involuntary hospitalization provision, a responsible person may be appointed by the
court to inventory and secure the assets of the respondent's estate
pending adjudication.6"
56

Id. § 71-1-4(12) (Supp. 1965).
57 This was the view of the legislative committee at the time the statute was drawn and
58

is the view of the author.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-5(1) (Supp. 1965).

59 Id.It should be noted, though, that this statutory provision requires the medical
statement to indicate "whether or not the physician has examined the respondent and
the date or dates of said examination . . . " while the provision in section 71-1-4
concerning short term involuntary hospitalization does net provide for a statement by
a physician who has not examined the respondent.
60 d. § 71-1-5(1) (Supp. 1965).
61 Id.§ 71-1-8 (1963).
62 Id. § 71-1-4(3) (Supp. 1965).
63Id. § 71-1-5(1) (Supp. 1965).
64
1d. § 71-1-8 (1963), as amended (Supp. 1969) and § 7i-1-1(3) (Supp. 1965).
65 Id. § 71-1-35 (Supp. 1969).
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Until such time as final determination has been made as to
the respondent's mental condition, he remains in the custody of
a relative or other proper person, or the department of institutions
for placement in a state hospital, or in the custody of another
hospital, or in some other convenient and suitable place designated
by the court for examinations, diagnosis, observation, care and
treatment. 66
2.

Medical Commission
a. Appointment

The court appoints a medical commission whenever a petition
and doctor's statement are filed under the involuntary commitment
section.17 Additionally, a commission may be appointed under the
provisions of the emergency procedure and short term involuntary
hospitalization statutes, as described supra.s
The commission consists of two doctors licensed to practice
medicine in Colorado, neither of whom is a relative of the respondent or of any petitioner or has any financial interest in the
outcome of the proceedings.6" Upon appointment of the commission,
the court fixes a time and place for the first meeting. Notice must
be personally served on the respondent at least 5 days prior to the
hearing.7 °
b.

Procedure

At the request of the commission, the guardian ad liteni, the
respondent's attorney, or the city attorney, the court will cause
subpoenas to be issued to compel the attendance of witnesses or
the production of records at the commission hearings. 7' The commission has the power to administer oaths, hear evidence, and hear
statements of the respondent, his attorney or his guardian ad
litem. 72 The commission can examine hospital and medical records,
reports, and witnesses, make such investigation and inquiry as it
deems necessary and adjourn the hearing to a time and place
id. § 71-1-5(2)

(Supp. 1965). "[N]o person held under the provisions of this
section shall be confined in a common jail unless there be sufficient showing that he
is violent and dangerous to himself or others or that there is no other adequate place
of custody available in the county." Id.
67Id. § 71-1-6(1) (Supp. 1965).
68 See text, § B(2) & C(4) supra and accompanying notes.
66

69 Id. § 71-1-6(1)

(Supp. 1965).

70 Id. § 71-1-6(2) (Supp. 1965).
71
1d. § 71-1-7(1) (1963).
72 Id.
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certain.7" All of the proceedings of the commission are to be
conducted by the city attorney. 4
c. Report of the Commission
Within 48 hours of the conclusion of the hearing (unless
an extension of time is granted by the court), the commission
must file a verified report of its findings with the court. 75 The
commission's report must answer the specific questions listed in
the statute as to the nature of the respondent's affliction.7" If any
of the questions are answered in the affirmative, the report is to
provide personal information about the respondent and recommend
a suitable place for his commitment or a suitable person to be
entrusted with custody of the respondent. Additionally, the report
must include any conditions of custody which the commission
recommends.77 A copy of the report is forwarded to the institution
in which the respondent is placed, to the department of institutions,
7
and to the guardian ad litem.

s

d. Report of the Guardian Ad Litem
The guardian ad litem is required to attend all meetings of
the commission, after having been given at least 2 days notice,70
and must make a written report to the court within 5 days after the
commission report is filed,"° His report gives personal information
about the respondent and information about the witnesses who
testified at the hearing.8" In the event the commission finds that
73 Id.
74Id. § 71-1-9 (Supp. 1965).
75Id. § 71-1-7(2)(a) (1963).
76 The questions are noted in CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-7(2)(b-e)

(1963):
(b) Is the respondent afflicted with a disease, infirmity, old age, or
disorder, which impairs his mental or emotional functions to a degree
sufficient to require protection, supervision, treatment, or confinement for
his own welfare or the welfare or safety of others? (c) Does the respondent.
by reason of mental illness, lack sufficient control, judgment, and discretion
to manage his own property or affairs? (d) Are the respondent's intellectual
functions so deficient, arrested or impaired by disease, or physical injury
that he lacks sufficient control, judgment, and discretion to manage his
own property or affairs? (e) Are respondent's intellectual functions so
deficient, arrested, or impaired that for his own welfare, or the welfare or
safety of others, he requires protection, supervision, guidance, training,
control, or care?
7
7 Id. § 71-1-7(3) (Supp. 1965).
78

Id.

79

1d. § 71-1-8(1)

(1963).

Old. § 71-1-8(2)

(1963).

81 Id.§ 71-1-8(2) (1963). "The guardian ad litem shall make a written report to the
court within five days after the filing of the report of the medical commission,
showing the occupation, citizenship, and residence of the respondent, his length of
residence in Colorado, his previous place of residence, if known, and the name,
address, and relationship to respondent of the petitioner and of the wit esses
examined at the hearing." Id.

1969

CIVIL COMMITMENT IN COLORADO

the respondent is mentally ill or mentally deficient, the guardian
ad litem's report must include an inventory of the respondent's
real and personal property, social security information, the names
and addresses of next of kin, and a recommendation as to the
desirability of appointing a conservator for the respondent's estate.82
3. Adjudication, Commitment, and Custody
If the medical commission finds that the respondent is
mentally ill or deficient and recommends indefinite commitment
and adjudication, the court must then enter an order within 6
days after the filing of the commission report; this order adjudicates the respondent mentally ill or mentally deficient and provides
for his commitment or custody.8" If the commission recommends
short term hospitalization without adjudication, the court proceeds
under the provisions of the short term involuntary hospitalization
8 4

statute.

A respondent adjudicated mentally ill is committed to the
department of institutions for placement in a state hospital or,
if he is eligible, the respondent may be committed to an agency
of the United States for care and treatment; 5 the court may also
commit the respondent to a hospital or other suitable place not
under the jurisdiction of the department of institutions, or the
court may designate some proper person to take custody of the
respondent and assume his custody, care, and maintenance."'
A respondent adjudged mentally deficient is committed to the
department of institutions for placement in a state institution or
committed to a designated private hospital or other suitable place;
82
83

ld. § 71-1-8(3) (1963).
1d. § 71-1-11(1)

(Supp. 1965).

84 Id.

The use of the term "adjudicating" indicates that a jury verdict is not an
essential requisite of adjudication within the meaning of [a 1957 statute
concerning the appointment of a conservator for a respondent's estatel. To
be sure, this initial adjudication is an interlocutory one where a jury trial
has been requested. However, the statute relative to appointment of conservators does not require that the person shall have been finally "adjudicated
mentally ill" by a jury as a condition precedent to the appointment of a
conservator. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the county court acted
within the powers granted to it by statute when it appointed the conservator
herein prior to impaneling a jury. Acceptance of the petitioner's contention
could mean delay in the appointment of a conservator and could result in
loss of property. The statute does not tie the hands of the county court :r
this manner.
Young v. Brofman, 139 Colo. 296. 303, 338 P.2d 286, 290 (1959).
8COLO. REv. STAT.

86 Id.

ANN. § 71-1-11(2)

(Supp. 1965).
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if the court deems it desirable, a responsible person may be designated to take custody of the respondent.8 7
The statute provides that the Colorado psychopathic hospital
is not a suitable place for the commitment of a respondent who
has been adjudicated mentally ill or mentally deficient.8 8
4. Commitment of Persons Under Age Sixteen
No mentally deficient person under the age of 16 can be
placed in a state hospital by the Department of Institutions unless
such person is psychotic or mentally ill, in addition to being
mentally deficient.8 9
5. Review
Any respondent or his attorney, his guardian ad litem, his
legal guardian, parent, spouse, or adult next of kin may, within 5
days after the entry of the order of adjudication or commitment,
file a demand in writing with the court that the questions considered by the medical commission be tried by the court or by
a jury. 0 If the respondent has been removed from the area of
jurisdiction of the court during this 5 day period, he has an additional 15 days (a total of 20 days after the entry of the order
of adjudication or commitment) to file his demand.9
If a jury trial is demanded, the court must cause a jury of six
871d. § 71-1-11(3) (Supp. 1965).
88
1d. § 71-1-11(4) (1963).
The Colorado psychopathic hospital shall not be considered a suitable place
for the commitment of a respondent who has been adjudged mentally ill
or deficient, nor shall such respondent be committed thereto or retained
therein after adjudication, except that temporary treatment of an adjudicated
respondent in Colorado psychopathic hospital may be authorized by the
medical director thereof when, in his opinion, such would further the
teaching and scientific objectives of the hospital.
Id.
89
Id. § 71-1-12(1) (Supp. 1965).
Subsection 2 of the same article provides that "in the event that suitable
space in facilities of the department of institutions for the accommodation
of mentally ill persons under the age of sixteen is not available, the department shall not be required to place such respondents in an institution
immediately and shall determine the priority of admission of respondents
not yet admitted. In establishing priorities, the department shall give due
regard to the nature of the child's emotional disturbance, the presence of
a situation in which the child is dangerous to himself or others, and other
relevant factors. The department of institutions may request the children's
diagnostic center, established by section 124-3-10, C.R.S. 1963, to evaluate
the child following adjudication and prior to admission to an institution
or may make such other arrangements concerning the child as seem desireable. The department of institutions shall notify the court of the availability
of space for admission or of any other arrangements so that a proper order
of commitment may be entered.
Id.§ 77-1-12(2) (Supp. 1965).
90
1d. § 71-1-13(1) (Supp. 1965).
9

1Id.
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to be summoned and a trial to be held within 1 month. 92 The
findings of the medical commission are admissible as evidence,
upon their identification by the person or persons verifying the
commission report.93 Such person or persons are subject to crossexamination, and the statute provides that the jury shall be instructed that the findings of the medical commission may be
overcome by a preponderance of the evidence.9 4 The Colorado
Supreme Court has, however, interpreted this burden of proof
provision to require the city to establish the mental illness of the
respondent by a preponderance of the evidence, and not to require
the respondent to produce any evidence whatsoever." The court
held that the burden of proof could not be shifted from the city
to the respondent.9"
The jury must answer the same questions prescribed in the
statute for the medical commission to answer. 7 The court enters
a decree in accordance with the determination of the jury, either
entering an order of commitment if the jury answers in the affirmative any questions propounded, or discharging the respondent
if all questions are answered in the negative; the court may set
aside the jury finding and enter an order notwithstanding the
finding if the court is of the opinion that the finding of the jury
is contrary to the law or evidence."
6. Rights of Respondent
The statute provides that no respondent shall lose any civil
rights nor forfeit any legal status unless he has been adjudicated
mentally ill or deficient.9 Entry of an order of competency restores
all civil rights and legal status.100
92

1d. § 71-1-13(2) (1963). See also Young v. Brofman, 139 Colo. 296, 338 P.2d 286
(1959). Young makes this jury trial a mandatory procedure once it has been
requested. In Young the lower court reasoned that it could deny a requested jury
trial if it felt that the best interests of the respondent required such action, analogizing to the fact that it may enter a judgment notwithstanding the verdict if such trial
is had and it disagrees with the jury's findings as being contrary to law. Mr. Justice
Doyle, writing for the majority of the court, stated: "We do not believe that the
court, can once request has been made, determine whether the case is a proper one
for a jury trial or whether it is in the best interests of the ward to impanel a jury.
Our interpretation of the statute is that the words, 'if the respondent requests' means
if the respondent or some one of the persons named requests the same in his behalf.
Thus, the court has no discretion in the matter, but must impanel a jury." Id. at 300,
338 P.2d at 288.
93
COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-13(2) (1963).
94

Id.

95 Sabon v. People, 142 Colo. 323, 350 P.2d 576 (1960).
96 Id.
97

CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-13(3)

(1963).

98 Id.
99
1d. § 71-1-23(1) (1963).
1'0 Id. Subsection (2) of this statute provides: "Any
article shall have the right to communicate with his
further right to communicate with the judge of the
with his attorney, by sealed mail or otherwise. Id. §

per-on in custody under this
spouse and relatives, and the
court having jurisdiction, and
71-1-23(2) (Supp. 1965).
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7. Adjudication of Competency
Upon the filing of a written petition by any reputable person
setting forth that the adjudicated respondent is no longer mentally
ill or deficient, supported by a doctor's certificate, the court must
immediately appoint two doctors to examine the respondent at the
place where he's physically present and report their findings. 1"'
If the respondent is confined, at least one of the examining doctors
must not be associated with the institution in which the respondent
is confined.1 0 2 If the court finds that the respondent is no longer
mentally ill or deficient, it will enter an order of competency and
if the respondent is at that time confined in an institution, he must
be immediately released."0 3
8. Discharge by Hospital
If, in the opinion of the superintendant or chief medical officer
of a hospital, any respondent adjudicated and committed to the
hospital is no longer mentally ill or deficient, the officer shall file
in the court a verified statement to that effect, recommending that
the respondent be discharged. 0 4 The court may, on its own motion,
enter an order of competency in such case.1"'
Additionally, administrative discharges may be granted by the
hospital when such conditional release is felt to be in the best
interests of the respondent or society. 1 6
II.

CARE AND TREATMENT OF THE MENTALLY ILL

All of the procedural safeguards imaginable in the hospitalization and commitment process would be of little avail if effective
treatment facilities were not provided for the care and treatment
of the mentally ill, whether they have been committed voluntarily,
by court order, or otherwise. In the Denver area, the services and
facilities of the Denver General Hospital Comprehensive Mental
Health Center and the Fort Logan Mental Health Center 0 . provide
101Id. § 71-1-26 (1963).
lo21d.
103 Id.
1

°4Id. § 71-1-27 (1963).

10

5Id.

Id. §

71-1-28 (Supp. 1965). This section provides for the release of a respondent by
the superintendent of the Colorado State Hospital, or the superintendent of the
state home and training schools located at Ridge and Grand Junction, or the chief
officer of a veteran's administration hospital. However, there is no provision in
this section of the statute for release of a respondent by the superintendent of a
private hospital.
207 See generally R. GLASSCOTE, J. SUSSEx, E. CUMMING & L. SMITH, THE COMMUNITY
MENTAL HEALTH CENTER: AN INTERIM APPRAISAL 107-28 (1969) and R. GLASSCOTE, A. KRAFT, S. GLASSMAN, & W. JEPSON, PARTIAL HOSPITALIZATION FOR THE
MENTALLY ILL: A STUDY OF PROGRAMS AND PROBLEMS 65-80 (1969).
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examples of the new thinking and approaches being developed to
treat the mentally ill. These two facilities are used extensively by
the probate court because of the services they are capable of
providing.
The inpatient facilities at Denver General Hospital are limited,
but the new addition being constructed will provide greatly expanded and improved care and treatment. There will be a walk-in
service, a base of operations for the home visitation service, medical
education facilities, offices for social workers and volunteers, two
22-bed psychiatric units, space for the day care program, group
therapy rooms, a psychological testing laboratory, and a 10-bed
nursing unit for children with psychiatric illness.
The programs offered by Denver General include both inpatient and outpatient services, a day treatment program, forensic
psychiatry program, psychiatric emergency service, hospital consultation and liason program, and the psychological testing laboratory. The outpatient service includes 5 teams, each composed of
a psychiatrist, a clinical psychologist, two psychiatric social workers,
a psychiatric nurse, a secretary, several volunteers, and graduate
students drawn from social work, nursing, psychology, special
education, and rehabilitation counseling. Family and self-referrals
make up the largest category of referrals to the teams, but many
patients are referred from the emergency room, the psychiatric
liason service, psychiatric agencies, Denver General's inpatient
service, social agencies, private physicians, the police and, of course,
the courts.
The outpatient service also includes the Visiting Nurse Service,
a program sponsored jointly by the City and County of Denver
and the United Fund. The several hundred nurses serve patients
at Denver General and provide home nursing services to patients
discharged from the Colorado State Hospital. The nurses make
home visits to the families of hospitalized patients and followup
home visits to patients. A visiting nurse is assigned full time to
the alcoholic treatment program.
In 1967, about 3,900 persons were seen as outpatients by the
personnel at Denver General, for a total of almost 22,500 hours
of patient contact.1 °8 The visiting nurses saw about 1,300 patients
in 2,600 visits in 1967.109 During 1967, about 900 hours of consultation were provided to the courts and the police by the staff
of the Denver General program." 0
108 R. GLASSCOTE, J. SUSSEX, E. CUMMING & L. SMITH, THE COMMUNITY MENTAL
HEALTH CENTER: AN IN"TERIM APPRAISAL 115 (1969).

i0 Id.
"Old. at 119.
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The Fort Logan Mental Health Center is a state facility established in 1961 to treat as many patients as possible in a day
program.1 11 It has been said that the facility "has probably the
largest and certainly one of the most important day hospital programs in the world.'12 Fort Logan has special programs for
alcoholics, geriatric patients, and children under age 15. It offers
a crisis intervention service, halfway houses and other services in
a comprehensive mental health program.
In addition to the approximately 500 full time clinical employees there is an extensive volunteer program at the Center. Also,
during the summer months, 80 to 100 high school and college
students serve as volunteers in approximately 25 different departments. The efforts of volunteers are evident in other areas of
the Fort Logan program. About 35 garden clubs and 200 other
community organizations have helped raise funds, donated equipment, furnished entertainment and taught classes to patients on
gardening, bridge, personal grooming, flower arranging and
crafts.' 1 3
Fort Logan is permitted to exclude any admission as it sees fit,
except for those patients under court order. The purpose of this
restriction is to insure that those admitted have real need for the
treatment offered at the Center, and that existing community services such as those offered by Denver General are used extensively.
There is presently no program for the adolescent at Fort Logan, so
young persons between the ages of 15 and 18 must go to the
Colorado State Hospital in Pueblo. A program for adolescents is,
however, in the offing at Fort Logan.
The facilities at Pueblo provide services similar to those
offered at Fort Logan. Additionally, there are facilities which
provide the security required by some patients. Once this facility
was the only one available for the care and treatment of the
mentally ill in Colorado. Today, the trend is to provide flexible
treatment services which can be tailored to meet the individual
needs of each patient. The availability and expansion of such
treatment facilities and programs is of tremendous importance,
and is given much consideration by the court in making a determination whether to commit and where to commit a patient.
Great progress has been made in Colorado over the years in
providing improved care for the mentally ill. As Chief Judge David
Ill R.

A.

GLASSCOTE,
KRAFT, S. GLASSMAN & W. JEPSON, PARTIAL HOSPITALIZATION
FOR THE MENTALLY ILL: A STUDY OF PROGRAMS AND PROBLEMS 65 (1969).

1121d.
3

11 d. at 69.
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L. Bazelon of the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit has said, "The purpose of involuntary hospitalization is treatment, not punishment ....Absent treatment, the

hospital is transformed into a penitentiary where one could be
114
held indefinitely for no convicted offense."
There was a day in Colorado when the "Colorado Insane
Asylum" was literally a warehouse for the mentally ill, offering
little if any treatment or possibility of release. The author recollects
that at one time there was a single physician for some 6,500
patients!
Today, we in Colorado recognize the truth of Judge Bazelon's
statement. The legislature has enacted statutes which provide extensive due process safeguards, so that it is not possible to "railroad" a person into a mental hospital, as it might have been at
an earlier time." 5 The requirement that a doctor's statement must
accompany a petition for hospitalization has done much to prevent
baseless actions.
The federal and state governments have appropriated significant funds to improve existing care and treatment facilities and
to provide new facilities.
Still, last year only $350 million was spent for all the research, training and service activities of the National Institute of
Mental Health, while $10 billion was spent at all levels of government for highways to accommodate 80 million cars which killed
58,000 Americans and seriously injured 2 million more. '"
The first comprehensive study of the economic costs of mental
illness was released in 1968. Covering the calendar year 1966, the
study indicated that the cost of mental illness in this country is
more than $20 billion a year. Of this total, $15.5 billion is lost
to reduced individual productivity, and the remaining $5 billion
is attributable to the cost of treating and preventing mental illness
in a single year.''

7

The proposed research budget for the National Institute of
Mental Health for fiscal 1969 was but $100 million, in spite of
114Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 452-53 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
5
11
Hultquist v. People, 77 Colo. 310, 236 P. 995 (1925).
116 Address by M. Gorman, Executive Director of the National Commission Against
Mental Illness, 6th Legislative Dinner, Mass. Association for Mental Health, Feb. 11,
1969, published as Comprehensive Community Mental Health Centers: Myth or
Reality at 22 (Nat'l Comm. Against Mental Illness, 1028 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.,
Wash., D.C. 20036)
117 Testimony by M. Gorman before House Appropriations Subcomm. on Labor-H.E.W.,
April 25, 1968, published as Community Mental Health Center Program in jeopardy
at 6 (Nat'l Comm. Against Mental Illness, 1028 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036).
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the fact that in 1968 mental illness incapacitated more than 4
million people and filled close to 50o of all the nation's hospital
beds."'
Experimental treatment approaches have proved effective at
such Centers as Fort Logan in cutting down the amount of time
patients spend in hospitals, and in helping them to return to productive lives and stay out of the hospitals once released. Of course,
long term treatment and hospitalization facilities are necessary to
provide adequate care, treatment, and security for the acutely and
chronically ill, but where there is a chance to return people to
productive lives with short term treatment and hospitalization, day
centers, or outpatient treatment, these programs should be available and fully utilized.
The Denver Probate Court has kept pace with the rapid
changes in the mental health field and has geared its operation to
accommodate the modern concepts, as treatment and training are
substituted for custody. This fact is reflected in the reduction in
adjudications and increase in "Hold and Treat" orders (temporary
hospitalizations) from 1961 through 1968:119

Adjudication:
Hospitalization:

1961

1962

1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

1048
91

487
245

281
271

265
251

288
315

292
254

255
328

207
487

The above figures do not reflect the large number of persons
who were accepted for voluntary hospitalization.
If we are to continue to improve our treatment and rehabilitation facilities and methods, the interest and support of legislators,
medical people, lawyers, and the general public is vital. Since
courts and lawyers play a primary role in the hospitalization and
commitment process, we have a special obligation to insure that
the procedural safeguards provided in the statute are scrupulously
followed and that the spirit as well as the letter of the law is
followed.
SUMMARY

Colorado now has adequate statutes to deal with the problems
of the mentally ill. The rights of the mentally ill are fully protected
and there is little possibility of "railroading" because of such
safeguards as appointment of a guardian ad litem; originating
current physician's letter; city attorney's representation to the
118 Id. at 4.
119 1968 ANNUAL REPORT, PROBATE COURT FOR THE CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER
2-3.
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515

court; medical commission; provision for jury and the court review
of the findings; the protection of the right to communicate with
the court, family, friends and attorney; and the release or recommended restoration to reason by hospital administrators.

DUE PROCESS IN INVOLUNTARY CIVIL
COMMITMENT AND INCOMPETENCY
ADJUDICATION PROCEEDINGS:

WHERE DOES COLORADO STAND?
CARL

E. JOHNSON*t

"Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect
liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent. Men born
to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by
evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious
encoachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding."
-

Brandeis'
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INTRODUCTION

N the past several years legal periodicals and publications
throughout the nation have begun to devote a substantial
amount of attention to the legal, moral, and medical problems
involved in depriving a person of his freedom for the purpose
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of providing him with care and treatment in a mental hospital
or an institution.' The purpose of this article shall be to present
an overview of the problems and concerns which have emerged
from this growing body of literature, and to describe and evaluate the Colorado law regarding involuntary civil commitment
and its daily administration.
2

See, e.g., I. BELKNAP, HUMAN PROBLEMS OF A STATE MENTAL HOSPITAL (1956);
A. DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA (2nd ed. 1949); E. GOFFMAN,
ASYLUMS (1961); THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW (Lindeman & McIntyre
eds. 1961); W. OVERHOLZER, THE PSYCHIATRIST AND THE LAW (1953); R. ROcK,
HOSPITALIZATION OF THE MENTALLY ILL (1968); T. SZASZ, LAW, LIBERTY, AND
PSYCHIATRY (1963); V. TARsiS, WARD 7 (1965); D. Brofman, Colorado Case Law

on the Mentally Ill, (unpublished paper written in the early 1960's) ; Birnbaum, The
Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960); Chayet, Law and the Mentally 111, 18
HARV. L. S. BULL. 10 (1967); Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 44 TExAS L. REv. 424 (1966); Curran, Hospitalization of
the Mentally Ill, 31 N.C.L. REV. 279 (1953); Dix, Hospitalizationof the Mentally ll
in Wisconsin: A Need for Re-examination, 51 MARQ. L. REV. 1 (1967); Kaplan,
Civil Commitment 'As you Like It, 49 B.U.L. REV. 14 (1969) ; Kittrie, Compulsory
Mental Treatment and the Requirements of "Due Process," 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 28
(1960); Kittrie, Justice for the Mentally Ill, 41 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y. 46 (1957);
Kutner, The Illusion of Due Process in Commitment Proceedings, 57 Nw. U.L. REV.
383 (1962) ; Leifer, The Competence of the Psychiatrist to Assist in the Determination of Incompetency: A Sceptical Inquiry into the Courtroom Functions of Psychiatrists, 14 SYRACUSE L. REV. 564 (1963) ; Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, On the
Justifications for Civil Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 75 (1968); Meyer &
Rheingold, Mental Capacity and Incompetency: A Psycho-Legal Problem, 118 AM.
J. PSYCHIATRY 827 (1962); Robson, Commitment and Release of the Mentally Ill
Under Criminal Law, 11 CRIM. L.Q. 186 (1969) ; Ross, Commitment of the Mentally II: Problems of Law and Policy, 57 MICH. L. REV. 945 (1959); Slovenko,
The Psychiatric Patient, Liberty and the Law, 13 U. KAN. L. REV. 59 (1964); Swartz,
Compulsory Legal Measures and the Concept of Mental Illness, 19 S.C.L. REV. 372
9 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 399
(1967); Szasz, Civil Liberties and the Mentally I11,
(1960); Weihofen, Hospitalizing the Mentally Ill, 50 MICH. L. REV. 837 (1952);
Zenoff, Civil Incompetency in the District of Columbia, 32 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
243 (1963) ; Comment, Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill: Due Process and Equal
Protection, 35 BROOKLYN L. REV. 187 (1969) ; Note, District of Columbia Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Act, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1062 (1965) ; Note, The New
York Mental Health Information Service: A New Approach to Hospitalization of the
Mentally Ill, 67 COLUM. L REV. 672 (1967) ; Comment, Hospitalization of the
Mentally Disabled in Pennsylvania: The Mental Health - Mental Retardation Act of
1966, 71 DICK. L. REV. 300 (1967); Comment, Compulsory Commitment: The
Rights of the Incarcerated Mentally Ill, 1969 DUKE L.J. 677; Comment, Involuntary
Commitment of the Mentally Ill in Pennsylvania, 5 DUQUESNE UNrV. L. REV. 487
(1967) ; Note, Comments on a Draft Act for the Hospitalization of the Mentally III,
19 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 512 (1951); Note, Adjudication of Insanity-Commitment Proceedings Without Prior Notice and Hearing is not a Denial of Due Process
Since Subsequent Statutory Hearing is Available, 57 HARV. L. REV. 847 (1962);
Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill in the District of Columbia, 13 How.
L.J. 303 (1967) ; Comment, Civil Commitment of the Mentally IIIin Nebraska. 48
NEB. L. REV. 255 (1968); Comment, The New Mental Health Codes; Safeguards
in Compulsory Commitment and Release, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 977 (1967); Comment, Analysis of Admission and Release Procedures at the Yankton State Hospital, 14 S.D.L. REV. 266 (1969) ; Note, Constitutionality of Nonjudicial Confinement, 3 STAN. L. REV. 109 (1950); Note, The Need for Reform in the California
Civil Commitment Procedure, 19 STAN. L. REV. 992 (1967); Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 822 (1967); Note, Due Process for
All - ConstitutionalStandards for Involuntary Civil Commitment and Release, 34 U.
CHI. L. REv. 633 (1966); Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 107 U. PA.
L. REV. 668 (1959) ; Note, The Nascent Right to Treatment, 53 VA. L. REV. 1134
(1967) ; Note, Equal Protection of the Laws- State Cannot Deprive an Individual
of Jury Review of Civil Commitment Decision or Judicial Determination of Dangerous Propensities Solely on the Ground That he is Presently Serving Penal Sentence,
12 VILL. L. REV. 178 (1966); Note, Analysis Legal and Medical Considerationsin
the Commitment of the Mentally II, 56 YALE L.J. 1178 (1947).
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The exploration of Colorado law and practice will consist of two parts: (1) An analysis of the statutes and cases
most relevant to considerations of due process in involuntary
commitment proceedings integrated with empirical observations and comparisons of the administration of the law in
Denver, Arapahoe, and Jefferson counties; and (2) Evaluations, criticisms, and recommendations based on the analysis
and observation.
I. THE OVERVIEW
Today problems of mental health have become among the
most serious facing the nation, and the legal process has become intimately involved with these problems. One-half of all
hospital patients in the United States today are mental patients.
The majority of these have been placed in institutions by the
operation of some compulsory legal process based on the state's
police power and on the doctrine of parens patriae.3 Yet, in
no other area of the law are the standards of due process so
nebulously defined.4 For instance, the most commonly required
elements of due process (in some states, the only ones) are
notice and hearing.' However, even the exact meaning of these
minimum requirements varies considerably. In some states
service of notice on a relative of the subject is sufficient
notice.' Under some statutes the attendance of the subject is
not required at the hearing.7 Some states, using a "confiscation of property" rationale, require no hearing before commitment,8 and a habeas corpus proceeding may be the only
means of challenging confinement.
One reason for the lack of uniformity in procedural standards governing the commitment process is that most procedural rights a commitment subject enjoys are not considered
to be constitutional rights but merely the results of the state's
beneficence expressed in the statutes. 9 The courts which have
3

Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 668 (1959).

4 See AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW

table
VIII-C at 239-45 (F. Lindman & D. McIntyre, Jr. 1961) [hereinafter cited as
AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION].In a more recent study sponsored by the American Bar
Foundation, the author compares commitment practices in California, Delaware, Missouri, and Pennsylvania. See R. ROCK, HOSPITALIZATION OF THE MENTALLY ILL
(1968).
5
Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Comment, The New Mental Health Code: Safeguards in Compulsory Commitment

and Release, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 977, 979 (1967).
9 See Prochuska v. Brinegar, 251 Iowa 834, 102 N.W.2d 870 (1960); State ex rel.
Hussman v. Hursh, 253 Minn. 578, 92 N.W.2d 673 (1958); Ex parte Higgins v.
Hoctor, 332 Mo. 1022, 62 S.W. 2d 410 (1933).
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reached this conclusion have relied on the "privilege" or "benefit" doctrine. Since the state, by providing treatment for an
individual, is really according him a benefit, rather than taking away a right, the due process standards, which are applicable in areas where the state may deprive a citizen of some
right, are lowered.1 °
Although some lower federal courts have held that the
subject of a civil commitment proceeding must be provided
the assistance of counsel as a matter of constitutional right,1"
the United States Supreme Court has not ruled on this question." Recently the Court sidestepped the issue of the nature
of due process in civil commitment proceedings by relying on
equal protection grounds to overrule a New York statute which
prescribed a different civil commitment procedure for prisoners
whose sentences were soon to expire from that applied to other
persons." The Court avoided any discussion of the question
of a commitment process subject's right to counsel as a matter
of procedural due process to which counsel for the petitioner
had devoted ten pages of his brief. 4
The existence of grave procedural problems is evident
from even a cursory survey of the relevant secondary literature.
In Chicago a Polish immigrant discovered a sum of money
missing from her apartment. Since the building janitor was
the only person other than her husband who had a key to the
apartment, she suspected him of taking the money and confronted him with an accusation of theft. The janitor telephoned
the police and, upon their arrival, stated that the woman and
her husband were insane. The police took the couple in handcuffs to the Cook County Mental Health Clinic. A "hearing"
was held. The immigrants had but a rudimentary knowledge
of English and were not provided with counsel. They were
pronounced mentally ill and committed to the Chicago State
Hospital. Bewildered, frightened, and confused by his sudden
inexplicable imprisonment, the husband, who had spent time
10 Note, Due Process for All - Constitutional Standards for Involuntary Civil Commitment and Release, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 633, 636-37 '(1967) (hereinafter cited as Due
Process for All].
11 Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968) ; cf. Dooling v. Overholser, 243
F.2d 825 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
12 In 1940, the Supreme Court dismissed as premature due process objections to the
discretionary procedural provisions of a Minnesota commitment statute which provided inter alia that the subject may be represented by counsel and that if the subject
were found indigent, the court "may appoint counsel to represent him," since the
law had yet to be applied to the petitioner. Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate
Court of Ramsey County, 309 U.S. 270 (1970).

13Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
14 12 VILL. L. REv. 178, 182 (1966).
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in a concentration camp during World War II, hanged himself during the sixth week of his confinement.' 5
Although wantonly extreme injustices such as this one
and authenticated cases of "railroading"' 6 may be comparatively rare, the relevant literature reveals a universal laxity in
establishing and maintaining adequate procedural safeguards
in the area of mental incompetency adjudication and involuntary commitment.
Even in the majority of adjudication and involuntary commitment cases, where presumably gross miscarriages of justice
do not occur, hundreds of thousands of individuals are yearly
subjected to a process which, at worst, is conducted with scant
regard for whatever legal requirements exist, and, at best,
constitutes, in its sloppy and perfunctory administration, a
serious affront to the dignity of those unfortunate persons
subjected to it.
In preparing his paper on the role of lawyers in the adjudication and commitment process, 7 Fred Cohen spent one
afternoon observing a typical Texas commitment hearing where,
under the provisions of the applicable statute, forty individuals
were committed for an indefinite period of time. The hearings
were held before a judge in a large room at the Austin State
Hospital. One local attorney had been appointed as guardian
ad litem to represent all of the individuals whose fates were
to be determined that afternoon. Two staff doctors at the state
hospital were sworn as witnesses as the hearing began. The
judge then called the name of the first subject. He did not
appear. The clerk of the court asked for his height, weight,
hair, and eye color. One of the doctors supplied this information. Referring to a file in front of him, the judge again gave
the name of the subject and recited the dates of the medical
examinations. He then asked the doctors: "Is it your opinion
that Mr. X is a mentally ill person and needs medical care and
treatment in a mental hospital for his own welfare and protection or the protection of others, and is mentally incompetent?"
Most of the other cases were disposed of in a similar
fashion as a parade of staff doctors filed in to perfunctorily
answer the same statutorily prescribed question. The attorney
remained mute and his principal activity appeared to consist
of a close scrutiny of each file to insure that notice require15 Kutner,

The Illusion of Due Process in Commitment Proceedings, 57 Nw. U.L. REV.
383, 383-84 (1962).
18 See Annot., 145 A.L.R. 711 (1943).
17 Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally Ill,
44
TEXAS L. REv. 424 (1966).
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ments had been observed. He also signed a jury trial waiver
form for each subject.18
Only two of the 40 subjects appeared in person at the
hearing. One of these was a woman who had written the guardian ad litem to protest her mental competency, but he had
made no attempt to contact her before the hearing. He did
proceed to briefly cross-examine the testifying doctors by asking them how long they had been practicing and if they were
absolutely sure of their diagnosis. The testimony of one physician revealed that he was substituting for a doctor who had
actually examined the woman and that his only direct contact
with her consisted of a short conversation before the hearing.
The other physician who testified stated that the woman was
making progress and a furlough was imminent. The attorney
spoke with the patient about the prospect of a furlough and
she agreed that everything would be all right if she would be
home in 3 or 4 weeks. She then left the room. At the end of
an hour and a half the hearings were over. All 40 individuals
had been found mentally incompetent and committed. For his
services the guardian ad litem was paid ten dollars per case.1"
A similar procedure appears to be the general rule throughout the country. In San Francisco the required examination of
a subject for commitment by two doctors generally consists of
nothing more than a short conversation between the individual
and the doctors.2 0 Court reviews of medical commission decisions rarely exceed five minutes.2 ' Although public defenders
are provided for subjects desiring court reviews, they generally
become involved in a case only a half hour before a hearing and
22
rarely speak or take any other active role in the proceeding.
The general sloppiness of adjudication and commitment
procedure is particularly reprehensible in view of the fact that
serious consequences can result from the decisions made during
the process. In addition to a deprivation of liberty, a subject
of a commitment proceeding frequently suffers an automatic
loss of a great many personal and civil rights. These generally
include the right to vote,28 to hold office, 24 to contract, 25 to
181d, at 428-30.
19Id.
20 Note,

The Need for Reform in the California Civil Commitment Procedure, 19

STAN.

L. REV. 992, 995-96'(1967).
21 Id. at 996.
22

1d. at 997. See also Comment, Involuntary Commitment of the Mentally Ill in
Pennsylvania, 5 DUQUESNE L. REv. 487 (1967).
2 AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 4, table IX-D at 291-96.
24 Id.
2 Id. table IX-A at 275-79.
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make a will,26 to drive an automobile,27 to serve on a jury,
and to engage in certain occupations.2 9 In most cases he will
also be subject to subtle forms of economic and social discrimination when he seeks employment, attempts to establish credit,
or to join an exclusive club.
A major objection to present commitment procedures goes
to the heart of the "benefit" theory long used by courts to avoid
inquiry into the operation of the procedures. 30 A great many
individuals committed never receive any benefit in terms of
treatment or therapy, but instead are subjected to an extended
(perhaps even lifelong) period of custodial confinement dif31
fering little from prison incarceration.
Once committed, an individual in many states becomes,
for all practical purposes, bereft of legal remedies to challenge
the conditions of his confinement or to seek release. As in the
case of internal prison practices, the courts have traditionally
applied a "hands off" doctrine when the internal practices of
mental hospitals have been challenged. 2
In seeking release a patient may face virtually insurmounttable obstacles. The state bears the burden of proof in the
original commitment proceeding and this burden is usually
measured by the familiar civil "preponderance of the evidence"
standard. 3 However, in seeking release, the burden may fall
totally on the patient to establish by satisfaction of the same,
or an even higher, evidentiary standard that he is "sane" or
"mentally competent." To do this, he must overcome several
formidable hurdles. First of all, he may experience great difficulty in communicating with the outside world. This may be
true even though a statute gives mental patients the right to
freely communicate with people outside the institution including attorneys, judges, physicians, and friends. Since most patients are generally not in a position to enforce these rights,
many institutions severely limit the opportunities of their patients to speak with persons outside and extensively censor the
26 Id. table IX-B at 282-84.

27Id. table IX-D at 291-96.
28
Id.
29 Id. table IX-C at 285-90.
30 See text accompanying note 10 supra.
31 Due Process for All, supra note 10, at 639. See also Note, The Nascent Right to
Treatment, 53 VA. L. REv. 1134 (1967).
32 Due Process for All, supra note 10, at 639. See also Haynes v. Harris, 344 F.2d 463,
465 (8th Cir. 1965) ; Sutton v. Settle, 302 F.2d 286, 288 (8th Cir. 1962).
33 Due Process for All, supra note 10, at 654.
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patients' letters.34 Even if the patient is successful in reaching
the appropriate judicial authority to arrange a release hearing,
the cards are stacked against him. Many attorneys refuse or
hesitate to represent mental patients seeking release, even in
the uncommon situation where the patient can afford such
assistance. 5
Should the patient succeed in obtaining adequate representation, he still faces the problem of marshalling evidence
beneficial to his case. The state automatically has at its disposal a plethora of evidence to support its objection to release,
principally in the form of voluminous psychiatric reports and,
of course, the readily available testimony of staff psychiatrists,
psychologists, and social workers. Courts generally rely on expert testimony in cases of this kind. Unless the patient is extraordinarily wealthy, an extremely rare situation in involuntary commitment cases, he will not be able to obtain independent
experts to support his contention that he is ready for release
or to be adjudicated as "restored to reason.' 36
There are a great many factors which have led to the
present loose procedural practices in civil commitment and
incompetency proceedings, and which continue to militate
against any effective reform in the area.
A formidable difficulty is that of solving the major policy
question: What kind of person should be deprived of his liberty and, perhaps, of many of his personal and civil rights by
operation of a mental health law? Opinions on this question
vary widely among psychiatrists, psychologists, lawyers, legislators, and others involved with the process. Some maintain
that a person should be involuntarily committed only when
it is clear that he constitutes a clear danger to others.3 7 However, many state statutes take the other extreme and grant the
power to order confinement and treatment whenever such a
course of action would "help the individual" or be in "his
best interest."13 8 The statutory provisions defining the types
of individuals who may be committed take positions at every
point on this spectrum, but the majority are vaguely worded,
neither precisely defining the type of illness nor the type of
341d. at 655. See also AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 4, at 142-45. The
authors present, in tabular fashion, various state statutes regarding correspondence
and visitation. Id. table V-A at 158-60.
35 AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 4, at 129.
36 Due process for All, supra note 10, at 655.
3

7 T. SZASZ, LAW, LIBERTY, AND PSYCHIATRY 233-34 (1963).

38

AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION,

ch. 91

supra note 4, table 11-B at

, § 1-8 (Smith-Hurd 1966).

49-51.

See

ILL. ANN. STAT.
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behavior which could subject an individual to confinement
under the law. 9
Purposely or coincidentally this statutory vagueness has
contributed to use of these statutes as a catch-all to handle a
wide variety of social problems. These statutes are frequently
used to provide a means of caring for elderly persons without
families or whose families are unable to care for them. Further,
in many states, including Colorado, an order of adjudication
is generally the only practical way to set up a conservatorship
or guardianship for an aged individual who is no longer able
to adequately manage his property.40 Individuals with alcohol
problems, drug addicts, and even epileptics are frequently institutionalized under this procedure. 4 ' Persons who somehow
don't quite "fit in" are apt to become involved in the process.
The statute of one state even specifies potential nonconformity
to the established laws, ordinances, conventions, and morals
as one basis for commitment,4 2 and, in the actual practice of
all states, a person who has become a problem for his family
or a pest to his neighbors stands a chance of becoming the
subject of a commitment proceeding. Up until a few years ago
the commitment procedure was frequently used in some Colorado counties to place rebellious teenagers who had become
management problems for their parents in the state hospital
43
at Pueblo.
In addition to offering vague definitions of the types of
individuals who can be subject to commitment and/or adjudication, the statutes, whose provisions again differ widely from
state to state, are often ambiguous or even silent on such basic
procedural matters as: (1) notice, 4 4 (2) attendance of the
subject, 45 (3) procedure for the conduct of the hearing, 40 and
(4) place of hearing. 47 Even in those states where the right
to counsel is unequivocally recognized, the statutes generally
do not delineate specifically the duties and responsibilities of
counsel.4 8
39

4, at 17-18.
d. table II-A at 44-48. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-1(b) (1963).
41 AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 4, table II-A at 44-48.
42
MAss. ANN.LAWS ch. 123 § 1 (1957).

40

AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note

43This information was conveyed to the author by an official of the Jefferson County
District Court clerk's office.
4AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 4, table II-D at 63-64.
45
Id. table II-E at 65.
4Id. table I-C at 56-59.

47 Id.
4 Cohen, supra note 17, at 441.
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The formulation of comprehensive, clearly articulated
statutes embodying essential procedural safeguards would not
by itself solve the problems in this area. In those states which
have enacted model acts, whose provisions on their face seem
fully adequate to protect the rights of those subject to their
operation, the law is often ignored or diluted by those persons
charged with their administration, partly because of a lack of
the financial and human resources necessary to achieve full
compliance and, in many cases, partly because the professionals
closely involved with the commitment and adjudication process
disagree with the legal requirements and purposely deviate
from them. Thus, a statute may provide for a "full and fair
hearing," but in practice a hearing will consist of cursory examination rarely exceeding ten minutes duration, frequently
at a time when the subject is under sedation. The law may
provide that a subject shall be informed of his statutory right
49
to counsel, but in practice this may not be done.
A serious policy conflict over what constitutes proper procedure for civil commitment and incompetence adjudication
has also slowed the pace of procedural reform. This conflict
involves a division between what can be characterized as a
"therapeutic" approach versus a strict "safeguard of rights"
viewpoint. The most outspoken proponent of this latter position is Dr. Thomas Szsaz. Taking a highly skeptical view,
shared by some of his colleagues,5 of the ability of psychiatry
to properly deal with the issues presented in commitment and
adjudication proceedings, he maintains that because of the
serious consequences which can result from an adjudication
or commitment hearing, the subject of such a proceeding should
enjoy virtually all of the formal procedural safeguards, including right to counsel and jury trial, which a suspect in a criminal
case is guaranteed."
Advocates of the "therapeutic" viewpoint insist that procedural requirements should never be rigid and should, in every
case, be subordinated to a consideration of what would be most
conducive to the treatment of the commitment subject. This
would necessarily be a determination only the treating doctor
could make. Thus, under this view, if the doctor felt that compelling the subject's attendance at the commitment or adjudi49

Kutner, supra note 15, at 385.
50 Leifer, The Competence of the Psychiatrist to Assist in the Determination of Incompetency: A Skeptical inquiry into the Courtroom Functions of Psychiatrists, 14
SYRAcusE L. REV. 564 (1963).

51T. SzAsz, supra note 37, at 69 § 244.
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cation hearing or even notifying him of such a hearing would
be harmful to him, then these normal procedural requisites
52
should not be required.
Although most lawyers and doctors involved with these
problems would probably favor some intermediate approach,
such a solution has not yet been reached and probably will not
be realized until the legal profession, as a whole, becomes
seriously concerned and involved with the process. Luis Kutner
suggests one possible compromise solution. He maintains that
jury trials should not be part of the commitment and adjudication process, both because they place the subject under great
stress and are thus not therapeutically helpful, and because a
jury does not possess the competence to deal with the complex
issues involved in such proceedings. For therapeutic reasons
all similarities between a commitment or adjudication proceeding and a criminal trial should be eliminated in order to avoid
compounding the feelings of persecution a subject may already
have developed. Kutner recommends an informal, basically
non-adversarial hearing at which the subject is represented by
counsel and during which all of the participants are actively
seeking to arrive at the best possible solution for the subject's
problems. The hearing should be conducted before an impartial
medical panel and the subject should have the opportunity to
be examined by an independent expert whose testimony would
always be seriously considered. He also insists that the attendance of the subject, uncontrolled by sedation, as well as adequate notice of the hearing to the subject and his counsel, are
minimum, indispensable due process requirements.5"
The general failure of lawyers to contribute meaningfully
to the commitment process has also stymied reform in this
area. There are several reasons why attorneys have not played
a stronger, more influential role in the process. First of all, the
whole format and atmosphere of the commitment proceeding is
strange to them. Most states define the commitment process
as a totally unique type of proceeding. It is considered to be
neither a criminal nor civil action. 4 Thus, unless the attorney
finds an opportunity to use the jury trial provision of a commitment law (a rare occurrence), his experience in the adver52 Perhaps the most articulate spokesman for this point of view is Dr. Winfred Over-

53
5

holser, who believes the problems raised by such people as Szasz and Kutner have
been grossly exaggerated. See OVERHOLSER, TIE PSYCHIATRIST AND THE LAW 73-100
(1953). See also Note, Analysis of Legal and Medical Considerationsin Commitment
of the Mentally Ill, 56 YALE L.J. 1178 (1947).
Kutner, supra note 15, at 392-99.

4 See note 114 infra.
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sarial process which characterizes most of our legal system will
be of little aid to him in determining how to play his role in
the commitment process.5 5 As previously mentioned, statutes
rarely define the role of counsel in any detail, and the cases
have not filled this void. " ' Furthermore, the attorney in a
commitment or adjudication proceeding does not have tradition
to rely on as does, for example, the criminal lawyer. There is
no specific Canons of Ethics provision to which to refer for
guidance, and the organized bar has done little to define a
role for counsel in mental health situations. Finally, most law
schools do not provide any professional training to equip the
attorney for his role in the process. 57 As a result, the attorney
in a commitment or adjudication case often lacks a clear idea
of the identity of his client, the loyalty owed his client, the
goals desired by and desirable for his client, and what consti58
tutes success in the area.
Equally important as a factor limiting the effectiveness
of counsel in the commitment process is the low rate of compensation paid for their services. Most commitment subjects
who are represented have court-appointed counsel who receive
a set fee of between ten and twenty-five dollars per case. Although this rate of compensation may seem adequate, or even
exorbitant, for the job attorneys are presently performing in
the process, it obviously does not constitute a sufficient incentive for an attorney to invest the time necessary for a thorough
preparation of each case.
A serious lack of financial and human resources obviously
pervades the whole mental health field. The adjudication and
commitment processes suffer substantially from this deficiency.
In fact, many of the defects noted so far, such as the predominance of perfunctory hearings and examinations, the ineffectiveness of counsel, and the general inability of a commitment
subject to receive the benefit of an independent expert's services and testimony, can be traced to the failure of legislatures
to allocate a sufficient amount of money to insure a fair and
humane commitment process.
II. COLORADo LAW AND PRACTICE

This section consists of a description and analysis of the
Colorado statutes and cases dealing with the compulsory hosCohen, supra note 17, at 446.
Id. at 424.
57 Id. at 441.
58 Id. at 447.
5

56
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pitalization and commitment of the mentally ill, integrated
with a series of empirical observations of the actual everyday
administration of these laws in the Denver metropolitan area.
The purpose of this undertaking was threefold: (1) to attempt
a comparison between the formal law- as set forth in the
statutes and court opinions - and the law as it is administered
in day-to-day practice; (2) to attempt to gain an insight into
and evaluate the standards of "due process" inherent in the
practices under the present formal law with a view to suggesting changes and improvements in the present commitment and
adjudication procedures; and (3) to attempt to provide the
practicing attorney with a basic rudimentary description of the
present commitment and adjudication procedures in Colorado
and their administration.
Although the empirical portions of this paper are based
upon relatively few random observations of a continually ongoing process gathered over a comparatively short period of
time (February, March, and April, 1969), I have been assured
by those involved with the process for several years that the
events I have witnessed are typical of what has happened and
continues to happen every day in the administration of Colorado's present commitment laws.59
A. The Compulsory Hospitalization, Commitment, and
Adjudication Procedures
There are basically four ways in which an individual may
be confined under the mental health statutes: (1) by voluntarily entering any hospital, "° (2) pursuant to the emergency
procedure, 1 (3) pursuant to the short term involuntarly hospitalization procedure, 2 and (4) pursuant to the indefinite
term involuntary commitment procedure."
59 My observations focused on aspects of the involuntary commitment and hospitaliza-

tion process in Denver, Arapahoe and Jefferson counties. In each of the counties, I
received the willing cooperation of the judges, the court clerks, and their staffs. They
assisted in arranging to view court files, interviews of petitioners seeking to have
someone hospitalized or adjudicated, medical commission hearings, and court reviews
of hospitalization orders. In addition they provided insights into the process which
could never have been obtained from observation alone. At no time was it felt that
anyone was attempting to conceal anything or to misrepresent in any way the true
operation of the process. Thus, any criticisms, express or implied, of the current
administration of the laws of involuntary commitment are not meant to reflect on
the integrity of those charged with administering the law, nor are they meant to
imply that these persons are not seeking conscientiously to perform a thorough job in
what is frequently a difficult and frustrating area, These criticisms simply reflect
the honest opinions of a newcomer to the process, based on approximately three
months observation.
60
CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-2(3)(d) (Supp. 1965).
61
1d. § 71-1-3(2) (Supp. 1965).
62 Id. § 71-1-4 (1963), as amended (Supp. 1969).
63
Id. § 71-1-5(3) (Supp. 1965), as amended (Supp. 1969).
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B. Five Day "Hold" Under Voluntary Hospitalization Statute
It seems contradictory that an individual can at one and
the same time be a voluntary and an involuntary hospital patient. The voluntary hospitalization statute, however, allows
any hospital to detain a voluntarily admitted patient who is
mentally ill, mentally deficient, or displays symptoms of mental
ilness or mental deficiency. Such detention comprises a period
of five days after a required written request for release has
been filed with the administrative office of the hospital by
the patient himself, his legal guardian, parent, spouse, or adult
next of kin. This, could, in practice, exceed five days, since
Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays are exempted from the com64
putation of days.
C. The Emergency Detention Procedure
The emergency procedure permits any sheriff or peace
officer to take into protective custody and place in a suitable
place of confinement any individual whom the sheriff or officer
believes, in good faith, to be mentally ill or mentally deficient6"

and apt to injure or endanger himself or others if allowed to
remain at liberty.66 Immediately after taking such a person
into custody, the detaining officer is required to file a statement with the district or probate court of the county where
the person is taken into custody setting forth the circumstances
of the detention and giving the reasons for his belief about
641d. § 71-1-2(3)(a) (1963).
65

6

The terms "mentally ill" and "mentally deficient" recur throughout chapter 71 of
the Colorado statutes and are crucial terms in the involuntary commitment statute,
CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-5 (1963). They are defined in section 1:
(b) "Mentally ill person" shall mean a person afflicted with disease,
infirmity, old age, or disorder, which impairs his mental or emotional
functions to a degree sufficient to require protection, supervision, treatment,
or confinement, for his own welfare or for the welfare or safety of others,
or who, by reason thereof, lacks sufficient control, judgment, and discretion
to manage his own property or affairs. The terms, "insane person," "mental
incompetent" or "lunatic," shall hereafter be deemed to mean and be
included within the words, "mentally ill person," within the present statutes
of the state of Colorado, unless context otherwise indicates a mentally
deficient person.
(c) "Mentally deficient person" shall mean a person whose intellectual
functions have been deficient since birth or whose intellectual development
has been arrested or impaired by disease, or physical injury to such an
extent that he lacks sufficient control, judgment, and discretion to manage
his property or affairs, or who by reason of this deficiency, for his own
welfare, or the welfare or safety of others, requires protection, supervision,
guidance, training, control, or care. The terms, "idiot," "feebleminded
person," "mental incompetent," or "weak-minded person," shall hereafter
be deemed to mean and be included within the words "mentally deficient
person," within the present statutes of the state of Colorado, unless the
context otherwise indicates a mentally ill person.
COLO. REV.STAT. ANN. § 71-1-1(b) & (c) (1963).
Id. § 71-1-3(1) (1963).
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the individual's condition.6" Failure to file a timely and proper
report has formed the basis for civil liability for false arrest
in at least one case. 68
Within 24 hours (excluding Saturdays, Sundays and legal
holidays) after the filing of the report, the court is required
to issue a written order either discharging the individual, confining him for observation, diagnosis, or treatment in accordance with the terms of the short term involuntary hospitalization statute, or referring the matter to a medical commission
as though a petition had been filed under the indefinite term
involuntary commitment and adjudication statute.6 0
D. Short Term Involuntary Hospitalization
1. In General
The short term hospitalization statute allows the court to
order an individual to be confined for observation, diagnosis,
and treatment of mental illness for three months, 0 a period
which can be extended by the court for an additional three
months whenever it appears from the written statements of the
attending physician or the director of the hospital that the
original three month period is insufficient to accomplish the
purposes of the hospitalization. 7 Notice of such extension must
be given the respondent and his guardian ad litem.72 The total
period of confinement cannot exceed six months from the date
of the original hospitalization order. 3
2. Initiation of Proceeding by Petition, Physician's State-

ment and District Attorney's Statement of Probable
Cause
Any reputable person may institute a short term hospitalization proceeding against another individual, who under the
terms of the statute is called the "respondent." 7 He can do
so by submitting a verified petition to the court of jurisdiction
in the county where the respondent resides or is physically
present, alleging that it would be in the respondent's best interest to be hospitalized for the previously mentioned statu67

Id. § 71-1-3(2)

(1963).

68 Denver Post, Oct. 26, 1967, at 32, col. 1.
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torily prescribed purposes. The petition must be accompanied
by a statement from a licensed physician also alleging that
such observation, diagnosis, and treatment would be in the
best interest of the respondent, giving the doctor's reasons
for the allegation and also giving the dates when he has
examined the respondent. Finally, a statement of probable
cause for the issuance of an order of hospitalization must be
supplied by the district attorney or, in counties exceeding three
hundred thousand in population, by the county attorney or
by their assistants.75
In practice, the physician's letter and the statement of
probable cause required by this statute serve an extremely perfunctory purpose. In Denver, petitions and physicians' letters
generally receive careful scrutiny by either of two veteran city
attorneys assigned to the mental health division of the city
attorney's office to insure that the statutorily prescribed contents are present. If these contents are present, the attorneys
believe that the requirement of "probable cause" is satisfied.
They do not appear to conduct a more extensive investigation,
such as telephoning the physician submitting the letter before
issuing a statement of probable cause - one stated reason being
that they are not psychiatrists, and therefore should concern
themselves only with the statutory requirements.
In Arapahoe and Jefferson Counties, the district attorney's
offices, perhaps because of a lack of sufficient personnel and
resources, pay scant attention to mental health matters. District
attorneys seldom see a petition or physician's statement, but
the district attorney's offices routinely issue a statement of
probable cause on the advice of the clerks who handle mental
health matters in the district court clerk's offices. In Jefferson
County, the clerk further facilitates and standardizes the prehospitalization process by issuing uniform printed statement
forms to physicians.
3. Five Day Waiver of Physician's Statement and
Statement of Probable Cause
If the court receives a satisfactory showing that emergency circumstances make it essential for the respondent to
be immediately hospitalized and that it would be unsafe or
dangerous for the respondent himself or others if he were
to remain at large, the court is empowered to waive the requirement of a physician's and district attorney's statement
75

1d. § 71-1-4(1) (Supp. 1965).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 46

for a period not exceeding five days after the issuance of the
order of hospitalization. 6
4. Alternative Ways of Instituting a Short Term
Proceeding
a. By a hospitaladministratorproceeding under either
short term or long term statute
Short term hospitalization proceeding may be initiated by
the officer or attending physician of a hospital in the case of
a voluntarily admitted patient whose release would, in the
written opinion of the doctor or administrator, be unsafe or
dangerous for himself or others. This written opinion must be
submitted to the court of jurisdiction in the county where the
hospital is located within five days (Saturdays, Sundays and
holidays exluded) after the patient files a written request for
release with the administrative office of the hospital. Upon
receiving such an opinion the court may proceed either under
the provisions of the short term hospitalization statute or the
77
indefinite term involuntary commitment statute.
b. By a medical commission
Short term hospitalization proceedings may also be commenced by a medical commission. The commission, which is
entrusted with the responsibility of deciding the merits of petitions filed under the involuntary commitment statute, is empowered to recommend short term hospitalization as one of
its three options (the others are discharge or adjudication),
when considering the case of a respondent in an involuntary
commitment proceeding. 8
I learned of only one medical commission hearing which
exercised this option. In this case, the recommendation of short
term hospitalization appeared to be the result of a compromise
between the commission and the legal aid attorney representing the respondent.
Describing the hearing an hour later at his office, the
legal aid attorney stated that the respondent's small three room
house in which the hearing was held was continuously filled
with cacophony as a half dozen conversations raged simultaneously. Finally, after everyone had strolled through the
rooms cluttered with books and knic-knacs, the member of
the commission who was a psychiatrist announced, "He's obvi76Id.
77d. § 71-1-4(2) and § 71-1-2(3)(d) (Supp. 1965).
78
d. § 71-1-4(4) and § 71-1-7(3) (Supp. 1965).
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ously paranoic." The aged doctor then turned to the respondent's attorney and asked, "What will you do if we adjudicate
[the respondent]?"

"We'll probably demand a jury trial."
"O.K., well, in that case we'll recommend short term
hospitalization." The hearing then ended.
c. By a court pursuant to emergency detention
procedure provisions and on its own motion.
As previously mentioned, the court can institute a short
term hospitalization proceeding as one of its three options in
dealing with a person held pursuant to the emergency detention statute.79 Also, although the statutes do not specifically
provide for such a procedure, the Denver Probate Court and
the District Court for Arapahoe County will on occasion issue
a short term hospitalization order on motion of the court when
a satisfactory showing is made that it would be in the best interest of a given person to be hospitalized, but for some reason
a petitioner and a physician to furnish the required statement
are unavailable. Hospitalization orders on the court's own motion are frequently issued at the request of the welfare department or some other public agency.
5. Guardian Ad Litem and His Duties
The court is required to appoint an attorney to serve as
guardian ad litem for the respondent whenever a request for
an order of short term hospitalization is filed. The guardian
ad litem must be furnished with a copy of the hospitalization
order within two days after its entry. He is charged with three
duties: (1) to make such investigation as may be necessary to
protect the interests of the respondent; (2) to make certain
that the respondent is advised of his right to a hearing either
by a medical commission or by a court; and (3) to report the
results of his investigation to the court as soon as possible,
but no later than five days after the entry of the hospitalization order, unless the court extends the time.8 °
Guardians ad litem in short term hospitalization cases are
theoretically chosen from the entire rosters of the respective
county bar associations. In practice, the attorneys appointed
are generally those who have informed the court clerks of their
desire to receive court appointments. These are frequently
lawyers recently admitted to practice.
79

id.§ 71-1-4(7)

(Supp. 1965).

8OId. § 71-1-4(3). A reasonable extension of time is generally granted as a matter of
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In Denver, guardians ad litem in short term hospitalization cases are paid a flat fee of twenty-five dollars per case,
plus twenty-five dollars per hour for additional work performed
of an extraordinary nature, as reflected in the case record.
If a court review is requested, the attorney appointed as
guardian ad litem in the short term hospitalization may represent the respondent in court. If review by a medical commission is requested, however, the guardian ad litem appointed
to serve with the medical commission assigned to conduct the
review represents the respondent. Medical commissions frequently review "hold and treat" orders"1 as part of a normal
afternoon caseload.
In Jefferson County I was permitted to view some representative files in both short term hospitalization and involuntary commitment cases. The required forms and reports were
all present and were neatly filled in.
The reports of the guardians ad litem in short term hospitalization cases were particularly interesting. Most of these
were exceedingly brief statements simply showing that the
minimum statutory duties had been performed. They indicated
that the attorney had spoken with the respondent, checked for
proper service of process, and had advised the respondent of
his right to a hearing. A few such reports indicated that the
respondent contemplated a request for a hearing. The files did
not indicate whether a hearing had ever subsequently been held.
In only a few cases had a guardian ad litem filed a demand for a court review on behalf of a respondent. A young
attorney who had served several times as a guardian ad litern
in short term hospitalization cases informed me that most attorneys he knew felt that the guardian ad litem fee did not justify
going beyond the bare statutory requirements.
A court clerk informed me that if a guardian ad litem did
perform work beyond the minimum specified duties, he could
petition the court for additional compensation. The attorney
stated, however, that he had never been informed of this practice by anyone in the court, and that he believed that the mental
health division and the court itself generally looked with disfavor on an attorney who worked beyond the statutory requirements minimum. The attorney's viewpoint was confirmed by
81 The hospitalization order entered pursuant to the provisions of the short tern involuntary hospitalization statute is referred to by those professionally involved with the
process as a "hold and treat" order.
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the court clerk who stated that judges for whom she had served
had generally considered the simple compliance with the statutory duties, not extensive investigation and frequent requests
for hearings, to be the proper role of the guardian ad liten.
6. Place of Hospitalization
If the requirements for short term involuntary hospitalization are met, 82 the court is empowered to issue an order committing the respondent to the department of institutions for
placement in a state institution, or an order committing him
to some other hospital, including a federal hospital, if he is
administratively certified to be eligible by an appropriate federal agency for a period of three months. As previously mentioned, this time period can, under appropriate circumstances,
be extended for an additional three month period. The department of institutions is required to inform the court of the
specific institution to which respondents committed to its charge
shall be sent.13 Fort Logan Mental Health Center is the facility
to which all respondents, except those requiring maximum
security conditions, in Denver, Arapahoe and Jefferson Counties
are sent.
7. Hospitalization Order
The hospitalization order (referred to as a "hold and
treat" order by those professionally involved with the process),
must direct the sheriff or some responsible person to deliver
the respondent to the designated hospital. The person taking
the respondent to the hospital must personally serve a copy of
the order on the respondent.8 4 The respondent must also be
given a written notice of his right to a hearing concerning his
hospitalization before a medical commission or the court. In
case the respondent is already a patient in the hospital of confinement specified in the order, the court must appoint an
appropriate person to serve the order and notice of the right
to hearing on the respondent within two days after the issuance
of the order. Whoever serves the order and notice is required
to make a written return to the court that the duties have been
performed.85
For the requirements for short term involuntary hospitalization, see text accompanying
notes 74 and 75 supra. Upon a "satisfactory showing" that it would be in the
respondent's best interest to be confined in an institution, the court is empowered
to issue the hospitalization order. COMO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-4(1 ) (Supp. 1965).
83
1d. § 71-1-4(4) (Supp. 1965).
-Id. § 71-1-4(5) (Supp. 1965).
82
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8. Review of Hospitalization Order by Court or Medical
Commission
The respondent or his guardian ad litern may file a written
request for review of the hospitalization order either by a
medical commission or by the court. They may also in like
manner request that the observation and treatment be conducted
on an outpatient basis or in a nursing home. If the hospitalization order was made upon the recommendation of a medical
commission, review of this order must be by the court. If a
court review is requested or mandatory, the court must provide
a hearing within ten days of the request, and must give notice
of the time and place of the hearing to the respondent, the
guardian ad litem and the district attorney. At the conclusion
of the hearing the court may exercise any of the following
options: (1) enter or confirm a hospitalization order; (2) discharge the respondent; (3) refer the matter to a medical commission; or (4) enter any other suitable order.8 6
There appears to be substantial constitutional objections
to the third alternative. In asking for a court review of his
hospitalization order, the respondent wants to test the validity
of the hospitalization order and the validity of his confinement
under the order. He is certainly not seeking to have himself
adjudicated mentally incompetent and committed for an indefinite term. By requesting a court review, the respondent
does in fact subject himself to the possibility of this latter fate
under the provisions of the statute allowing the court to refer
the matter to a medical commission. A medical commission
seems to have the statutorily prescribed power to recommend
adjudication and commitment for an indefinite term.8 7 The
court appears to be bound to follow medical commission recommendations.s" The option is thus violative of due process in
that a greater deprivation can ultimately result from review
than from the original hospitalization order itself. This makes a
review an extremely hazardous venture for a respondent under
a "hold and treat" order.
Two court hearings reviewing short term hospitalization
orders were observed-one in Arapahoe, the other in Jefferson County. Both hearings were conducted in a highly orderly
86

Id. § 71-1-4(6) (Supp. 1965).

87 Id.

§ 71-1-7(3)

(Supp. 1965). The Denver Probate Court, however, takes the posi-

tion that the medical commission does not have the power to adjudicate. See text,
p. 551 infra.
88Id. § 71-1-11(1) (Supp. 1965). The relevant section of the statute is quoted in note
130 infra.
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and dignified manner, and the judges showed genuine concern
and displayed great courtesy toward the respondents.
Still, I could not escape the feeling that the hearings (in
essence the laws) were weighted against the respondents from
the start - that they stood virtually no chance of being released from the hospitalization orders and that the hearings
offered them simply a forum in which to "speak out" without
any real possibility of gaining the relief requested.
One facet of the hearings, in particular, contributed to
this feeling. In both hearings, the psychiatrists appearing on
behalf of Fort Logan testified that neither of the respondents
constituted a physical danger either to others or to themselves.
Of course, the short term hospitalization statute does not require a showing that the respondent present such a danger
but merely requires that it be "in the best interest" of the respondent to be hospitalized. But who should be the judge of
"best interest?" What criteria should be followed in determining the nature of a respondent's "best interest?"
In both hearings, it was clear that the judges decided these
questions by relying almost entirely on the testimony of the
psychiatrists in reaching their decisions. The Jefferson County
Judge made this fact explicit in rendering his decision: "I have
now heard all the testimony and am required to render a decision. Although not legally bound to do so, as a practical matter, I must follow the opinion of the experts in cases like this.
The hospitalization order will be continued." Psychiatrists testifying in hearings reviewing hospitalization orders often represent, whether directly or indirectly, Fort Logan or some other
receiving institution. If they did not favor continuance of hospitalization, they wouldn't appear. They would instead petition
the court to release the respondent. This procedure affords the
respondent little opportunity to procure independent psychiatric examination and testimony on his behalf.
9. Attending Physician's Report
Upon the motion of the guardian ad litem the court must
issue an order requiring the doctor attending the respondent
to submit a report to the court within ten days thereafter detailing the results of his examination to that date. The court
may also order this on its own motion. Upon receipt of such
a report the court has three options: (1) to continue the original hospitalization; (2) to discharge the respondent, if the
examining doctor so recommends; or (3) to institute involun-
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tary commitment proceedings pursuant to the involuntary commitment statute.8 9
10. Release from Hospitalization
Whenever the court receives a satisfactory showing (such
as by medical reports) that the respondent has received maximum benefit from treatment, that he is mentally competent,
and that it would be in his best interest to be released, the
court is required to immediately enter an order releasing him
from hospitalization. The court clerk must notify the guardian
ad litem of this order."0 The provision for this statute requiring "mental competency" as a condition for release from a
short term hospitalization order is curious, since "mental incompetency" is not required for short term involuntary hospitalization. In Colorado "mental incompetency" means that a
medical commission has recommended that an individual be
adjudicated "mentally ill" or "mentally deficient" and that
the court has done so.9 1 Without such an adjudication, no presumption of "mental incompetency" can arise9 2 and consequently a respondent in a short term hospitalization proceeding would be presumed to be "mentally competent" at every
stage of such a proceeding. Thus, the provision appears to be
devoid of meaning.
11. Records
Records in short term proceedings must be maintained
separately by the court clerk. If the respondent is released from
the hospitalization order, his file must be sealed and his name
omitted from the indices of the court until the court orders it
opened upon a showing of good cause or until the respondent
has been adjudicated pursuant to the involuntary commitment
statute. If a petition is filed under the latter statute, the file
89 Id. § 71-1-4(7) (Supp. 1965).
90
1d. § 71-1-4(10) (Supp. 1965).
91

See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-1(b) (1963); § 71-1-5 (Supp. 1965); § 71-1-7
(Supp. 1965); § 71-1-11 (1963), as amended (Supp. 1965); § 71-1-23 (1963),
as amended (Supp. 1965); and § 153-1-1(7) (1963). The precise meaning of

mental incompetency is somewhat unclear. Section 71-1-23(1) seems to imply that
an individual can only be considered to be a mental incompetent if he has been
adjudicated mentally ill or mentally deficient. Section 153-1-1(7), part of the
definitional section in the chapter and article dealing with wills, estates, and heirship,
defines a mental incompetent in the following manner:
"Mental incompetent," "incompetent person," "incompetent," or "mentally
ill person" denotes a person who has been adjudicated mentally ill or
mentally deficient, or who by the laws of this state is designated as a
lunatic, insane person, incompetent, mental incompetent, incapable or feebleminded, or who has been found in an appropriate proceeding to be unable
or unfit to manage his own property.
92
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may be opened and made part of the long term commitment
case, and the respondent's name may be indexed. 3
E. Involuntary Civil Commitment for an Indefinite Term

The involuntary commitment process (often referred to
by those involved with it as "long term adjudication" as opposed to the short term hospitalization's informal label "hold
and treat") presents the most serious consequences for a respondent. Under the relevant statutory provisions he may be
confined (or at a minimum, subjected to confinement) for an
indefinite, perhaps interminable, period of time and can lose
several rights under the law which he would otherwise enjoy. 4
1. Initiation of Proceeding by Petition and Physician's
Statement
Any reputable person can institute involuntary commitment proceedings by filing with the court of jurisdiction a
verified petition alleging that any person, then physically present in the county, is mentally ill or deficient, and requesting
that a hearing be held before a medical commission. This petition must be accompanied by a statement from a licensed physician which says that the respondent is mentally ill or mentally
deficient, states whether the physician has examined the respondent, and gives the date of any examination. 5
2. Custody of Respondent Pending Medical Commission
Hearing
Upon receipt of the petition and physician's statement, the
court may issue an order directing any person to take the respondent into custody, pending determination of his mental
condition by the commission. The court can also issue such an
order on its own motion if it has good cause to believe that
a person is mentally ill or deficient.9 " Orders on the court's
own motion are frequently entered in response to requests by
the welfare department or some other public agency.

Pending determination of a respondent's mental condition,
the court must place him in the custody of some relative or
other proper person, or the department of institutions for placement in a state hospital or some hospital or suitable place not
under the supervision of the department of institutions. No
93ld. § 71-1-4(12) (Supp. 1965).
94
See Id.§ 71-1-11(1) & (2) (Supp. 1965). See also Appendix.
951d. § 71-1-5(1) (Supp. 1965).

96 Id.
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person held pursuant to an involuntary commitment proceeding may be confined in a jail unless a satisfactory showing is
made that he is violent and dangerous to himself or others, or
that there is no other adequate place of custody in the county. 7
3. Jurisdiction and Venue
Normally the court in which the petition is filed has jurisdiction over the proceeding and appoints the medical commission. The court of original jurisdiction, however, may order
the matter to be transferred to a court of another jurisdiction.
If the respondent or his guardian ad litem files a written petition any time before the first hearing of the medical commission, requesting that the hearing be held in the county of
respondent's residence, the court is required to enter an order
transferring the case to the county of the respondent's residence.
In such a case, the court must enter a further order returning
the respondent to his county of residence for confinement in
a suitable place pending further proceedings. 8
4. Guardian Ad Litem
Whenever involuntary commitment proceedings are instituted, the court is required to appoint an attorney as guardian
ad litern for the respondent.9 A copy of the petition and any
order detaining the respondent pending inquiry by the medical
commission must be personally served upon the guardian ad
litem at least two days prior to any hearing before the medical
commission and within five days after issuance of the order."' 0
He also must be given at least two days notice of the time and
place of the first meeting of the medical commission. 10' Interpreting a prior statute containing a notice provision identical
to this present one, the Colorado Supreme Court held in the
case of Hultquist v. People that the giving of this notice was
mandatory and couldn't be waived by the guardian ad litem. 1 0 2
5. Duties of Guardian Ad Litem
The guardian ad litem is charged with two duties in an
involuntary commitment proceeding. He is required to attend
all meetings of the medical commission,10 3 and he is required
to file a written report with the court within five days after
97
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the medical commission files its report. The report must show
the occupation, citizenship and residence of the respondent, his
length of residence in Colorado, and his previous place of residence, if known. It must also give the petitioner's name and
address and state his relationship to the respondent. The names
of any witnesses examined at the hearing must also be included."' If the medical commission finds a respondent to be
mentally ill or deficient, the guardian ad litem must include
the following additional items of information in his report:
(1) an inventory of any real or personal property believed to be owned by the respondent;
(2) the respondent's social security number;
(3) a list of any social security or other benefits to which
the respondent is entitled;
(4) the names and addresses of the respondent's next of
kin, if known;
(5) a recommendation as to whether a conservator should
be appointed.
The court must forward a copy of this report to the hospital where the respondent may be confined. 1 5 In Huhquist,
the Colorado Supreme Court elaborated somewhat on the statutorily prescribed duties of the guardian ad litem by declaring
that the purpose of the two day notice was to enable the attorney to make an adequate investigation and preparation to protect the interests of the respondent at the medical commission
hearing.10 6
In Arapahoe and Jefferson Counties, guardians ad litem
for involuntary commitment proceedings, like those in short
term hospitalization cases, are selected from the entire roster
of the respective county bar associations. In Denver, however,
guardians ad litein for involuntary civil commitment proceedings are generally chosen from a list of only about six attorneys.
Most of these lawyers have been serving continuously in this
capacity for the past two decades or longer, and are sixty years
of age or older. They are paid ten dollars for each case and
are guaranteed fifty dollars for an afternoon's work regardless
of the number of cases.
6. Appointment of a Medical Commission
Whenever an involuntary commitment petition is filed,
the court is required to appoint a medical commission to deter104ld. § 71-1-8(2) (1963).
106 Id. § 71-1-8(3) (1963).
1o6 Hultquist v. People, 77 Colo. 310, 316, 236 P. 997, 999 (1925).
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mine whether the respondent is mentally ill or deficient. A
commission must be comprised of two medical doctors licensed
to practice medicine in Colorado. They are not required to be
residents of the county of appointment, but they cannot be
related to the respondent or petitioner, nor are they allowed
to have any financial interest in the outcome of the proceeding.1 °7 In Denver the judge of the court has generally been
making his appointments from the same panel of physicians
for the past two decades or longer. The panel from which
medical commissioners are appointed consists of about twelve
physicians most of whom are psychiatrists (there is one neurologist), and most range in age from about sixty-five to eighty.
In Jefferson County non-psychiatrists alone are chosen to
serve on medical commissions. A clerk in charge of mental
health proceedings stated that the psychiatrists in the county
are generally unwilling to serve, considering such service to be
an intolerably unremunerative interference with private practice. Thus, she had simply stopped asking psychiatrists to serve.
Until several months ago medical commissioners received fifteen dollars per case for their services. Now they receive twentyfive dollars per case. Rarely is more than one case considered
in a single day.
Medical commissioners in Arapahoe County are chosen
supposedly from the entire roster of the county medical association. The list, as a practical matter, has been narrowed to
about two dozen physicians, since a great many doctors have
repeatedly refused to serve as commissioners or otherwise indicated their lack of desire to serve. Few physicians, even of those
who consent to serve, are eager to serve, considering such service to be an intolerably unremunerative interference with private practice. Usually the deputy clerk attempts to obtain one
psychiatrist and one general practioner or specialist in some
other field for each commission. They are paid twenty-five
dollars per case for their services and rarely will see more than
one respondent on one day.
7. Notice of Medical Commission Hearing
Upon appointment of the commission the judge must immediately fix by written order a time and place for the first
hearing of the commission. Notice of this hearing must be personally served on the respondent at least five days (including
Saturdays, Sundays and holidays) before the hearing.' 0 8 The
107 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-6(1)
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commission hearings must be held in the county where the petition is filed unless the court orders the commission to sit at
some other place in the state.1 °9
Although no cases have arisen involving the notice requirements of the present hospitalization and commitment statutes,
in dealing with the predecessors to the current statutes, the court
has repeatedly reiterated the position that:
(1) The court receives its jurisdiction exclusively from the
statutory provisions;
(2) Since the statutes are in derogation of the common
law, the requirements of the statutes must be strictly
construed;
(3) The court exercises valid jurisdiction only when the
statutory requirements are strictly followed; otherwise
110
its orders are void.
Thus, an alteration of a court order by a sheriff so that
it showed a place of confinement and a time and place for the
first meeting of the medical commission different from those
specified in the order of the court was held to nullify a subsequent order of adjudication. 1 The failure to clearly prove
proper service of notice on the respondent has also resulted in
1 2
reversal of an order of adjudication.1
8. District Attorney to Conduct Proceedings
The law requires that all commitment proceedings be conducted by the district attorney or by the county attorney, if the
county's population exceeds 300,000, or by a qualified attorney
acting for these officials who is appointed for that purpose by
the court of jurisdiction. 1"' This provision would seem to encompass medical commission hearings. The Arapahoe County
District Court and District Attorney's office, however, apparently take the view that this provision does not apply to such
hearings. No representative from the district attorney's office
was present at the two medical commissions I attended in
Arapahoe County, and, according to an official who deals with
mental health matters in the district court clerk's office, the
court policy is not to require the presence of the district attor10 9 1d. § 71-1-6(3)

(1963).

11 See, e.g., Young v. Brofman, 139 Colo. 296, 338 P.2d 286 (1959) ; Rickey v. People,
129 Colo. 174, 267 P.2d 1021 (1954) ; Kendall v. People, 126 Colo. 573, 252 P.2d
91 (1952) ; Okerberg v. People, 119 Colo. 529, 205 P.2d 224 (1949).
Ill 1werks v. People, 120 Colo. 86, 273 P.2d 133 (1954). See also Barber v. People,
127 Colo. 90, 254 P.2d 431 (1953).
112Okerberg v. People, 119 Colo. 529, 205 P.2d 224 (1949).
113 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-9 (Supp. 1965).
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ney or his appointed representative at commission hearings.
9. Medical Commission Procedure
a. Hearing
The medical commission is empowered to administer oaths.
It is required to receive evidence, as well as any statements
offered by the respondent, his own attorney, or his guardian
ad litem. The commission may examine hospital and medical
reports and records. It may examine witnesses."1 At the request of the medical commission, the guardian ad liten, the
respondent's privately retained counsel, or the attorney acting
for the county, the court is required to issue subpoenas compelling in the presence of witnesses or the production of records
before the commission at its hearings."'
b. Report
The commission is required to make such investigation
and inquiry as it deems fit, and may adjourn the hearing to a
time and place certain. 1 Unless the court grants an extension
of time, the commission is required to file a verified report of
its findings, based upon the facts considered, with the court
within 48 hours after the conclusion of the hearing. These
findings are to be made in answer to the following questions:
(1) Is the respondent afflicted with a disease, infirmity,
old age, or disorder, which impairs his mental or
emotional functions to a degree sufficient to require
protection, supervision, treatment, or confinement for
his own welfare or the welfare or safety of others?
(2) Does the respondent, by reason of mental illness, lack
sufficient control, judgment and discretion to manage
his own property or affairs?
(3) Are the respondent's intellectual functions so deficient, arrested, or impaired by disease or physical
injury that he lacks sufficient control, judgment, and
discretion to manage his property or affairs?
(4) Are the respondent's intellectual functions so deficient, arrested, or impaired that for his own welfare,
114

1d. § 71-1-7(1) (1963). The Supreme Court of Colorado has stressed that a proceeding under the commitment laws is a special statutory proceeding neither criminal
nor civil in nature Kendall v. People, 126 Colo. 573, 252 P.2d 91 (1952) ; Hultquist
v. People, 77 Colo. 310, 236 P. 995 (1925). Because of their special nature, their
sole aim being to benefit the respondent, the court has held the testimonial privilege
statutes to be inapplicable to commitment proceedings. See Hawkyard v. People,
115 Colo. 35, 169 P.2d 178 (1946).
115
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-7(1) (1963).
116 Id.
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or the welfare or safety of others, he requires protection, supervision, guidance, training, control, or
care?' 1 7
Although not free from ambiguity, the first two questions
are generally interpreted by the attorneys for the counties and
the medical commissioners as referring to mental illness and
the last two as referring to mental deficiency. Thus, if a commission finds a respondent to be mentally ill, it will answer
one or, in most cases, both of the first two questions in the
affirmative and the last two in the negative. Some commissioners, apparently uninstructed in the distinction between the
two pairs of questions, answer all questions in the affirmative.
If any of the questions are answered affirmatively, the
commission report must also give the following information:
(1) name, age, sex, and nativity of the respondent; and (2)
names and addresses of his parents, spouse and children to the
extent these are ascertainable. The commission is further required to recommend a suitable place for commitment and can
recommend conditions applying to such commitment.1 18
In Denver and Jefferson Counties, I was allowed to view
a great number of medical commission reports filed over the
past several years. The standardized form reports were generally filled out in a perfunctory manner. The first two questions were generally answered "yes," and the last two, "no."
The diagnosis would generally be given in two or three words.
Generally, the space after the word "recommendations" was
left totally blank. In cases where some recommendation was
made, it consisted of a terse statement such as, "keep at nursing home."
c. Cases concerning medical commission procedure
The Colorado Supreme Court has directed no real scrutiny
at the functioning of a medical commission, and hence no judicial standards have evolved to expand on or to clarify the
vague statutory provisions regarding medical commission procedure. In a pair of cases arising under earlier statutes with
different provisions for medical commission findings, the court,
in dictum, criticized medical commission reports as being ambiguous and contradictory." 9
In the Kendall case, the court, after finding the report of
the medical commission to be contradictory, stated: "A finding
117Id. § 71-1-7(2) (1963).
118Id. § 71-1-7(3) (Supp. 1965).
119 Rickey v. People, 129 Colo. 174, 178, 267 P.2d 1021, 1024 (1954); Kendall v.
People, 126 Colo. 573, 577, 252 P.2d 91, 93 (1952).
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by the commission should be for the protection of the respondent as well as society, specific, and not be an all-inclusive
finding that could leave its stigma upon respondent throughout life."' 2 ° This language, which is at the same time both bold
and puzzling, has not been developed in any other cases. The
typical approach toward commission action is represented by
Hawkyard v. People. 2' In this case the court refused to consider an allegation of error charging defects in a medical commission hearing because the record was silent concerning such
a defect, and the trial court had found the hearing to be regular.' 22 The court stated that in such a case it would presume
23
the regularity of a commission hearing.
d. Medical commission procedure in practice
When a medical commission is convened, it is provided
with three alternative courses of action. It may recommend (1)
discharge,' 2 4 (2) short term hospitalization 1 25 or (3) adjudication.' 2 6 If a medical commission finds a respondent mentally
ill or deficient and recommends adjudication and commitment,
the court seems to be bound by statute to follow the commission's findings and recommendations and enter an order adjudicating the respondent mentally ill or deficient and provid127
ing for his commitment or custody.
Medical commissions for a variety of reasons, are rarely
appointed in Jefferson County. I sensed in my interview with
a clerk who dealt with mental health matters that the court
and the district attorney's office have a strong aversion to medical commission hearings. In their view, the hearings deplete
the court's budget and waste the time of the district attorney's
staff. A member of the district attorney's staff indicated that
such hearings are generally quite perfunctory in nature.
A clerk of the court stated that she believed that a medical
commission should be convened only as a last resort. The court
has the power by order to temporarily hospitalize a person,
although it may not affect his assets in this procedure. The
clerk stated that if a respondent's difficulty consisted exclusively of a mental problem, therefore, and did not involve the
120

Kendall v. People, 126 Colo. 573, 577, 252 P.2d 91, 93 (1952).

121 115 Colo. 35, 169 P.2d 178 (1946).

122 1d. at 38, 169 P.2d at 179.
12 Id.
24

1
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COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-7 (1963).

Id. §§ 71-1-7'(3) and 71-1-4 (Supp. 1965).
12GId. § 71-1-11 (Supp. 1965).
127 Id.
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conservation of his assets, he is never ordered to appear before
a medical commission as a first step. Instead, short term hospitalization is ordered. In most cases, she reported, further compulsory care beyond that permitted under a "hold and treat"
order is unnecessary.
Where the major problem involves the necessity of providing someone to manage the respondent's estate, the clerk
stated that she initially counseled prospective petitioners to
investigate the possibility of petitioning the court for the appointment of a voluntary guardian.' 2 8 In many cases this course
has provided a satisfactory solution.
In Denver, the city attorneys seem less eager to seek voluntary guardianship for a prospective respondent. They reason
that if an individual needs a guardian it generally won't be
long before he will require some form of compulsory care.
Thus, they believe that it is better to handle the matter in a
single proceeding.
When a medical commission is convened, the actual internal hearing procedure is apparently left to the discretion
of the commission itself." 9 In order to gain an insight into
medical commission procedure in actual practice, I observed
several medical commission hearings in each of the three counties studied. A few of these observations will be detailed here.
One or two afternoons every week, an unusual group of
men makes its way to several Denver area hospitals, nursing
homes, and sanitoriums. The group consists of two psychiatrists, a city attorney, an attorney in private practice, and their
chauffeur (who is the court baliff). The two psychiatrists comprise a medical commission duly appointed by the judge of the
probate court. The psychiatrists have served on many such commissions during the past two or three decades.
The city attorney is one of the two city attorneys assigned
to the mental health division. According to law, he is supposed
to conduct the hearings of the commission. The private practitioner has been appointed, as he was on countless previous
occasions during his legal career, to serve as guardian ad litem
for all of the respondents in the hearings to be conducted by
the commission that day.
The psychiatrists, the attorneys, and their driver know
each other well. During their rounds they converse amiably,
frequently kid each other, and, in general, exude a team feeling.
128 Id. § 71-1-8 (1963).
129

The commission is required to make such inquiry as it deems fit and is noticeably
silent as to internal procedural matters. Id. § 71-1-7(1) (1963).
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The commission meets at noon prior to commission hearings
to review all records in cases heard that afternoon.
On my first day of observation, the first of the four hearings was scheduled at Veterans Hospital. The second was to
be held at Mt. Airy Sanitorium and the final hearings were to
take place at Fort Logan. The hearings were scheduled onehalf hour apart. This period included time for a hearing as
well as travel time.
The first hearing at Fort Logan involved a large, heavily
bejeweled woman of about forty who, through the guardian
ad litem appointed pursuant to the short term hospitalization
statute, had requested a medical commission review of her temporary hospitalization order. We gathered around a long narrow table in a conference room.
The respondent and a staff psychiatrist, a middle-aged
woman, entered and set down near the middle of the table
facing the commission and the attorneys. A young man and
woman, later identified as staff social workers, seated themselves at one end of the table near the door.
One of the psychiatrist commissioners began the hearing.
"What's your diagnosis?"
The staff psychiatrist gave her diagnosis and the medical
commission members began filling in the forms in front of
them.
The other psychiatrist commissioner lifted his head and
inquired, "Should we take her driver's license away?" Although,
the Ft. Logan staff members stated that the patient did not
have a license, he repeated the question twice during the remainder of the hearing.
The patient, who was visibly angry, attempted to speak.
The commission members remained oblivious to her strongly
expressed protests. They were engaged in a discussion with the
city attorney concerning the proper method of filling in the
required forms. Finally, the staff psychiatrist asked, "Doesn't
she get a chance to say why she feels she shouldn't be under
our care? She requested this hearing. I thought she'd get a
chance to speak."
The guardian ad litem, who had been virtually silent up
to this point, then began to question the respondent intensely,
primarily concerning the number of her relatives living in the
Denver area and the way she got along with them. The members of the medical commission, the city attorney, and the driver
ignored the interrogation. They 'had become involved in a loud
dispute over the question of the commission's power to adjudi-
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cate the woman mentally ill. The commission members favored
adjudicating the woman. Their voices became louder.
Soon the guardian ad litem became perturbed, abruptly
stopped his questioning and faced his colleagues. "Dammit,
give me a chance to do my job, will you? I didn't bother you
when you were talking," he said forcefully.
"Well, hurry up," the medical commissioner replied, visibly annoyed by the interruption, "it's clear she doesn't have
an estate."
The guardian ad litem resumed his questioning and the
legal dispute continued for a few more minutes in a subdued
tone. It was finally conclusively settled by the city attorney.
"It's the judge's interpretation of the statute that a person
seeking a review of his hospitalization order shouldn't be adjudicated at this hearing."
The hearing then ended. The medical commission recommended continuation of the order of hospitalization. The patient, a somewhat befuddled look on her face, was gently
ushered out by the staff psychiatrist.
I attended a medical commission hearing in a small town
near Denver. The respondent was a sixty-four year old woman.
I rode to the hearing with a county welfare worker who moonlighted at night as a coroner's investigator. He had become
involved in the case when the respondent's seventy-five year
old husband, who was the petitioner in the matter, had become
severely ill a few months earlier and had been placed in a
Denver nursing home.
Upon arriving in the town we went to the office of the
respondent's physician, who had submitted the letter supporting the petition for involuntary hospitalization. Here we were
joined by the medical commission, composed of two psychiatrists and the guardian ad litem.
The respondent's doctor proceeded to give us a background
report on the respondent. He reported that she had grown up
in an orphanage, had been married twice and was sixty-four
years old. He believed that the woman was mentally retarded
and probably had always been so. He also stated that she had
become troublesome to the community, particularly since her
husband left. She pestered bank tellers, and the doctor had
heard reports that she had on one occasion attempted to direct
traffic while in the nude. He also heard that she had threatened
some school children with a shotgun the previous summer.
A discussion ensued regarding the best place- the doctor's office or the respondent's home-to see the respondent
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and the appropriate manner in which to approach her. It was
decided that her physician should accompany us to the respondent's home and make an introduction. The members of the
commission would then talk to her briefly at home, make a
tour of the premises and then ask the respondent to accompany
them to the office of the doctor, where they would conduct a
more intensive examination.
The medical commission, the guardian ad litem, the physician, the welfare worker, and I drove about five blocks to an
old wood structure which had at one time obviously been a
gas station and garage. We approached a large sliding door
on the side of the building. The guardian ad litem knocked.
In a few minutes the door opened and a slight, wrinkled old
woman neatly clad in a blue dress appeared. Her eyes moved
quickly over us and she exclaimed, "My, what a handsome
group of men! I've never seen the like of it in all my life."
"My, don't you look pretty yourself, Ann [not her real
name]," the guardian ad litem, who had never seen her before
responded cheerfully.
The psychiatrists introduced themselves as doctors, and
the guardian ad litem identified himself as an attorney. They
stated that they had come to see how she was doing. The respondent, who according to her physician had been served with
an order requiring her to appear before a medical commission
on the previous day, replied that she had been expecting us
and invited us inside.
The interior of this portion of the building had at one
time been the garage. The room appeared to be free of grease
and oil, but was dusty and dirty. The respondent pointed out
that she lived in a silver trailer which was parked on one side of
the room. She invited us to enter. Straight inside lay a tiny
alcove housing a small, made bed. To the left was a narrow
compartment containing a tiny gas-burning stove, a sink, some
cupboards, and a kerosene heater. It was quite warm inside.
The interior of the trailer, however, appeared to be neat and
clean.
After viewing the inside of the trailer, Ann escorted the
group to the front of the building where a clean bathroom
was located.
Outside, one of the medical commissioners said that he
had "seen enough." "The place is a public menace. No ventilation. She could asphyxiate in there. The stuffiness could well
be the cause of some of her mental problems." He then sniffed
the air immediately inside and outside the building, claiming
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to detect some foul odors. Although the building did not convey the antiseptic quality of, for example, a middle-class suburban home, its odors seemed to be well within the limits of
human toleration. The welfare worker informed me that Ann
and her husband had lived in the trailer inside the garage for
many years.
A few minutes later the guardian ad itemn and Ann came
walking out of the building. "Now you don't mind coming
with us over to your doctor's office, do you Ann?" the guardian
ad litern asked.
"No, I reckon not. I'll have to be back before noonhave a lot of work to do."
The attorney continued talking light-heartedly with the
respondent as we travelled the few short blocks to the physician's office.
At her doctor's office we were ushered to a large examination room in the back. The commissioners seated themselves
on the left side of the room. Using their attache cases for backing, they began to arrange and fill in their report forms. The
guardian ad liten placed a tape recorder on a small table near
the commission. Ann sat about 10 feet away facing the attorney
and commission. The welfare worker and I sat on a small bed
behind and to one side of the medical commission.
"Ann, we just want to ask you a few questions," began
one of the commissioners bringing his ballpoint pen to readiness. The doctors took turns asking the respondent questions.
She didn't know the date, nor could she identify the President
of the United States or the Governor of Colorado. On the other
hand, she recalled details of her personal life quite vividly.
She knew the name of the town where she lived, her birthdate,
and birth place. She knew that she had been married twice,
that her first husband was dead, and that her present husband
was in a Denver nursing home. After willingly responding to
the psychiatrists' continual questioning for about twenty minutes
the woman became irritated.
"Is is true that you threatened some of the school kids
with a gun last summer?" one commissioner asked sweetly.
"What are you asking all these damn fool questions for?"
she exploded, stirring briskly in the chair, her eyes glistening.
The doctor's ballpoint moved quickly and wrote "paranoic"
under the heading "Diagnosis." "We just want to help you,"
he replied soothingly.
"I'll bet you're a tryin' to send me to one o' them awful
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homes in the city. No sir, you ain't going to do it. I never done
what you just said; I don't have a gun."
The questioning stopped momentarily when respondent's
doctor came in and showed a chart to one commissioner. He
glanced briefly at the chart and said, "Hm, this clearly indicates cerebral arteriosclerosis." He made another notation on
the report form.
Resuming the questioning, the psychiatrists asked Ann if
she had any friends in the town.
"Well, my caretaker and his wife come by once a day.
They're my best friends. Of course, I've lived here for 20 years
and know all of the folks. I don't have a single enemy, I'll tell
you that."
The psychiatrists left the room to ask her doctor a few
questions. "Does Ann have a caretaker for her place?" they
asked.
The doctor informed them that Ann did not have a caretaker, but a couple did visit her and offer her some assistance
almost daily.
"I thought if there was someone who could take care of
her ...but they're not here. If they cared, they would've been

here," one commissioner said pensively to no one in particular.
"She's got to be taken out of that place. It's a firetrap.
It's inhuman," the other commissioner commented emphatically.
The guardian ad litem then proceeded to question Ann
closely about her financial condition, and soon learned the location of her bank accounts.
At this point a uniformed sheriff's sergeant entered the
front door of the office followed by a plainclothes officer.
"Is Ann here?" he asked. "We've got an order to take
her to the sheriff's department pending transfer to Fort Logan.
She has been adjudicated, hasn't she?"
The three doctors nodded affirmatively and directed the
officers toward the back room. The welfare worker and the
guardian ad litem attempted to coax Ann to enter the marked
sheriff's car which was already parked by the back door of the
office. The guardian ad litem repeatedly importuned: "We're
just going over to make sure your money is all right in the
bank." She angrily refused and attempted to walk toward the
front of the building. The stocky welfare worker and the tall,
husky sergeant grabbed her by her elbows and pulled her firmly
out the back door, her rigidly held feet bumping lightly on
the floor.
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During this time, the psychiatrists were busy completing
the medical commission report form. After completing this
task, one commissioner walked out into the sunlight and stood
beside me as we watched the struggle to place Ann in the back
seat of the sheriff's automobile.
In the process of struggling, the respondent's purse opened
and fell out of her hands into those of the plainclothes officer.
The officer and the guardian ad litem began examining the
contents of the purse and soon discovered some money. The
commissioner turned and said: "I hear that ambulance drivers
often make out real well in cases like this."
"About two hundred dollars here," the attorney exclaimed
as he counted. "Lord, I thought you didn't have any money
with you."
The plainclothes officer and welfare worker had succeeded
in placing Ann in the back seat by this time. The guardian
ad litem got out and the car sped away.
10. Order of Adjudication
The recommendation that a respondent be adjudicated
mentally ill or mentally deficient and be committed for an indefinite term does not, by itself, operate as an adjudication and
commitment. A court order of adjudication is necessary to
achieve this result. However, the court order appears to be
little more than a formality because the statute appears to require the court to follow the findings and recommendations
of the medical commission.' 8 ' This is in sharp contrast with
the role of the court in a proceeding to determine whether an
incompetent should be adjudicated competent. Even though
the restoration law requires that the respondent is examined
by two doctors and that they submit a report of their findings
to the court, the statute speaks of the court making its own
findings. 1 The case law interpreting an earlier restoration
30

Id. § 71-1-11(1) (Supp. 1965). "If the report of the medical commission finds that
the respondent is mentally ill or mentally deficient, and recommends indefinite
commitment and adjudication, the court shall, within six days after the return of said
report, enter an order adjudicating the respondent mentally ill or mentally deficient."
Id. (Emphasis added).
131Id. § 71-1-26 (1963).
If any reputable person shall file in the court by which a person has been
adjudicated mentally ill or mentally deficient, a written petition setting
forth the adjudicated respondent is no longer mentally ill or mentally
deficient, supported by the certificate of a doctor... said court shall immediately appoint two reputable doctors... to examine the respondent...
and to report their findings to the court ....
If from such examination it
shall be found by the court that the respondent ... is no longer mentally ill
or mentally deficient, the court shall forthwith enter an order of competency ....
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statute containing an identical "findings by the court" provision makes it clear that the court has the power to make its
own findings in a restoration proceeding and that the findings
of the doctors are only advisory.' 3 2
11. Trial by Court or Jury
The questions considered by the medical commission must
be tried by the court or by jury if the respondent, his attorney,
the guardian ad litem, his legal guardian, parent, spouse, or
adult next of kin files a written demand for such a trial within
five days after the entry of the order of adjudication or commitment. 1MF If any of these specified persons demands a trial,
the judge has no discretion and must grant the request.'
a. Adjudication order interlocutory during trial
demand period
The adjudication order remains interlocutory during the
five day period when a trial can be demanded, and, if a demand
is made, the order remains interlocutory pending the outcome
of the trial.13" Even though the order is interlocutory under
these circumstances, the court still possesses the power to appoint a conservator and to authorize the conservator to take
36
appropriate action on behalf of his ward.'
b. Longer trial demand period if respondent removed
from county
If the respondent is removed from the county during that
five day period he is allowed an additional fifteen days (or a
total of twenty days after the entry of the adjudication order)
to file a demand. 3 7 If a jury trial demand is made before the
respondent is removed from the county, the judge of the court
is required to issue an order detaining the respondent in the
38
county for a period not exceeding five days.'
132

Hill v. People, 118 Colo. 571, 577, 198 P.2d 450, 452 (1948).

33

1' COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-13'(1)

(Supp. 1965).

13 4 id. § 71-1-13(2) (1963). See Young v. Brofman, 139 Colo. 296, 338 P.2d 286
(1959).
135 Young v. Brofman, 139 Colo. 296, 303, 338 P.2d 286, 290 (1959).
'36 Id.
37

' CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-13(1)

(Supp. 1965). Prior to the 1960 amendment

allowing the respondent fifteen additional days to file a demand for a jury trial if
removed from the county of commitment, the supreme court had reversed two adjudication orders in cases where the respondent had been removed from the county of
commitment before the five-day trial demand period had expired. Hultquist v. People,
77 Colo. 310, 236 P. 995 (1925) and Watkins v. People, 140 Colo. 228, 344 P.2d
682 (1959).
13

8 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-13'(1)

(Supp. 1965).
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c. jury trial
If a jury is requested, the court is required to order a jury
of six to be summoned within one month.' 8 9 Trial procedure
is governed by the law pertaining to civil jury trials. 140 The
findings of the medical commission are admissible as evidence,
if identified by the person or persons who have verified the
commission report' 4 ' and who are subject to examination and
cross examination the same as a witness in other civil actions. 4 2
The judge is required to instruct the jury that the medical
commission findings may be overcome by a preponderance of
the evidence. 4 ' However, the Colorado Supreme Court has
held that this provision is merely a redundant reiteration of a
fundamental rule of law which exists without aid of the statute.1 ' It declared that the county has the burden of proof by
a preponderance of evidence throughout a hearing or trial on
commitment and that this burden could not be shifted to the
respondent.' 4 5 Furthermore, the court found that a jury instruction stating that "the report of the medical commission can only
be overcome by a preponderance of the evidence" was improper
in that it gave undue evidentiary strength to the report of the
medical commission and appeared to limit the ways in which
the report could be overcome. 46 The court declared that a
respondent was under no obligation to present any evidence,
and, if he desired, could overcome whatever evidentiary weight
the commission report possessed in several ways not involving
the presentation of evidence. 14 He could, for example, attack
the veracity of the report or the credibility of the medical commissioners on cross examination. 1 48 Although the failure of the
court to give a jury instruction concerning expert (psychiatric)
testimony was not raised by the appellants, the court specifically
found that the trial court should always tender such an instruc1 49
tion on its own motion if not requested to do so by counsel.
The jury in rendering its verdict, is required to answer the
same questions which the medical commission is required to
9

13

Id. § 71-1-13(2)

(1963).

14Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.

143Id.
144 Sabon v. People, 142 Colo. 323, 325, 350 P.2d 576, 577-78 (1960).
145 d. at 325, 350 P.2d at 577.

14'ld.
1471d. at 325-26, 350 P.2d at 578.

148 Id.
149 Id. at 329, 350 P.2d at 579.
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answer. 5 ' The judge is required to enter a decree in accordance with the jury findings, unless it is his opinion that the
findings are contrary to the weight of the applicable law and
evidence. 5 ' If the court so finds, the judge may set aside the
jury finding and enter an order notwithstanding the findings
of the jury.' 52 Otherwise, the court must enter an order discharging the respondent if all questions are answered in the
53
negative.'
According to court officials in the Denver metropolitan
area, the right to a trial is seldom exercised. Often a substantial
estate is involved in those few cases where a trial is demanded.
The fact that the law does not require anyone to inform an
adjudicated respondent of his right to trial could well be a
major reason that trial demands are infrequent. In Hawkyard,
the Colorado Supreme Court said: "In the motion for a new
trial it is alleged that defendant was not advised of his right
to a jury trial. Conceding this as a fact, our attention is not
directed to any statute requiring the court or the county attorney or the guardian ad litem to impart this information to a
defendant."' 5 4
F. Restoration, PartialRestoration and Administrative
Discharge
There are three ways in which a respondent may be released from the confinement imposed by an order of adjudication and commitment. He may be adjudicated competent and
be immediately released from confinement and relieved of all
legal disabilities resulting from incompetency.' 5 5 The respondent may also be restored to competency and released by the
court on its own motion if the superintendent or chief medical
officer of a hospital files a verified statement with the court
stating that a respondent in his custody is no longer mentally
ill or deficient. The hospital officer is required to file this
statement whenever he has reason to believe that the respondent is no longer mentally ill or deficient.' 5 6 The Colorado
Supreme Court has held, in interpreting earlier statutes, that
the hospital administrator has authority to discharge a respon5
10COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-13(3) (1963). "The verdict of the jury shall be
answer to the questions set forth in section 71-1-7(2)." Id.

151
Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.

154 Hawkyard v. People, 115 Colo. 35, 38-39, 169 P.2d 178, 180 (1946).
15 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-26 (1963).
6

15

Id. § 71-1-27 (1963).

in

1969

CIVIL COMMITMENT IN COLORADO

dent only if he is restored to reason.' 57 If the administrator
discharges a respondent not restored to reason, the court can
return him to confinement without a new hearing. 5 '
1. Administrative Discharge
A respondent may be freed by an administrative discharge.
If the statutory conditions are fulfilled, an administrative discharge follows a conditional release, granted by the head of a
state hospital or training home or the chief officer of a veterans administration hospital, who believes that a conditional
59
release is in the best interest of the respondent or society.1
The court which committed the respondent must be notified
in writing of this release.' 6 ° If a conditionally released respondent is not returned to the institution within two years after
his release, his name must be stricken from the rolls of the
institution, and he must be administratively discharged.' 6 ' This
discharge must be entered on the records of the institution, and
written notice must be filed with the court which committed
the respondent. 62 The benefit of administrative discharge is
also made available to a respondent who escapes from an institution and is not returned within a period of one year after
his escape. 65
The effect of an administrative discharge is limited. An
administratively discharged respondent may be compelled to
return to the institution only by an order of court issued after
64
proof of need for further institutional care is produced.
An administrative discharge does not operate as an adjudi65
cation of competency.'
2. Competency Restoration Adjudication
Any reputable person may institute a restoration proceeding by filing a written petition with the court which has adjudicated the respondent's competency, stating that the respondent
is no longer mentally ill or deficient 66 This petition must be
accompanied by the certificate of a doctor licensed to practice
57

1 Metuxos v. People, 76 Colo. 264, 230 P. 608 (1924).

158Id.
'59 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
16

0 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id.
1

6Id. § 71-1-28(4)
16 5 1d. § 71-1-28(3)
18

(1963).
(1963).

Id. § 71-1-26 (1963).

§ 71-1-28(1) (Supp. 1965).
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medicine.1 67 Upon receipt of such a petition the court is required to appoint two reputable doctors licensed to practice
medicine to examine the respondent at the place where he is
then physically present and to report their findings to the
court.' 6 ' If the respondent is confined at the time the petition
is filed, at least one of the appointed doctors must have no
association with the institution of confinement.' 69 If the court
finds from the examination that the respondent is no longer
mentally ill or deficient, it shall enter an order of competency
which frees the respondent from confinement and all legal
disabilities resulting from adjudication.' 7 After entering its
order adjudicating competency, the court has no power to issue
further orders regarding the restored respondent's property
except those which may be necessary to settle the accounts of
the conservator and to restore the property to the respondent. 7 '
The court must forward a copy of the order of competency to
72
the department of institutions.'
G. Additional Case Law Concerning Commitment Proceedings
In addition to the points already mentioned in conjunction
with individual sections of the commitment statute, the Colorado Supreme Court has also decided various other more general questions involving the commitment/adjudication statutes.
It has repeatedly stressed that a proceeding under the commitment laws is a special statutory proceeding neither criminal
nor civil in nature.'7 3 Because of their special nature- their
sole aim being to benefit the respondent - the high court has
held the testimonial privilege statutes to be inapplicable to
commitment proceedings."'
The court has also repeatedly stated that the properly
asserted jurisdiction of a court in a commitment proceeding
is a continuing one and that consequently orders and judgments
67

1

Id.

168d.

169 Id.
70
1 Id.

People ex rel. Smith v. County Court of Fremont County, 106 Colo. 95, 101, 102 P.2d
476, 478 (1940).
172
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-26 (1963).
73
1 See Sabon v. People, 142 Colo. 323, 350 P.2d 576 (1960); Kendall v. People, 126
Colo. 573, 252 P.2d 91 (1952) ; Okerberg v. People, 119 Colo. 529, 205 P.2d 224
(1949).
174
See Hawkyard v. People, 115 Colo. 35, 169 P.2d 178 (1946). In this case the
attorney-client privilege was held inapplicable to a medical commission hearing.
Id. at 39, 169 P.2d at 180. See also Sabon v. People, where the husband-wife privilege
was held not applicable to a jury trial commitment proceeding. 142 Colo. 323, 329,
350 P.2d 576, 579 (1960).
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entered in such proceedings are open to reconsideration and
modification by the court of original jurisdiction upon the application of any party in interest, at any time before the respondent
is adjudicated competent or dies.17
On this ground the high court has not allowed judgments
and orders in commitment cases to be challenged in collateral
actions such has habeas corpus proceedings.'7 6 If the court
entering a commitment order had no jurisdiction to do so,
however, the order may be challenged in a habeas corpus
1 77
proceeding.
The cases indicate that although orders and judgments
entered in commitment proceedings are continually open to
modification, they still possess the degree of finality necessary
for appeal.

III.

RECOMMENDATIONS, CRITICISMS, AND EVALUATIONS

A. Introduction
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 71-1-23 (1963). Rights of Respondent. - (1) Every respondent shall be entitled
to humane care and treatment. No respondent shall
lose any civil rights nor forfeit any legal status unless
he has been adjudicated mentally ill or mentally deficient. Upon the entry of any order of competency,
any adjudicated respondent shall be restored and entitled to all civil rights and legal status of any other
mentally competent person. (2) Any person in custody under this article shall have the right to communicate with his attorney, by sealed mail or otherwise.
This first sentence of this statute indicates that respondents are to receive humane care. In general it can be fairly
said, if my observations at Fort Logan are typical of state-wide
practice, that respondents do receive humane care within the
mental institutions of Colorado. The mental health professionals are conscientiously striving to provide the most effective treatment possible for those committed to their charge
within the limitations of the resources available to them. However, the commitment process fails to satisfy this statutory
175
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See Hill v. People, 118 Colo. 571, 198 P.2d 450 (1948); People ex rel. Best v.
County Court, 110 Colo. 249, 132 P.2d 799 (1942); People v. Musser, 75 Colo.
257, 225 P. 218 (1924) ; In re Rainbolt, 64 Colo. 581, 171 P. 1068 (1918).
See Zimmerman v. Angels, 137 Colo. 129, 321 P.2d 1105 (1958); Klancher v.

Anderson, 113 Colo. 478, 158 P.2d 923 (1945); In re Rainbolt, 64 Colo. 581, 171
P. 1068 (1918).

177 Hunt v. People, 76 Colo. 231, 230 P. 607 (1924).
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requirement and it is towards the commitment procedures
themselves that my comments are aimed.
The criticisms, evaluations and recommendations which
follow are not intended to form a detailed blueprint for the
reformation of the present system of involuntary hospitalization and commitment. They do, however, indicate problems and
concerns which the legal profession, the medical profession,
and ultimately legislators must take into account if a fairer,
more orderly and more humane hospitalization and commitment process is to be established.
B. Philosophical Principles to Guide Policy Decisions
The United States conceives of itself as a free and open
society. In such a society every individual should be guaranteed
the maximum amount of individual freedom consistent with
the well-being and safety of others and of society as a whole.
The decision to divest an individual of any part of his freedom or any of his rights should not be undertaken lightly or
perfunctorily.
Compulsory hospitalization and commitment proceedings
have traditionally been justified by the courts because they
benefit the individual subject to them. Although the "benefit"
concept is appealing, it has seldom, if ever, been realized in
practice. It is time that this "benefit" conception be implemented in a rational manner. The commitment process should
insure that a searching inquiry and determination - guided by
reasonably well-defined standards - is made as to what course
of action would confer the most benefit on the individual.
With these guiding principles in mind, the following
recommendations are submitted. Some of the recommendations
envision a drastic legislative revision of the present system.
Others suggest major reforms within the basic framework of
the present process.
C. Who Should Be Hospitalized?
1. The Short Term Hospitalization Law
The policy question of who should be compulsorily hospitalized or committed is perhaps the most difficult problem
in the field of involuntary civil commitment. Presently, the
Colorado law allows an individual to be hospitalized for up
to six months if a reputable person and a licensed physician
believe that it would be in the best interest of the respondent
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to be hospitalized.'
He is not required to present a danger
to himself or others nor does the statute require that he be
suffering from any particular mental illness or defect, nor does
it state that he must display a certain form of aberrant behavior.
The term "in the best interest of" is clearly exceedingly
broad and vague. It poses a serious potential threat to the liberty and security of all citizens. This is true because of the
unique nature of mental illness. The conception of mental illness (at least that which lacks a clearly discernible organic
basis) is inextricably linked to the behavioral values and standards established by society. In fact the symptoms of mental
illness consist of a noticeable deviation from societal norms on
the part of an individual. As anthropologists and other social
scientists have frequently pointed out, behavior which in one
society would constitute conclusive evidence of mental illness
would bring its perpetrator wide public praise in another. 7 '
The same situation can exist between sub-groups within the
same society.
It is possible that the compulsory mental treatment process might be used as a quiet, tidy means of suppressing dissent
or behavior unpleasing to the government or society. The practice of the Soviet Union is perhaps the best known and most
extreme example of this practice."8 ) In America, well known
writers and intellectuals are not removed by these means as
they are in the Soviet Union, but the system could readily be
converted and consciously applied toward the end of suppressing dissent as long as the vague terminology exists in the law.
Thus, unless we desire to use the involuntary hospitalization and commitment system as a means of enforcing conformity to societal beliefs and conventions, and unless we desire to move toward a therapeutic state'
where all nonconformists and troublesome people are viewed as "mental health"
problems, vague statutory standards for compulsory hospitalization and commitment should be eliminated. In regard to the
Colorado hospitalization statute, a showing that the individual
whose hospitalization is sought is dangerous to himself or others
should be required, and some reasonable definition should be
given to the term "dangerous."
178 The statutory requirements concerning short term involuntary hospitalization are
found in section 71-1-4. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-4 (Supp. 1965).
1 9 See generally T. SzAsz, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS (1961).
0

18 See V. TARSIS, WtRD 7 (1965).
181 For an interesting expression of the viewpoint that the United States is moving in

this direction, see Kaplan, Civil Commitment "As you Like it,"' 49 B.U.L. REV. 14
(1969).
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2. The Indefinite Term Commitment Statute
Most of the same criticisms set out above apply to the
present indefinite term commitment process, where the statute
speaks of the respondent's mental or emotional functions being
so impaired as to require protection, supervision, treatment or
confinement for his own welfare or the welfare or safety of
others, and his lack of ability to manage his own affairs.1 82
"Own welfare" and "welfare of others" are, of course,
terms which are as vague as the term "in the best interest of."
"Safety of others" seems to furnish a more manageable standard.
The question of a person's capacity to manage his own affairs is
an issue with which the courts, but not the medical commissions have had a long experience.
Regardless of the particular standards adopted to determine whether an individual is a proper subject for commitment and adjudication, they must be conscientiously applied by
the trier of the facts to be of any value. Presently, medical commissions make no in-depth inquiry as to what the "welfare of
the respondent" is or as to what the "safety and welfare of
others" consists of in each particular case. If the medical commission is to be retained as the decision-making agency in involuntary civil commitments, it should be specifically required
to make a thorough inquiry and specifically report its findings
with regard to these matters as part of its normal hearing
procedure.
D. Preliminary Investigation by Mental Health Professionals
in Place of Physician's Letter
Presently an individual can be hospitalized for up to 6
months on the basis of a verified petition and a physician's
letter. He can be committed for an indefinite term by a similar
procedure. The medical commission hearing which is an additional requirement in commitment cases adds nothing substantial because of its perfunctory nature. The physician submitting
the letter is not required to be a specialist in mental disorders.
Often he submits the letter on the basis of only a cursory examination or interview. Consequently many people are forced
into the care of the mental hospitals who are not proper subjects for the kind of care offered by these institutions.
To rectify the deficiencies in the initial phases of the
commitment procedure, the requirement of a physician's letter
should be abolished. Instead, whenever a petition for hospitali82

1

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-1(1) (b) (c)

(1963).
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zation or commitment is filed with the court, it should be referred to a team of mental health professionals (psychiatrists,
psychologists and social workers) whose job it would be to
investigate the matter fully and make recommendations to the
court as to the best course of action. The court would not be
bound by such a recommendation, but would be required to
give it serious consideration. No individual should be hospitalized during this investigatory period unless a showing was made
to the court that the individual presented a substantial danger
to himself or others.
E. Voluntary Action Should Be Encouraged
If some form of mental health care is necessary, the mental
health team should be required to make a serious attempt to
get the individual to agree to voluntarily accept their recommendations before resorting to any compulsory process. The
psychiatrists and mental health workers I have talked with believe that most persons who need treatment will accept it voluntarily if they have the benefit of effective counseling.
F. The Medical Commission Should Be Abolished
If a compulsory process is believed necessary, a hearing
to determine whether it should be invoked should be held before a court, not a medical commission. Courts have the experience to maintain an orderly procedure, conduct a fair hearing,
and weigh evidence properly. Further, as full-time public servants whose special skill and function is to adjudicate, judges
are free of the conflict of interest problems which clearly affect
the decision making capacities of busy doctors pulled reluctantly
away from private practice.
G. Effective Counsel For the Respondent
Perhaps the greatest single need from a due process standpoint is the need for every respondent to be furnished with
effective counsel.
The guardian ad litem does not adequately fulfill this
function for several reasons. First of all, the statutes are extremely vague in spelling out the duties of a guardian ad litem.
In short term hospitalization cases the law requires only that
he make such investigation as may be necessary to protect the
interests of the respondent, that he make certain that respondent is advised of his right to a hearing, and that he make a
report of his investigation to the court.' 8 3 No attempt has been
1

8id. § 71-1-4(3) (Supp. 1965).
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made by the legislature, the supreme court, or the bar association to spell out what the interests of a respondent are or what
kind of an investigation is adequate in such cases. Thus, each
individual guardian ad litem must determine his role for himself. As illustrated by the accounts in previous sections of this
article most guardians ad litem in hospitalization cases generally perform in a perfunctory manner.
In involuntary commitment proceedings where the respondent stands to suffer far more serious deprivations than in short
term hospitalization proceedings, the statute defining the duties
of a guardian ad litein requires even less. The attorney is simply required to attend all meetings of the medical commission
and to make a report to the court. This report contains primarily information about the respondent's financial and family
status.' True, one Colorado Supreme Court case has interpreted
the statutory language as requiring the guardian ad litem to
investigate and prepare prior to the first medical commission
hearing.'
Yet, in another case the court interpreted the statutes more literally and stated that the guardian ad litem had
no duty to inform the respondent of his right to a court or jury
trial of the issues decided by the medical commission.'8 6
Two steps should be taken to insure that every respondent
enjoys effective representation. First, the statutes must be revised so that the role of counsel is spelled out in greater detail. 1 87 Second, wherever possible a full-time public defender
staff should be established to deal with mental health matters.
Defining a role for counsel in mental health proceedings
will not be an easy task because these proceedings differ
markedly in purpose, at least theoretically, from criminal actions. A joint committee composed of representatives of the
legal and psychiatric disciplines should be convened to study
the problem and present a proposal to the legislature.
It has been recommended that counsel in mental health
proceedings perform the following tasks:
(1) Advise the commitment or adjudication process subject thoroughly of the nature of the process, his rights
under it, and all of its legal implications.
(2) Check the accuracy of the alleged behavioral incidents
I-Id. § 71-1-8 (1963).
85

1

Hultquist v. People, 77 Colo. 310, 236 P. 995 (1925).

186 Hawkyard v. People, 115 Colo. 35, 38-39, 169 P.2d 178, 180 (1946).
187 The term "guardian ad litem" should be dropped. A respondent should be assured of
counsel, preferably the same attorney, not only during the course of a particular
hearing, but during the entire period of his subjection to court order under the statute.
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or psychological symptoms (e.g. reported delusions,
erratic behavior, etc.) upon which the state relies.
(3) Attempt to determine what would be best for the
client by interviewing family members, doctors, social
workers, etc., and by exploring alternative courses of
treatment or action.
(4) Insure that all aspects of an individual's case are seriously considered at the hearing and that the decision
maker is apprised of all possible alternatives.
(5) If a client is committed, the attorney should continue
to follow the case periodically to see that the client
is receiving proper care and treatment.'8 8
The low rate of compensation is a major reason for the
ineffectiveness of counsel in mental health cases, yet to pay
an attorney a fee comparable to that which he would receive
in private practice would strain the public financial resources.
A full-time salaried professional staff could avoid this problem. Counties with low rates of hospitalization and commitment activity could be joined together to form public defender
districts.
A second benefit would result from a public mental patient
defender system. The attorneys could easily be given special
training in the mental health field. Further, their daily involvement in the total mental health process would undoubtedly
make them more effective in the area than attorneys only infrequently working in the field.
H. Opportunity For Examination By an Independent
Psychiatrist
The respondent should have the right to an examination
by a psychiatrist not associated with any state agencies or institutions. The testimony or report of this expert should be accorded as much weight as those of the treating team.
I. Liberty and Rights Should Be Protected From Abrogation
Today an order of adjudication serves as blanket judgment of incompetency for all legal purposes. 8 9 The present
procedure is favored by many of the participants in the process
precisely because of this feature. In their view it is nice to be
able to wrap everything up in one proceeding. Yet, the normal
tradition and practice of the law is the opposite. The law recog18 Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 44
TEXAs

L. REv. 424, 450-57 (1966).

158 See Appendix.
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nizes that a person may be mentally incompetent for one purpose but not for another. For instance, an individual may be
mentally incompetent to make a will but not possess that kind
and degree of incompetency which would justify compulsory
confinement.
The Colorado Supreme Court has already recognized that
meanings of the term "mental incompetency" can differ in
dissimilar situations by ruling that the fact that an individual
has been adjudicated mentally incompetent is not necessarily
conclusive on the question of testimonial, testamentary, and
contractual capacity.' 90
Why should this fundamental legal fact not be recognized
and implemented by the mental incompetency adjudication
process? The prime function of the law is not to serve the convenience of those charged with its administration. This is especially true where the basic liberty and rights of human beings
are at stake. The judicial, adjudication, and hospitalization proceedings should require the court to make specific findings
concerning each right or portion of liberty which the respondent is alleged to be mentally incompetent to enjoy.
J. Indefinite Term Commitments Should Be Abolished.
Presently, when an individual is adjudicated and committed he is placed in the hands of institutional administrators
and cut adrift from the legal process, which for all practical
purposes, takes no further interest in him. A Colorado statute''
gives a respondent the right to communicate with an attorney
and with the judge of the court. These statutorily prescribed
rights have little meaning for the typical respondent who is
of modest means and whose understanding of the legal system
is not great. He becomes, in effect, a forgotten person as far
as the legal system is concerned.
The implications of this fact may not presently be so
horrifying in view of the current trend in Colorado toward
the adoption of enlightened mental health treatment policies.
Yet the day when hundreds of mental patients sat in gloomy,
custodial isolation is not so remote in the experience of the
state that the potential ability an involuntary commitment system possesses to inflict grief and injustice cannot be appreciated. Further, even in the most progressive and enlightened
of mental health systems, pockets of insensitivity and neglect
are bound to exist.
190 See cases cited in Appendix.
191 COLO.

REV.

STAT. ANN.

§ 71-1-23(2)

(Supp. 1965).
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It is imperative, therefore, that the legal system be obliged
to demonstrate a continuing interest in those compulsorily
placed in the custody of the mental health agencies. All such
orders should be reviewable periodically, perhaps every three
or four months, by the court. The public defender should be
required to contact every respondent at the end of this same
period to discuss his treatment with him, and also make an
independent investigation (e.g. by interviewing the treating
doctors, etc.) of his treatment and prognosis. The defender
would be required to submit a report of his investigation to
the court. At every such interval the respondent, by himself
or through the public defender should be able to demand a
court hearing, challenging either the confinement or custody
per se or challenging the manner of treatment or confinement.
This would, of course, not preclude the availability of court
review between these particular dates if extraordinary circumstances warrant it.
K. Sensitivity Training

Most people probably have the impression that doctors,
social workers, and others involved in the so-called service professions are, of necessity, more kind, patient, and sensitive than
are ordinary persons. My experience in studying the involuntary commitment system and in other dealings with members
of these professions leads me to conclude that a substantial
number of these people are, if anything, more calloused and
insensitive than laymen. This hardening process no doubt takes
place over a long period of time and results from their prolonged and continuous exposure to all varieties of human misfortune.
After long exposure people stop appearing as individuals
with special qualities and needs and become "types" to be
treated in a cold, efficient, "professional" manner which is
sometimes ineffectually concealed by a stereotyped mask of
conviviality. The prospect of a fee encourages the doctor or
lawyer to exhibit at least a mechanical concern for his paying
patient or client, but he is likely to view those problem-ridden
persons not likely to achieve this status as burdensome "cases"
to be disposed quickly.
It is important that those who are involved in compulsory
mental health procedures, therefore, be afforded frequent
opportunities to better understand themselves and those with
whom they work. They should not only be encouraged, if not
required, to participate in courses which convey an intellectual
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understanding of recent developments in the mental health
field, but they should also take part in recently-devised "sensitivity" programs which are designed to give an individual a
total and unified understanding of himself and others- both
emotionally and intellectually.
L. The Role of the Medical Commission
If the medical commission is to be retained, its duties
should be more specifically defined. Today, if the examples
related in this paper can be taken as representative of statewide practice, medical commissions perform totally perfunctory
roles, automatically recommending commitment for most of
the individuals placed in front of them. Hearing procedures
are frequently outrageously chaotic and evidentiary standards
of any kind appear to be nonexistent.
The statutes should set out a procedural format for the
conduct of commission hearings, if for no other reason than
to infuse such proceedings with some measure of dignity. Some
minimum evidentiary requirements should be imposed. Again,
an interdisciplinary study would probably be necessary to establish these procedures and standards.
M. Modification of Voluntary HospitalizationProvision
The present voluntary hospitalization statute allows any
hospital to detain a voluntarily admitted patient up to five days
after he has filed a written request for release, if hospital officials believe that he is mentally ill or that he displays symptoms of mental illness or deficiency. 1 92 An individual could be
kept longer than five days since the statute excludes Saturdays,
Sundays and holidays from the computation of the five-day
period.
This power to detain is greater than that enjoyed by peace
officers under the emergency detention statute. Under that statute an individual cannot be held for longer than twenty-four
hours (Saturdays, Sundays and holidays are again excluded in
computing the time) without a court order. Further, the peace
officer must in good faith believe not only that the individual
is mentally ill or mentally deficient, but also that he is danger1 3
ous to himself or others.
Clearly, the five-day "hold" and the written request for
release requirements under the voluntary hospitalization statute
are harsh, unnecessary measures which can only serve to dis'-Id. § 71-1-2(3)(d) (Supp. 1965).
19 3
Id. § 71-1-3(1) (1963).
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courage voluntary hospitalization. The emergency detention
provisions seem sufficient to handle a patient posing a threat
to himself or others. Otherwise, if the hospital officials believe
that a patient needs further compulsory treatment, they should
be required to follow the provisions of the short term hospitalization statute without the benefit of a lengthy "hold" period
exercised at their own discretion without judicial supervision.
N. Records and Statistics
It is clear from even a cursory observation of the present
involuntary commitment process that the system is being used
to deal with a wide variety of society's problems. Yet no records are presently available which show exactly what problems
the individuals becoming subject to the system possess.
In order to gain a clear idea of what functions the system
is presently performing, an accurate, statewide record of all
hospitalization and commitment cases would be invaluable.
These records should show precisely what problems the respondents possess (i.e., alcoholism, drug addiction, schizophrenia, etc.), and how they become subject to the process
(i.e., who set the commitment process in motion - a family
member, the housing authority, the welfare department, etc.).
With a better knowledge of the system, an intelligent
policy evaluation of its operation could be made. A determination could be made as to which problems are suitable for the
commitment and hospitalization process and which problems
are not.
0. The Problems of the Aged
An extremely large number of elderly persons are adjudicated and committed under the present law. Sometimes an older
person is adjudicated because he needs someone to handle his
financial affairs.
Presently there are two ways in which an estate can be
opened and a conservator appointed. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 153-9-2 (Supp. 1965) requires the court to appoint a conservator for an individual who is adjudicated mentally incompetent and has assets needing conservation. Colo. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 153-9-13 (Supp. 1965) establishes a voluntary estate
procedure. Under the provisions of this statute an estate must
be opened, and a guardian appointed, if a person files a verified petition for the appointment of a guardian with the court
of jurisdiction in the county of his residence, or, if he is a nonresident, in the county where some of his property is located.
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The petition must be accompanied by a written statement signed
by a licensed, practicing physician which states that in the physician's opinion the petitioner was mentally competent at the
time he signed the petition, but that by reason of old age, disease, physical infirmity, alcoholism, drug addiction, or some
other cause he is not able to properly manage his estate and
that the appointment of a guardian would be in his best interest.
In Denver this latter procedure is rarely counseled as an
alternative to adjudication both because of the difficulty involved in obtaining a proper physician's statement and because
the city attorneys generally prefer adjudication in order to
facilitate confinement of the individual at a later date if this
should appear necessary. A person may also be adjudicated for
the additional reason that he needs institutional care and will
not voluntarily enter a hospital or nursing home.
Presently, medical commission hearings involving elderly
persons (referred to by mental health professionals as "geriatrics problems") are, if this can be possible, more perfunctory
than those in which the respondents are younger people. Usually
a son, daughter or other member of the family petitions for
an adjudicatory hearing and then all of the participants in the
process, including the guardian ad litem, cooperate to see that
the goal of adjudication is reached as quickly and smoothly
as possible.
The present procedure for handling the problems of the
conservation of an aged individual's assets should be abolished
because it serves no protective function for the subject. The
same end could be reached by the adoption of a simpler and
more economical procedure. Frequently, everyone, including
the respondent himself, agrees that a conservator should be
appointed, and the current cumbersome process constitutes a
meaningless annoyance.
One approach which could be adopted would be to allow
a family member or some other interested person to petition
the court for the appointment of a conservator for an aged
person whose mind is failing. Upon receipt of such a petition,
it would be the duty of the mental health public defender, or
an attorney appointed for this purpose, to investigate the matter, interview the individual for whom a conservatorship is
sought, inform him of the legal nature of a conservatorship,
and advise him of his right to a court hearing with representation by counsel, if he disagrees with the appointment of a
conservator on his behalf. If he requests a hearing, the public

1969

CIVIL COMMITMENT IN COLORADO

defender or some specially appointed qualified attorney should
represent the individual in the same effective manner that an
attorney would represent a client in private practice who desired to contest the appointment of a conservator on his behalf.
The district or city attorney would have the duty of presenting
the case for the conservatorship if he felt that it was warranted. The court would follow the same procedure and tests
it presently applies in cases involving an individual's testamentary capacity or his capacity to contract.
This procedure would not necessarily need to be limited
to the elderly. The statute could provide that a conservatorship
could be set up for an indvidual regardless of age.
APPENDIX
THE LEGAL STATUS OF A
MENTALLY INCOMPETENT INDIVIDUAL IN COLORADO
I. INTRODUCTION

The statutes do not clearly specify who is, for legal purposes, a mental incompetent. A definition of mental incompe-

tency is found in Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 153-1-1 (7) 1963, in the
chapter dealing with wills and estates:
"Mental incompetent," "incompetent person,
"incompetent," or "mentally ill person" denotes a
person who has been adjudicated mentally ill or men-

tally deficient, or who by the laws of this state is
designated as a lunatic, insane person, incompetent,
mental incompetent, incapable or feeble-minded, or
who has been found in an appropriate proceeding to
be unable or unfit to manage his own property.

Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 71-1-23(1) (1963) seems to imply
that an individual does not become legally mentally incompetent before he is adjudicated mentally ill or deficient:
Rights of respondent. -

(1)

Every respondent

shall be entitled to humane care and treatment. No
respondent shall lose any civil rights nor forfeit any
legal status unless he has been adjudicated mentally
ill or mentally deficient. Upon the entry of any order
of competency, any adjudicated respondent shall be
restored and entitled to all civil rights and legal status
of any other mentally competent person.
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LIABILITY FOR TORTIOUS ACTS OF NEGLIGENCE

In some areas a mentally incompetent individual, adjudicated or not adjudicated, is treated no differently from an
ordinary citizen. For instance, he is not relieved of liability
for his negligent acts by virtue of incompetency. In the case of
Johnson v. Lambotte,1 94 the Colorado Supreme Court followed
the majority rule"9 5 and declared that an incompetent person
is held to the same standard of care as a person of sound mind
as far as tortious negligence is concerned. The court intimated
that a different rule might apply with regard to torts requiring the elements of intent, or malice. This case involved a
woman who had left the mental hospital where she was confined under a hospitalization order, drove a car, and became
involved in an accident. Shortly after this time, she was adjudicated mentally incompetent.
In many areas, however, the Colorado law treats a mental
incompetent in a special way. Sometimes he is stripped of rights
and powers which most legally competent persons (barring
certain special groups such as felons) are allowed to exercise. In
some other areas the law affords a mental incompetent greater
protection than it gives a competent individual. In some cases,
the imposition of the disabilities and granting of these privileges depends on whether an individual has been formally
adjudicated incompetent, but in many cases it does not.
III.

DISABILITIES

A. Voting
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 49-3-2(2) (1963) states:
No person under guardianship, non compos
mentis, or insane shall be entitled to register or to
vote at any general, primary or special election.
B. Disqualificationas a Witness
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 154-1-6(1) (1963) provides: -(a)
The following persons shall not be witnesses: (b) those who
are of unsound mind at the time of their production for examination ....
The Colorado Supreme Court has ruled that the
question of whether an individual is of sound mind under this
statute is for the determination of the trial court in its sound
discretion, and that such a determination will not -be over194147 Colo. 203, 363 P.2d 165 (1961).
1

5See 44 C.J.S. Insane Persons § 122 (1945).
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turned, except where
Thus the fact that a
mentally incompetent
tion of soundness of

a clear abuse of discretion is shown. " '
prospective witness has been adjudicated
is not by itself determinative of the quesmind. 1 97

C. Testamentary Capacity
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 153-5-1 (1963) requires a person
to be of "sound mind and memory" to execute a will. The
Colorado Supreme Court has ruled that an adjudication of
incompetency by itself is not necessarily determinative of an
individual's testamentary capacity.'" 8 Instead, the supreme court
has declared the test of testamentary capacity to be a positive
showing that the testator understood the nature and consequences of his act.' 9
D. Motor Vehicle Operator's License
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4-22(1) (Supp. 1965) requires
the motor vehicle bureau to immediately revoke an individual's
operator's or chauffeur's license when he is adjudicated incompetent. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4-1(5) (1963), however authorizes the department of revenue to issue a license containing
any restrictions which may be desirable to insure the proper
operation of a motor vehicle to any person whose license has
been revoked as a result of an adjudication of incompetency.
For an incompetent to receive such a restricted license, a certified copy of the order of a medical commission approved by
the court adjudicating the individual mentally incompetent
must be filed with the department. The order must state that
the individual's mental condition as of the date of the finding
of incompetency will not impair in any respect his ability to
safely operate a motor vehicle on state highways. Before authorizing such a license, the statute requires the department
to make an examination of an unspecified nature.
E. Change of Beneficiary on an Insurance Policy
In the case of Crain v. Electrical Workers Benefit Association,"00 the Colorado Supreme Court applying the rule used
196 Garrison v. People, 158 Colo. 348, 408 P.2d 60 (1965).
197 Howard v. Hester, 139 Colo. 255, 338 P.2d 106 (1959). See generally Tubbs v.
Hilliard, 104 Colo. 164, 89 P.2d 535 (1939); Wilkinson v. People, 86 Colo. 406,
282 P.2d 257 (1929).
198 Martin v. Reid, 106 Colo. 69, 101 P.2d 25 (1940).

10 Cunningham v. Stender, 127 Colo. 293, 301, 255 P.2d 977 (1953).
"0 146 Colo. 361, 361 P.2d 442 (1961).
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in most jurisdictions decided that an attempted change of beneficiary by a mental incompetent is ineffective.
F. Adjudication of Incompetency as a Ground for Divorce or
Separate Maintenance

Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 46-1-1(1) (i) (1963) states that an
individual may sue for divorce on the ground that his spouse
has been adjudicated mentally ill or deficient within the previous three years. However, the adjudicated spouse must not

have been restored to competency before the entry of the divorce decree. Even though a divorce may be granted, a husband
will not be relieved of his duty to support his incompetent wife
unless she has sufficient means to support herself. Colo. Rev.

Stat. Ann. § 46-2-1(b) (1963) makes all grounds for divorce
sufficient bases in an action for separate maintenance and
therefore to be deemed mentally ill or deficient will fulfill
this requirement.
G. Mental Incompetency as a Ground for Annulment
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 46-3-1(g) (1963) makes a marriage voidable where "one or both of the parties were mentally
incapable of giving voluntary consent to the marriage." Here
again an adjudication of incompetency is not conclusive, but
2 1
serves only as evidence of the requisite mental incapacity. "
IV.

PRIVILEGES, IMMUNITIES AND SPECIAL
PROTECTIVE MEASURES

A. Conservatorship
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 153-9-2(1) (Supp. 1965) requires
the court of jurisdiction to appoint a conservator for an individual adjudicated mentally ill, if he is a resident in the county
or has property in the county which must be conserved, and
if a conservator has not already been appointed by another
Colorado court.
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 153-9-4 (Supp. 1965) allows a
district or probate court to appoint a conservator for a nonresident of Colorado adjudicated mentally ill, who owns property in the state regardless of whether a conservator or other
fiduciary has been appointed in his state or county of residence.
An involunary conservaorship contains elements of both
a disability and of a privilege or special protective measure.
201

Young v. Colorado National Bank, 148 Colo.
(1961).

104, 118-19, 365 P.2d 701, 710
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On the one hand, the mental incompetent is divested of the
right to control his financial and general affairs as he sees fit.
But at the same time, the law affords his assets special protection by placing them in the hands of a presumably competent
fiduciary and placing liability on the estate rather than on the
incompetent personally."'
B. Execution of a Judgment Against an Incompetent
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 153-12-5(2) (1963) prohibits execution on a judgment against a mental incompetent and provides that the judgment must be filed as a claim against his
estate. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 153-12-3 (1963) lists the priorities of claims against a mental incompetent's estate.
C. Statute of Limitations
Colo. Rev. Slat. Ann. § 87-1-17 (1963) provides that statutes of limitation do not run against an individual who is
insane at the time the cause of action accrues. The statute does
not begin to run until after the individual has been restored
to competency. 3 The Colorado Supreme Court has held that
an adjudication of incompetency is not necessary for this statute to operate.2" 4
D. Contracts
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 71-1-21 (1963) provides that "all
contracts, agreements and credits with or to any insane person,
shall be absolutely void as against such person, his heirs, or
personal representatives; but persons making such contracts or
agreements with any insane person shall be bound thereby at
the election of his conservators. ' 2 05 The court has yet to be faced
with the problem of interpreting this statute in a case where
an individual had already been adjudicated incompetent prior
to entering a contract.
The question of whether an individual was incompetent
at the time of the making of the contract so as to relieve him
from liability under the contract is an issue to be resolved on
the facts of each individual case. The test to be applied is that
of whether the alleged incompetent was incapable of under2 02

See generally Ellis v. Colorado National Bank, 86 Colo. 391, 282 P. 255 (1929).
203 Other statutes may place limitations on this provision. See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 87-2-3; 118-7-12; 118-7-13; 137-10-4 (1963).
2
04 Browne v. Smith, 119 Colo. 469, 205 P.2d 239'(1949).

205 The Colorado Supreme Court has ruled that this statute does not necessarily apply
to an individual found not guilty by reason of insanity in a criminal proceeding. See
Davis v. Colorado Kenworth Corp., 156 Colo. 98, 396 P.2d 958 (1964).
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standing and appreciating the extent and effect of business
transaction in which he engaged.206
E. Conveyances
One early case held an attempted conveyance by an individual already adjudicated mentally incompetent at the time
of the conveyance to be absolutely void." ° ' The precise question
of the validity of a conveyance by one adjudicated mentally
incompetent at the time of the conveyance has not arisen in
modern cases. In cases where mental incompetency has been
asserted in an effort to invalidate a deed, the court has decided
such cases according to their particular facts by applying the
familiar test of whether the allegedly incompetent grantor
understood the nature and extent of the transaction.2 0 1

Hanks v. McNeil Coal Corp., 114 Colo. 578, 168 P.2d 256 (1946) ; Ellis v. Colorado
National Bank, 90 Colo. 489, 498-99, 10 P.2d 336 (1932). Citing Ellis for this
proposition is Davis v. Colorado Kenworth Corp., 156 Colo. 98, 396 P.2d 958
(1964).
2Roher v. Darrow, 66 Colo. 463, 182 P. 13 (1919).
Wilson v. Girley, 145 Colo. 135, 357 P.2d 932 (1960) ; Bivens v. Van Matre, 129
Colo. 400, 270 P.2d 761 (1954) ; Ruffin v. Avara, 121 Colo. 567, 220 P.2d 355
(1950) ; Hanks v. McNeil Coal Corp., 114 Colo. 578, 168 P.2d 256 (1946) ; Green
v. Hulse, 57 Colo. 238, 142 P. 416 (1914) ; Elder v. Schumacher, 18 Colo. 433,
33 P. 175 (1893).
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EXCLUSION AND MODIFICATION OF
WARRANTY UNDER THE U.C.C.-How TO
SUCCEED IN BUSINESS WITHOUT BEING
LIABLE FOR NOT REALLY TRYING
By JOHN'E.

MOYE*

Recent decisions involving disclaimer of warranty have generated considerable confusion. These decisions are often irreconcilable or are based on nebulous notions of public policy. In this
timely and well documented article, Mr. Moye examines the pertinent Code provisions in light of their applications, and discusses
some of the policy considerationsinherent in these decisions. Moreover, he distills the rules for an effective disclaimer as the, have
been developed and modified by judicial interpretation. Finally,
he derives four principles which should guide the drafting of an
effective disclaimer:(1) define the risk, (2) negotiate the disclaimer; (3) clarify the agreement; and (4) prepare the evidence.
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INTRODUCTION

A sironic
as it may seem, the Uniform Commercial Code, promulgated specifically "to simplify, clarify and modernize

the law

governing commercial transactions;"'

has prompted a profusion

of conflicting and often irreconcilable opinions regarding the
'UNIFORM

U.C.C.1

COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-102(2) (a)

(1962 version)

[hereinafter cited as
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use of its warranty exclusion provisions.2 The reason behind such
diverse interpretations of a uniform code provision may be that
warranty cases must be decided on their facts, and the facts are
nearly always distinguishable. Each case then must balance the
interests served by the disclaimer against the interests giving rise
to the warranty being disclaimed, 3 and since those interests are
as varied as the persons whom they affect, it is not difficult to
understand why the cases are less than consistent. One student of
the disclaimer, after studying its evolution over a period of thirty
years, concluded that the underlying thesis behind the cases was
a determination to preserve a fair remedy in contract. 4 This diagnosis, typical of the generality required in this area of law, is
probably accurate but does little to define a method by which a
seller may prevent warranty liability. Moreover, the modern vendor
is subject to innumerable consumer pressures, not the least of
which is strict tort liability--a legal hazard that is apparently
immune to disclaimer of any kind.' Consequently, the ability to
limit warranty liability may indeed be "The manufacturer's last
stand ..

6

The classic case in the law of disclaimers is a good starting
point because it involved a disclaimer that "had everything wrong
with it." 7 In Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,' the clause
referring to the disclaimer was printed in type which was described by the court as "the least legible and most difficult to read
in the instrument .... .. The disclaimer was printed in small
type, on the back of the contract, among a series of clauses that
covered 81/ inches of fine print. Moreover, this was a standard
contract used by all automobile manufacturers and the buyer had
no freedom of choice whatever. Futhermore, the manufacturer
had provided Mr. and Mrs. Henningsen with an illusory, and
2The greatest confusion results from section 2-316, the major disclaimer provision.

Warranty of title has its own disclaimer provisions in section 2-312(2), and some
warranties may be disclaimed because they are cumulative and conflicting under
section 2-317. See text, § 111(A) (2) infra.
3See Note, Disclaimers of Warrant),in Consumer Sales, 77 HARV. L. REV. 318, 325
(1963) [hereinafter cited as Note, Disclaimers).
4See Note, Limitations on Freedom to Modify Contract Remedies, 72 YALE L.J. 723,
729 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Note, Limitations].
5 See Shanker, Strict Tort Theory of Products Liability and the Uniform Commercial
Code: A Commentary on Jurisprudential Eclipse, Pigeonholes and Communication
Barriers, 17 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 5, 40, 43 (1965). See also, Noel, Products
Liability of Retailers and Manufacturers in Tennessee, 32 TENN. L. REV. 207,
251-52 (1965). Disclaimer is a contractual concept, and thus not really applicable
in an action based on tort theory.
6 See Duesenberg, The Manufacturer's Last Stand: The Disclaimer, 20 Bus. LAW.
159 (1964).
7
1d. at 165.
832 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
9Id.at 365, 161 A.2d at 73.
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thereby worthless, expressed warranty which was to the exclusion
of all warranties.' ° Understandably, the court reacted strongly to
the disclaimer, finally declaring it to be invalid, probably because
it violated public policy." In doing so, the court established a
poorly defined standard which has encouraged courts to invalidate
disclaimers on the basis of vague notions of public policy. 2 While
the facts of the Henningsen case were highly unusual and hard
cases can make bad law, the decision certainly indicates that each
disclaimer must be evaluated within its individual context.
Warranty protection is a very important part of the consumer's legal arsenal. 1 The vendor generally occupies a far superior bargaining position, especially so in light of the fact that
the seller usually prepares the contract. Warranties were developed
to help correct this imbalance.' 4 On the other hand, there are a
number of unimpeachable reasons for a seller's attempting to
either limit or exclude his warranty liability. The use of a disclaimer can aid in the accurate determination of the seller's costs
by controlling the risk which he assumes. 5 Certainly the price of
a product is dependent up on the potential liability involved in
its sale. Where such liability is particularly difficult to estimate,
it may be impractical for the seller to market the product without
employing a disclaimer. I" This is especially true where he is a
'0 See Note, Limitations, supra note 4, at 736. See also the discussion in 36

NOTRE

DAME LAW. 233 '(1961).

It is significant to note that shortly after the Henningsen opinion was
published, all of the major automobile manufacturers increased the warranty
period on their products. Beginning with the 1961 model year, the standard
warranty will have a one year or 12,000 mile duration, instead of 90 days
or 4,000 miles .... Under the old warranty the buyer received nothing.
Under the new he receives three times nothing.
Id. at 236-37.
11 See Note, Limitations, supra note 4, at 736. See also Boshkoff, Some Thoughts About
Physical Harm, Disclaimers and Warranties, 4 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 285, 303-07
(1963) ; Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in California, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 9,
47-48 (1966).
12 See Haley v. Merit Chevrolet, Inc., 67 Ill. App. 2d 19, 214 N.E.2d 347 (1966).
But see Marshall v. Murray Oldsmobile Co., 207 Vr. 972, 154 S.E.2d 140, 144-45
(1967).
1aSee the policy arguments set forth in Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability
Theories and Disclaimers in Defective Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. REV. 974, 1008-12
(1966).
14 Compare U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 1 with U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment 1.
15 See Duesenberg, supra note 6, at 162, where the author laments that disclaimers are
occasionally used deceptively for risk elimination rather than forthrightly for risk
control. See also Note, Disclaimers, supra note 3, at 326-27.
16 See Blackburn, Warranties Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 ARB. J. (n.s.)
173 '(1967). The author notes that implied warranties, and what is required under
them, is not known, and therefore, the seller's potential liability is uncertain. Further,
in the case of an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, the seller
cannot be sure, unless he has disclaimed the warranty altogether, just what warranties
one of his salesmen might be held to have made. Id. at 180.
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marginal entrepreneur who is unable to shoulder the expenses occasioned by strict liability.' 7 Similarly, the price of a product reflects
the cost of repair or replacement and if the seller is unable to
rely on a disclaimer of this responsibility, he must necessarily raise
his price. To do this may impair his ability to compete effectively
and he could be forced out of business for lack of a reliable disclaimer.'" A related reason for a seller's disclaiming responsibility
is that he simply cannot estimate the quality of the product he is
selling or the amount of risk involved.' 9 Finally, the seller may
be concerned by the expensive litigation costs involved in a products liability or warranty action and thus desires to escape responsibility for the product as easily as possible. Certainly, if a buyer
is willing to accept the risks, what reason could exist for not
allowing him to enter into an agreement of his choosing? However,
for the buyer to enter into a contract he must be fairly appraised
of his rights and responsibilities under that contract. Herein lies
one of the elements of an effective disclaimer -impress upon the
buyer that the risk is his.2" Of course, the seller cannot afford to
create anxieties in his buyers to a point where the product becomes unmarketable. 21 Accordingly, the object in the disclaimer
game is to exclude warranty responsibility as softly, and as legally,
as possible.
Unquestionably, sellers possess the capacity to limit warranty
liability as to expressed and implied warranties, by sufficiently
specific and clear language. 2 Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
17 See Note, Disclaimers, supra note 3, at 327-28.
18 This consideration does not apply solely to the seller who is marketing an inferior

product. Any seller will admit that no matter how reliable his inspection system is,
mistakes are made.
19 See Prosser, supra note 11, at 46.
20 Dean William D. Hawkland (of Buffalo School of Law) has developed the proposi-

21

22

tion by using the celebrated case of Gardner v. Gray, 171 Eng. Rep. 46, 47 (N.P.
1815). "The purchaser," thundered Lord Ellenborough, "cannot be supposed to buy
goods to lay them on a dunghill." Dean Hawkland commented: "He might have
added that the buyer has no cause to complain that the goods ultimately end up on
the dunghill if the situation makes clear to him that the risk is his." Hawkland,
Limitation of Warranty Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 11 How. L.J. 28,
30-31 (1965).
See Boshkoff, supra note 11, at 307. In fact, it would be unreasonable to expect a
seller to impress upon a buyer that a possibility existed that one of every thousand
items sold would be harmful, and this particular one could be it. Id. The buyer need
only know that the quality of the item is his risk, and that he should conduct himself
accordingly.
See Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Flexible Tubing Corp., 270 F. Supp. 548, 561 (D. Conn.
1967). This pre-code law still applies to the sections of the U.C.C. dealing with
disclaimer. Freedom of the parties to make their own agreement is inherent in the
Code, and is upheld by the courts. See, e.g., Construction Aggregates Corp. v. HewittRobins, Inc., 404 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 921 (1969).
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if the rules are followed all warranty liability may be excluded.2
Similarly, the courts appear willing to uphold these disclaimers
where it appears that the disclaimer was a product of mutual agreement and made in the absence of fraud.24 However, as is indicated
by the Henningsen decision, a successful disclaimer must be both
bargained for and equitable. Moreover, the length of that opinion
and the volume of litigation regarding disclaimers is indicative
of the close judicial scrutiny such provisions must be able to withstand. Although, the Uniform Commercial Code provisions assist
the draftsman in preparing an ostensibly bargained for and equitable disclaimer, judicial scrutiny remains as yet the most difficult
hurdle. In order to successfully draft such a provision, one must
understand not only the nature and purpose of its use, but also
the technical requirements and contexts in which they may be used.
These aspects will be examined in light of the applicable Code
provisions and their treatment by the courts in order to gain
insights into the drafting of such a disclaimer provision.
I.

EXCLUSION OR MODIFICATION OF THE EXPRESS WARRANTY

The best way to avoid the liability imposed by an express
warranty is not to create the warranty in the first place. It is a
contradiction of the highest order for the seller to expressly assure
the buyer that the product will perform while at the same time
assure him that it may not. Certainly it would be a perversion of
the law to let the seller get away with it. It is to this situation,
where the seller gives an express warranty in one breath and takes
it back in the next, that section 2-316(1) is directed.
The 1952 version of the Uniform Commercial Code adopted a
strong position on disclaimer of express warranties, declaring:
"Ifthe agreement creates an express warranty, words disclaiming it
are inoperative."2 5 Commentators concluded from this provision
that no matter how carefully the sales contract was drawn, express
warranties could not be excluded.2" In the current edition this
section has for some reason emerged with what appears to be
23 U.C.C. § 2-316.
24 See, e.g., Sarwark Motor Sales, Inc. v. Husband, 5 Ariz. App. 304, 426 P.2d 404
(1967) ; Marshall v. Murray Oldsmobile Co., 207 Va. 972, 154 S.E.2d 140 (1967);
25

Northwest Collectors, Inc. v. Gerritsen, 446 P.2d 197 (Wash. 1968).
U.C.C. § 2-316 (1952 version).

26 See Note, The Uniform Commercial Code and Greater Consumer Protection Under

Warranty Law, 49 KY. L.J. 240, 253 (1961). This article, referring to the early
Code provision as the "old orthodox view," comments that such a strenuous position
is contrary to "general contract principles." Id.
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a considerably different rule. 7 Section 2-316(1) now provides:
Words or conduct relevent to the creation of an express warranty
and words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be
construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; but
subject to the provisions of this article on parol or extrinsic evidence (section 2-202) negation or limitation is inoperative to the
extent that such construction is unreasonable.
Whereas the original rule provided some guidance in this
subject, no matter how distastful it may have been to the merchant, the present position remands the issue to the courts, who
are hard pressed to interpret the new language differently from
the old.2

A. Exclusion or Modification Through Language Related to
Express Warranty
The Code permits the creation of an express warranty in three
ways: (1) any affirmation of fact or promise which relates to the
goods; (2) any description of the goods; or (3) any sample or
model.29 When any of these situations occur and the representations
become part of the "basis of the bargain" an express warranty is
created.3° Where this warranty is inconsistent with other language
within the contract (i.e., the disclaimer) it will be construed as an
ambiguity of terms which is resolved by making one term yield
to the other."1 The purpose of the disclaimer provision relating
to these express warranties is to "protect a buyer from unexpected
and unbargained for language of disclaimer. ' 3' Therefore, language
Some of the legislative history of section 2-316 is contained in Hogan, The Highways
and Some of the Byways in the Sales and Bulk Sales Articles of the Uniform Commercial Code, 48 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 7 n.25 (1962). There is evidence, however, that
some pressure was brought to bear on the draftsmen of the Code by persons who
were interested in effectively disclaiming their warranties. See Ezer, The Impact of
the Uniform Commercial Code on the California Law of Sales Warranties, 8
U.C.L.A.L. REV. 281, 310 (1961), where the author quotes Professor Grant Gilmore
who stated that he was: "[inclined to cite the drafting history of 2-316 ... as an
illustration of the useful truth that when a law professor ventures out into the real
world, as a draftsman of statutes . . . he will be well advised to take his brass
knuckles along; he will need them before he gets through." Id. at 310, quoting from,
Lectures by Professor G. Gilmore, No. 4, at 13 (unpublished lectures at Yale Law
School, 1958).
28See Berk v. Gordon Johnson Co., 232 F. Supp. 682 (E.D. Mich. 1964). "Section
2-316 of the 1952 version of the Code stated simply, in subsection (1), 'If the agreement creates an express waranty, words disclaiming it are inoperative.' The Michigan
version of this provision modifies the 1952 language, but the spirit of the provision
remains the same." Id. at 688 (emphasis added). See generally Note, The Uniform
Commercial Code and Greater Consumer Protection Under Warranty Law, 49 KY.
L.J. 240, 253 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Note, Consumer Protection].
SU.C.C. § 2-313(1).
30 "The basis of the bargain" test is a reliance factor used to weave the warranty "into
the fabric of the agreement." U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 3. It is easy to extend the
'express" warranty concept beyond the specific rules outlined in section 2-313(1).
See Shanker, supra note 5, at 40-41 n.124, and text accompanying notes 54-57, infra.
31 See Hawkland, supra note 20, at 28-29.
2
U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 1. See First National Bank v. Husted, 57 Ill.
App. 2d 227,
205 N.E.2d 780, 784 (1965).
2
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which creates an inconsistency, leaving both the buyer and seller
unable to appraise their respective risks, or language which is
unclear and gives rise to an ambiguity, is ineffectual in disclaiming
an express warranty. It is easy to deduce that since the warranty
is both expressed and disclaimed by certain language, in most
33
cases that language will be inconsistent.
In such cases, a reconciliation process is employed, or, if
reconciliation is impossible, some theory is adopted which declares
a consistent construction of the terms to be "unreasonable," thereby
allowing section 2-316(1) to sever the disclaimer from the contract
as "inoperative."3 4 Several theories have been proposed for justifying this result when it appears that reconciliation of the terms
is impossible. Suppose that a buyer and a seller agree on a contract which states that the product being sold is guaranteed to
perform trouble-free for two years. The contract also provides
that "there are no warranties, express or implied." First, it may
be said that the express warranty is created by specific terms,
whereas the disclaimer is couched in general terms. Since, by a
familiar rule of construction, specific terms prevail over the general,
the express warranty will prevail. 35 Secondly, the law is settled
that ambiguities in a contract of sale will be construed against the
party who created them" and, since the seller provided these conflicting contract terms, he should be held to his warranty.3 7 Thirdly,
the contract should be examined to determine if its language, read
as a whole, fairly apprises the parties of their respective risks. If
it does not, the matter must be resolved arbitrarily.38 Finally, since
an express warranty is created only when the enumerated factors
become "part of the basis of the bargain,"3 " a disclaimer of one
of those factors is a disclaimer of part of the bargain itself. The
disclaimer is ignored, then, because it reaches to the "essence" of
0
the contract and to uphold it would be to destroy the bargain. 4
The numerous theories for defeating a disclaimer leads one to
33 See generally Note, Strict Products Liability and the Bystander, 64 COLUM. L. REV.
916, 919-20 (1964).

34 "[T]he critical determination turns on whether the apparently conflicting language
of the warranty and disclaimer clauses can be reconciled. If it can, the disclaimer will
be given at least the limited effect of illuminating the whole contract and thereby
modifying the protective thrust of the warranty. If it cannot, the disclaimer will be
completely rejected."
Hawkland, supra note 20, at 28-29.
35See Note, Consumer Protection, supra note 28, at 253.
36

See 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 559, at 262 (1960).
37 See Note, Strict Products Liability, supra note 33, at 919.
38
39

See Hawkland, supra note 20, at 29.
U.C.C. § 2-313(1).

40 See Note, Limitations, supra note 4, at 738-39.
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wonder whether a disclaimer can ever be reasonably construed to
be consistent with the express warranty.
1. Warranty by Affirmation of Fact or Promise.
The type of express warranty which a seller would most like
to disclaim with impunity is the warranty by affirmation of fact.
This legal millstone has long plagued the art of salesmanship, 4'
and the drafters of the Code recognized that some statements made
by sellers just can not, in common experience, be considered to be
part of the bargain.4 2 While the seller cannot consistently affirm
a fact about a product and then subsequently disaffirm it, he may
make his pitch and then retreat a bit. For example, suppose the
contract is for the sale of "one copper brewing vat with a two-ton
capacity." The seller may disclose to the buyer that this item will
not corrode or decay for a period of years, and a warranty to that
effect has been made. However, the seller could add that in order
to prevent corrosion and decay, the purchaser must undertake a
regular maintenance program, and if such a program is not successfully performed, the guarantee will not apply. Dean Hawkland
points out that often the parties do not intend the warranty clause
to be given its plain meaning. In such a case, a disclaimer may
be employed to modify, but not to negate, the warranty.4 3 There
are two key issues in his analysis (1) the modification (not
negation) of the warranty, and (2) the intention of the parties.44
The negation of the warranty is flatly prohibited by section
2-316(1). If the warranty is stated, and then negated, no reasonable construction of such terms as consistent with each other is
possible. On the other hand, when the warranty is modified, the
words of disclaimer tend to explain the words of warranty, rather
than contradict them.
The intent of the parties is important because section 2-316
was drafted in order to protect the buyer from unbargained language
of disclaimer. 45 How could a buyer really intend to enter into an
agreement if he wasn't aware of significant terms of the contract?
The intention of the seller at the time the statements are made is irrelevant to the
determination of a warranty. See U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 3. See also Charles F.
Curry & Co. v. Hedrick, 378 S.W.2d 522, 536 (Mo. 1964); Turner v. Central
Hardware Co., 353 Mo. 1182, 186 S.W.2d 603, 608 (1945); Compton v. M. O'Neil
Co., 101 Ohio App. 378, 381, 139 N.E.2d 635, 638 (1955).
42U.C.C. § 2-313(2) states that "an affirmation merely of the value of the goods or
a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the
goods does not create a warranty." But whether or not the statements made constituted warranty still remains for the court to determine. See Dailey v. Holiday
41

Distrib. Corp., 260 Iowa 859, 151 N.W.2d 477 (1967).

43 Hawkland, supra note 20, at 29.
44 The seller's intention in creating the express warranty is, of course, irrelevant. It is
the intention of both parties that it be modified that is important here.
45 U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 1.
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Consequently, if the seller impresses upon the buyer that the risk
is his, and the buyer persists in his purchase after being so appraised,
then the seller should be relieved from responsibility for that risk."
Whether or not the buyer has been adequately apprised of his responsibilities is a question of fact, and the effectiveness of the
disclaimer is dependent on that determination.17 The problem is
clearly one of draftmanship, since the written contract may be
drafted in such a way as to completely determine all liability
resulting from the express warranty.48 One authority has recommended that the language of disclaimer should immediately follow
the language of warranty. 49 Another has concluded that the disclaimer and warranty language must at least be on the same page
of the contract. 50 In short, it must be apparent that the buyer clearly
understood which risks are his and which risks remain the seller's
responsibility. Where it appears from the entire agreement that
a reasonable buyer would expect the seller to assume certain risks
even though the seller had no intention of doing so, a court will
overlook any language of disclaimer and will require the seller
to perform. 5
It should be apparent that affirmations of fact should be made
sparingly, and only when the seller is willing and able to keep
them. If any affirmation of fact is not absolutely true, or if a
promise will be honored only in selective situations, the seller must
say so immediately. For example, the seller cannot claim the product
is "rustproof" and later say that this is applicable only where the
product is used indoors. Neither can he promise to replace parts
for two years, and afterwards interpose that the guarantee is conditional on the seller's approval of the buyer's maintenance program.
Words which disclaim part of the effect of a warranty, and follow
immediately thereafter may be construed as modifying the warranty,
rather than negating it. Moreover, since value judgments are allowed by the Code, the seller should coach his salesmen to preface
A court has recognized that the parties have the right to fix warranties by mutual
agreement. See Marshall v. Murray Oldsmobile Co., 207 Va. 972, 154 S.E.2d 140,
144 (1967) (and case cited therein).
47The court may make several different determinations if it finds that the buyer has
not been made aware of his risks. See text, § V, infra.
48 See text, § I (c) infra.
49 Hogan, supra note 27, at 7.
50 Blackburn, supra note 16, at 178.
51Once an affirmation of fact is made, a warranty is created, whether or not the seller
ever intended such an effect. "[Any fact which is to take such affirmations, once
made, out of the agreement requires clear affirmative proof." U.C.C. § 2-313,
Comment 3. Thus, the seller would have to affirmatively show that no reasonable
buyer could have relied on the affirmation of fact before the disclaimer could be
effective.
46
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their comments with the words "in my opinion," in order to ensure
that they are taken as such and not as affirmations of fact.
2. Warranty by Description

Where the express warranty has been created by a description
of the goods, that description must be complied with, and cannot be
disclaimed by any language. This conclusion is based on the fundamental contract principle that a vendor cannot sell apples and send
oranges. In the example where "one copper brewing vat with twoton capacity" is the subject matter of a contract which also contains
a clause disclaiming all warranties, it cannot be concluded by any
reasonable construction that the seller could deliver a tin brewing
vat, or a copper vat with one-ton capacity, or a copper mixing vat,
without suffering warranty liability.5 2 If the seller has stated a
53
description, he must conform to it.
Because the description warranty is immune to disclaimer, courts
and commentators are anxious to fit as many transactions as possible
into this category. One author contends that a contract to deliver a
"truck" may be construed as describing a "workable truck," and an
express warranty to that effect is thereby created. 4 A recent case
considered a contract for cotton seed which described the product
as follows: "60, 50# bags Hi-Vigor Stoneville 213 Demonsan treatment." At the same time the contract contained a disclaimer of all
warranty "as to description, productiveness, or any other matter
of any seed that we sell...
,5
and it further disclaimed responsibility for the crop. The state regulations required that the
percentage of germination of the seeds be stated on a tag and
attached to each bag.56 In this case, each tag showed the germination to be 80 percent but a test of some of the seed, after unsuccessful attempts at production showed a germination of only 27.75
percent. The plaintiff sued for breach of warranty and the defendant
interposed the disclaimer. The court refused to uphold the disclaimer, claiming that the germination guarantee was part of the
description of the product. However, was this really any more
than an affirmation of fact? The official comments to section 2-313
52 Of course, the seller probably could describe the product, and then immediately

modify it. For example, "one copper brewing vat with two-ton capacity, but without
normal valve fittings which are needed to operate a brewing vat." But these modifications are part of a new description, and do not constitute a disclaimer.
52 See Hawkland, supra note 20, at 28-30; Weeks, The Illinois Uniform Commercial
Code: Article 2- Sales, 50 ILL. B.J. 494, 515 (1962).
54 Shanker, supra note 5, at 40-41 n.124.
55 Walcott & Steele, Inc. v. Carpenter, 246 Ark. 93, 436 S.W.2d 820, 822, 6 U.C.C.
Rep. 89, 91 (1969).
56 Id. An interesting point to note here is that a governmental regulation, by requiring
a description, creates a warranty which is immune to disclaimer.
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recognize that a "description" may include technical specifications,
blueprints, and possibly even the quality of the goods previously
delivered by the seller."7 Therefore, the types of statements which
may be treated as a description and which as such are immune to a
disclaimer, are quite numerous.
To the extent that a warranty of description arises from the
course of dealings, a seller may find himself in a precarious position.
For example, if the seller had contracted to deliver onion seed to
the buyer, and he delivered "Grade A onion seed" he has created a
warranty of description and the buyer can expect the next delivery
to conform therewith. Because warranties of description cannot be
disclaimed or totally avoided in a continuous performance contract,
a seller would be well advised to periodically re-evaluate his conduct
to insure that he is able to perform to the expectations that the buyer
has assumed.
Since parties to a contract always describe the subject matter
of the contract, a description warranty is made in every case. As a
practical matter, the seller should couch the description in general
terms and should be certain that the product described can be delivered. If he is not certain whether he can deliver "one copper
brewing vat with two-ton capacity" he should delete that part of
the description about which he is uncertain. If the buyer insists on
each element of the description the seller might consider foregoing
the transaction. At least he should be aware of the fact that he
cannot rely on disclaiming language in the contract to save him
from the struggle with a description once it has been made.
3. Warranty by Sample or Model
The circumstances and statements of the seller surrounding the

displaying of a sample or model play an important part in deciding
whether or not a disclaimer is effective. The official comments
describe certain presumptions with which the seller must contend.
A presumption exists that any sample or model is intended to become part of the basis of the bargain, but the presumption is not
as strong when the model represents merchandise not on hand.5 8
Thus, when showing a product, the seller has an opportunity to
impress upon the buyer that the sample or model is intended only
to "suggest," rather than to "be," the character of the subject matter
of the contract.5 9 However, the seller must do so in a clear and
57U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 5.
58 U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 6.
59
d. See Baltimore Machine & Equip., Inc. v. Holtite Mfg. Co., 241 Md. 36, 215
A.2d 458 (1965).
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convincing manner because he must overcome the presumption that
the displayed item is part of the basis of the bargain," ° and he will
have to convince a jury that the buyer understood the reason for
displaying the item."' The exclusion of the warranty created by the
displaying of a sample or model must be contemporaneous with the
display, since the facts and circumstances surrounding that incident
are determinative of the effect of that warranty.6 2 The contract, which
would ordinarily contain the written disclaimer where one is to be
used, is usually executed after the sample or model has been shown.
Thus, it seems that written disclaimers which are not contemporaneous with the displaying of a sample would be as ineffective
against the sample as they are against an express warranty of description. This is so because, once the sample has been deemed to
be representative of the product, the sample really becomes the
description,63 and the policy surrounding disclaimer of a warranty
by description would be equally applicable here.6 4 Therefore, when
showing a sample or model, the seller should impress upon the
buyer that the item displayed is only intended to "suggest" the
character of the finished product. The seller can do so by having
words printed on the item or on a conspicuous tag attached thereto
stating: "This samplet is intended to suggest the characted of our
product. Manufacturing processes may produce variations in the
finished product which are not evident from this sample." The
seller could even request that the buyer sign a statement of understanding to that effect when the sample is displayed. If the buyer
insists on the exact specifications of the sample, the seller may
safely assure him that every effort will be made to duplicate it, but
can not specifically promise duplication without incurring liability
were he later to be unable to comply.
60 The distinction between "suggesting" and "being" is drawn in the official comment.
U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 6. It would seem that the seller, by pointing out that the
displayed item is intended only to "suggest" the product, is really never creating
any warranty, rather than disclaiming one. In fact, a district court in Beech Aircraft
Corp. v. Flexible Tubing Corp., 270 F. Supp. 548, 562 (D. Conn. 1967), held that
the mere exhibition of a sample does not mean that the sale is by sample. Id. at 562.
There is no indication that this pre-Code law is not equally applicable to section
2-313. See also American Canning Co. v. Flat Top Grocery Co., 68 W. Va. 698,
703-04, 70 S.E. 756, 759 (1911). However, in view of the fact that the Code speaks
of a presumption that a warranty arises when a sample or model is displayed, it is
better to assume that what is being done is disclaiming a warranty that has been
created. See U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 6.
61 See Sylvia Coal Co. v. Mercury Coal & Coke Co., 151 W. Va. 818, 156 S.E.2d 1
(1967).
62
See U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 6.
63 See, e.g.. Baltimore Machine & Equip., Inc. v. Holtite Mfg. Co., 241 Md. 36, 41,
215 A.2d 458, 460-61 (1965).
64See text, § I(A) (2) supra, and Note, Limitations, supra note 4 at 738-39. See also,
Weeks, supra note 53, at 515.
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To rely only on language of disclaimer in order to avoid the
effect of an express warranty is a hazardous endeavor. As was stated,
the best way to avoid express warranty liability is to avoid creating
the warranty in the first place. Language of disclaimer alone will
have no effect on a warranty of description. On the other hand, such
language can be effective to disclaim a warranty by sample or model,
but only if it is contemporaneous with the display, in such a way
as to overcome the presumption that such sample or model was a
part of the basis of the bargain, and in a manner sufficiently clear
to convince a jury that the buyer understood the limited nature of
that display. Similarily, language of disclaimer alone may be effective as to warranties arising by affirmation of fact but only where
the following criteria are met: (1) the buyer was fairly apprised
of his rights and liabilities under the contract, and (2) both parties
intended the effect of the disclaimer. Moreover, an express warranty
may never be completely negated by a disclaimer and where the
exculpatory language is to have any effect at all, it may only modify
the express warranty.
B. Exclusion or Modification of the Express Warranty Through

Recognized "Disclaimer" Language
General language of disclaimer such as "the seller makes no
warranty, express or implied," or other words and phrases of a
similar meaning, were the specific targets of section 2-316.65 Words
of art such as "with all faults" and "as is," although specifically
allowed to have a disclaiming effect under the Code, are directed
only toward exclusion of inplied warranty. "6 Of course, such language, when considered with regard to an express warranty, would
be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with the language
creating the warranty." Nonetheless it is difficult to imagine a case
where the terms "as is" or "with all faults" could be construed to
be any less than an attempt to completely negate the warranty.
Even so, the import of section 2-316 remains subject to judicial
interpretation 68 and courts have recently intimated that perhaps genComment 1.
§ 2-316(3)'(a). This section states:

65U.C.C. § 2-316,
66 U.C.C.

(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2) of this section:
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties
are excluded by expressions like "as is," "with all faults," or other language
which in common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion
of warranties and makes plain that there is no implied warranty ....(emphasis added).
67

id.
This is the test prescribed by the Code. See U.C.C. § 2-316(1).

68 See Ezer, supra note 27, at 311.
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eral language may disclaim express warranties after all. 69 However,
it is significant to note that the courts which have so intimated have,
with one exception,7" not been governed by the Uniform Commercial
Code, although the decisions were handed down after the Code became effective. The confusing feature of these cases is simply that
they are included in annotations which interpret section 2-316 of
the Code,7 1 and that section intended no such interpretation. Recognized "disclaimer" language that is aimed at the exclusion of a
warranty, can be every bit as inconsistent as any other type of
language could be. In fact, to declare these clauses inoperative is
easily justified because they are directed toward the elimination of
all warranty liability. Similarily, these terms are general in nature
and as such will be ignored where inconsistent language is more
specific. 72 In conclusion, then, the courts have a number of theories
by which they could hold such disclaimers ineffective as to the express
warranty.
C. Exclusion of Express Warranties by use of the ParolEvidence Rule
Although disclaimer language directed to the express warranty
carries questionable legal weight, it is possible, through careful draftsmanship, to do indirectly that which cannot be done directly. The
parol evidence provision of the Code73 has been made applicable to
the express warranty provisions in order to protect the seller against
"false allegations of oral warranties" and "unauthorized representations."174 It does more than that. It gives the seller a second chance
if he concludes that the oral warranties or authorized representations
were improprietious. 75 According to the Code's parol evidence rule,
69

See Intrastate Credit Service, Inc. v. Pervo Paint Co., 236 Cal. App. 2d 547, 552,
46 Cal. Rptr. 182, 185 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965) ("A provision that the buyer takes
the article in the condition in which it is, or 'as is,' prevents representations of the
seller, although relied upon by the buyer, from constituting express or implied
warranties." Quoting from Roberts Distributing Co. v. Kaye-Halbert Corp., 126
Cal. App. 2d 664. 669, 272 P.2d 886, 889 (1954)); Claxton v. Pullman, Inc., 116
Ga. App. 416, 418, 157 S.E.2d 642, 644 (1967) ("It is well settled that selling
'as is' and with specific disclaimer of warranty is sufficient to negate all warranties,
express or implied.") ; James Talcott, Inc. v. Finley, 389 P.2d 988, 993 (Okla.
1964) ("[L]egal corollary that such a condition ["as is"] negatives both express
and implied warranties and precludes the defense of failure of consideration.")
70A Pennsylvania lower court case, Garner v. Tomcavage, 34 Pa. Northumb. L.J. 18
(1962), said that a provision stating that the goods were sold "as is" excluded any
warranty express or implied under section 2-316. This seems to be the only case
which has implied that result under the Code, and insofar as that is what the court
intended, does not appear to be good law.

71See

I

UNIFORM

LAWS

ANNOTATED,

UNIFORM

COMMERCIAL

CODE

§

1-101

to

§ 2-725, at 242-43 (West Publishing Co. 1968).
72 See text accompanying note 35 supra, and Note, Consumer Protection, supra note 28,
at 253.
73 U.C.C. § 2-202.
74U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 2.
75 See Hogan, supra note 27, at 8; Duesenberg, supra note 6, at 163; Note Consumer
Protection, supra note 28, at 252.
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terms which are set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a
final expression of their agreement, cannot be contradicted by a
prior agreement or by a contemporaneous oral agreement although,
they may be explained or supplemented. 76 Therefore the language
in the contract constitutes the complete agreement and other terms
can be included only if they do not contradict -that
is, are consistent - with the language written in the contract. Thus, if the
language in the agreement is disclaimer language, and the seller
had created an express oral warranty prior to the signing of the
contract, the warranty, to be enforced, must be consistent with the
terms of disclaimer. In such situations the buyer has the burden of
proving that the terms are consistent and an express oral warranty
is ineffective wherever inconsistent with the disclaimer.
Accordingly, if the requirements of section 2-202 are met and
the contract contains language of disclaimer, the parties have reversed the effect of section 2-316(1).
In Green Chevrolet Co. v. Kemp,77 the buyer attempted to assert
express warranty for all mechanical parts for one year. However, he
had signed a conditional sales contract which provided that all conditions and agreements were covered by that contract. The court
ruled that testimony regarding the seller's representations was improperly admitted because it was contradictory and inconsistent with
the terms of the sales contract.7" Nonetheless, consistent with the
narrow construction generally afforded rules which adversely affect
consumers, 79 courts will examine the contract carefully and apply
section 2-202 only when absolutely necessary. Of course, if the contract contains an ambiguity on its face, parol evidence may be introduced to resolve it.8 ° Such was the case in Leveridge v. Notaras,8 1
where the contract stated that the buyer accepted the automobile
"in its present condition," and that "there are no warranties or
representations, expressed or implied, not specified herein." On the
same contract the salesman had written the words, "30 day warranty"
in his handwriting in a blank portion of the form. Despite an "integration" or "merger" clause in the contract, the court allowed introduction of parol evidence to solve the ambiguity thereby created.
One difficult hurdle is proving to the court that the writing
was intended by the parties as the final expression of the agreement.
76 U.C.C. § 2-202.

143, 3 U.C.C. Rep. 805, 806 (1966).
78 Id. at 143, 3 U.C.C. Rep. at 807. See also Appeals of Reeves Soundcraft Corp.,
ASBCA Nos. 9030 and 9130, 2 U.C.C. Rep. 210, 219 (1964).
79 See text, § IV infra.
77241 Ark. 62, 406 S.W.2d 142,

80 U.C.C. § 2-202.

81 433 P.2d 935, 937, 4 U.C.C. Rep. 691, 692 (Okla. 1967).

82 Id. at 941, 4 U.C.C. Rep. at 697.
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In Hull-Dobbs, Inc. v. Mallicoat8 3 the agreement stated that it was
the entire contract between the parties, but it also stated that the
warranties were not binding on any assignee of the seller. The court
concluded that this language indicated that warranties were to be
treated separate from the agreement itself, and therefore the agree84
ment was not the final expression of the agreement of the parties.
Generally where it can be shown that the buyer agreed to the contract as the final expression of the agreement, any warranties given
prior to or contemporaneous with the signing of the contract are
inadmissable and therefore ineffective.
II.

EXCLUSION OF THE WARRANTY OF TITLE

Exclusion of the warranty of title is provided for in a separate
section of the Code. Section 2-312 provides:
(2) A warranty under subsection (1) will be excluded or modified
only by specific language or by circumstances which give the buyer
reason to know that the person selling does not claim title in himself or that he is purporting to sell only such right or title as he
85
or a third person may have.

The significant element in such exclusion is that the specific
language or circumstances "give the buyer reason to know" of some
unusual factor in the title.86 Some situations which indicate a disclaimer as to title are mentioned in the comments. They include sales
by "sheriffs, executors, foreclosing lienors, and persons similarly
situated ....
87 The latter group should include any seller who is
clearly selling the property on behalf of a third person as evidenced
by the circumstances surrounding the transaction.
The Code and comments do not define what is meant by
"specific language" and there is a paucity of case material on the
subject. However, the courts will likely require that the language
be conspicuous, exacting and clear in light of the pre-Code attitude
toward this warranty.8 8 In Wilson v. Manhasset Ford, Inc.,89 the
court held that to allow an automobile dealer to evade his responsibility to furnish good title by the use of a disclaimer would be
83 3 U.C.C. Rep. 1032 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1966).
8

4U.C.C. § 2-312(2). See also Stern & Co. v. State Loan & Finance Corp., 238 F.
Supp. 901 (D.

Del. 1965)

analogizing section 2-202 to a contract for the sale of

securities.
85 U.C.C. § 2-312(2).
6Id.
87 U.C.C. § 2-312, Comment 5.
88 See N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-312, Comment 2 (McKinney 1964). Cf. Note, Contract Draftsmanship Under Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code. 112 U. PA. I. Rv.
564, 593 (1964).
8927 Misc. 2d 154, 156-57, 209 N.Y.S.2d 210, 212 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1960).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 46

subversive of public policy. At least, it has been held, reasonable
notice of the disclaimer must be given to the buyerY0
Warranty of title is not considered to be an implied warranty
and thus the general notion of disclaimer under section 2-316 is not
applicable. 1 As a result, disclaimers approved under section 2-316,
such as "as is" and "with all faults," and other disclaimers which
satisfy the requirements stated, 92 are ineffective as to the warranty
of title.9 3 While such language may well call the buyer's attention
to the risks of quality and performance, it cannot be presumed that
they would put him on notice of a defect in title. The buyer may not
be aware that he is assuming all of the risks inherent in the item
when he purchases it, but at the least he thinks he owns it. Therefore, a practical and effective disclaimer of this warranty will require
a clear statement that it is the warranty of title that is being disclaimed, and that the seller does not actually own the property being
sold. This disclaimer may be oral or written, though written notice
is preferable. For example, a sign attached to the product which
states that the seller does not claim title in himself, but is selling
for a third person, would probably be sufficient. 4
III.

EXCLUSION OR MODIFICATION OF THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES

OF QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE
An implied warranty is exactly what it says it is - a warranty
implied in law from the very fact that the transaction has taken
place. The obligation imposed by an implied warranty results from
implication of law, not from the conduct of the parties."' Since it
arises by operation of law, it will exist whether or not the parties
address themselves to it in the course of the transaction.9 6 One court
90

Moore v. Schlossmon's, Inc., 5 Misc. 2d 693, 696, 161 N.Y.S.2d 213, 216 (City Ct.
of N.Y. 1957).
91 U.C.C. § 2-312, Comment 6. It had been considered an "implied" warranty under
the Sales Act. UNIFORM SALES ACT § 13, and for some time after the Code had been
promulgated. See Hawkland, In Re Articles 1, 2 and 6, 28 TEMPLE L.Q. 512, 515-16
(1955).
92 The language must be such as to call the buyer's attention to the exclusion of
warranty and to make it plain that there is no implied warranty. U.C.C. § 2-316(3)

(a). See text, § III(A)(1) infra.
93 See generally Note, Consumer Protection,supra note 28 at 257-58.
94 This is suggested as a method to ward off a security interest from attaching to
goods which have been consigned. U.C.C. § 2-326(3) (a).
95 See Note, Warranty Disclaimers and Limitation of Remedy for Breach of Warranty
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 43 BosToN U.L. REV.

396, 400 (1963)

[hereinafter cited as Note, Warranty Disclaimers].
9 In a sense, some of the implied warranties are very much like strict tort liability.
One court recognized that the purpose behind the implied warranty sections of the
Code is to hold the seller responsible when inferior goods are passed along to the
unsuspecting buyer. Vlases v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 377 F.2d 846, 850,
4 U.C.C. Rep. 164, 168 (3d Cir. 1967). But, unlike strict tort liability, the implied
warranties may be disclaimed. See Shanker, supra note 5, at 40.
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stated that the implied warranty is properly a matter of public
policy,9 7 and the considerations surrounding its disclaimer indicate
the implied warranty may indeed occupy that status.
Generally, the implied warranty may be excluded when there
exists words and conduct tending to show that this was the intention
of the parties. These warranties may be disclaimed by express unequivocal language where there is no problem of contradiction of
terms because some are not expressed in the contract. 8 In fact, the
language used must be "so clear, definite and specific so as to leave
no doubt as to the intent of the contracting parties.""9 Once again
it becomes a question of allocating the risk. On one hand is the
fact that the Code does not intend to burden the seller with the
same responsibility as is imposed by the law of product liability. 1°°
Freedom of contract is one of the basic propositions embodied in
the Code.'
However, section 2-316 intends to protect the buyer
from surprise,' °2 and will not permit the "expectations of the parties
to be disappointed through uncommunicative contractual provisions."103

The recommended method of disclaiming implied warranties of
quality and performance is prescribed by section 2-316 as follows:
(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied
warranty of merchantability or any part of it, the language must
mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicious, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness
the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous. Language to
exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states,
for example, that "There are no warranties which extend beyond
the description on the face hereof."

In addition, certain words or conduct will automatically exclude
these implied warranties of they are present in the transaction.
Section 2-316 continues:
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2) of this section:
(a) Unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied
warranties are excluded by expressions like "as is," "with
all faults" or other language which in common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of
97

Greene v. Clark Equipment Co., 237 F. Supp. 427, 431 (N.D. Ind. 1965). See

generally Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 901,

27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1962).
98See Hawkland, supra note 20, at 30.

9Boeing Airplane Co. v. O'Malley, 329 F.2d 585, 593 (8th Cir. 1964). This decision
was concerned with an earlier and more demanding section regarding disclaimer of
implied warranties. However, its directive is still good advice today.
100The Code allows the disclaimer of all liability for failure to manufacture or sell a
safe, workable product. See U.C.C. § 2-316. That is a far cry from strict liability
for such malfunctions. See generally Shanker, supra note 5, at 40, 43.
111See U.C.C. § 1-102(3).

10'U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 1.
103 Hawkland, supra note 20, at 31.
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warranties and makes plain that there is no implied warranty; and
(b) When the buyer before entering into the contract has examined the goods or the sample or model as fully as he
desired or has refused to examine the goods there is no
implied warranty with regard to defects which an examination ought in the circumstances to have revealed
to him; and
(c) An implied warranty can also be excluded or modified
by course of dealing or course of performance or usage
of trade.
These provisions seem reasonably clear on their face, but they
are subject to interpretation and are certainly not immune from the
confusion that pervades this section of the Code. The following may
best be described as an attempt to unscramble the egg.

A. Exclusive by Language of Disclaimer
The primary consideration in evaluating the words of exclusion
for implied warranties is whether or not both parties understand the
words and their legal implication.
1. Recognized "Disclaimer" Language Which Excludes All
Implied Warranties
The Code indicates that certain words of art, and words which
import the same meaning- namely, that there is no implied warranty - will have the effect of excluding all implied warranties.
These words are "as is" and "with all faults," 1 4 and, an official
comment adds, "as they stand."' 1 It has been recognized that an
apparent inconsistency results by applying these words of art to both
implied warranties of quality and performance."0 6 Subsection (2)
to section 2-316 indicates that the implied warranty of merchantability is to be treated differently than the implied warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose, since the former requires specific mention
of the word "merchantability." However, subsection (3) makes inapplicable the technical requirements of subsection (2)10 ' and apparently the words of art are intended to have the same effect as
stating "merchantability." In fact, to the ordinary buyer, the words
"as is" means much more than the word "merchantability." Whatever inconsistency may exist in treating the two warranties together is
10U.C.C. § 2-316.
105 Id., Comment 7. Although the comments are not part of the statute, the term "as
they stand" would, in the proper context, be properly included as "language which
in common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties
and makes plain there is no implied warranty ... ." U.C.C. § 2-316(3).
100 Donovan, Recent Development in Product Liability Litigation in New England. The
Emerging Confrontation Between the Expanding Law of Torts and the Uniform
Commercial Code, 19 ME. L. REv. 181, 213 (1967).
10' U.C.C. § 2-316.
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probably resolved in the policy of section 2-316 which states that
the object is to "protect the buyer from surprise."'u 8 That object is
accomplished just as well by the language in subsection (3) as by
mentioning "merchantability."
Arguably, none of these words or phrases adequately apprises
the buyer of the risks he is assuming. One authority commented that
such language probably suggests only that the goods are not top
quality, but does not indicate that the goods could be useless and
might be harmful.' 0 9 But it must be assumed that the draftsmen of
the Code considered these problems and concluded that it was more
desirable to allow words of "strict disclaimer" than to attempt to
grapple with and develop a rule around each potential fact situation.
The latter job belongs to the courts, and they have refined these rules.
The bench was not shocked at the thought of a "strict disclaimer" by use of the words "as is," since pre-Code law generally
recognized this term as negating implied warranties."1 Cases which
have interpreted section 2-316 accept the effect of this language on
implied warranties. In Chamberlain v. Bob Matick Chevrolet, Inc."'
the buyer sued for breach of warranty in the sale of an automobile.
The salesman had explained to the buyer that the car, if sold at a
particular price, would be sold "as is," and with no guarantee. The
sales agreement stated: "this car not guaranteed." The circuit court
of appeals agreed with the lower court that there were no implied
warranties, and cited section 2-316 in support of this position." 2
Similarly, special words of disclaimer were given an absolute effect
in First National Bank of Elgin v. Husted,"' which held that words
similar to "as is" and "with all faults" have the effect of excluding
implied warranties. The Code does leave an escape, however, in
case a court decides that to enforce this language would be unjust.
Subsection (3) (a) begins by equivocating "unless the circumstances
indicate otherwise .... " No court has yet based a decision on that
language, but there are some indication to that effect in an Illinois
case. The court in Crown Cork & Seal Co. Inc. v. Hires Bottling Co.
of Chicago1 4 was confronted by a sale of bottling equipment under
o8U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 1.
109 Shanker, supra note 5, at 42.
n° See, e.g., Lindberg v. Coutches, 167 Cal. App. 2d 828, 334 P.2d 701 (App. Dep't,
Super. Ct. Alameda County 1959); Yanish v. Fernandez, 156 Colo. 225, 397 P.2d
881 (1965) ; Belvison, Inc. v. General Electric Co., 46 Misc. 2d 952, 260 N.Y.S.2d
579 (Sup. Ct. 1965) ; James Talcott, Inc. v. Finley, 389 P.2d 988 (Okla. 1964)
cases collected in Annot., 24 A.L.R.3d 465, 472-75 (1969).
11"4 Conn. Cir. 685, 239 A.2d 42, 44 (1967).
112Id. at 46. The court also used the examination subsection, section 2-316(3) (b), in
support of its conclusion that no implied warranty arose.
113 57 Il1. App. 2d 227. 235, 205 N.E.2d 780. 784 (1965).
114 254 F. Supp. 424 (N.D. I11.
1966), rev'd on other grounds, 371 F.2d 256 (7th Cir.
1967).
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an agreement providing that the property was sold "as is, where is."
The court held that this was a valid disclaimer of implied warranties, but not until it had reviewed all of the circumstances surrounding the case. 1 5 This leaves open the interesting possibility
that if a court is not satisfied with the "smell" of the transaction, it
could void the language of disclaimer by relying on the circumstances
surrounding the transaction." 6 Further, what is to prevent a court
from holding, as one pre-Code case did," 7 that certain implied-law
terms exist in every sales contract which may not be waived or defeated by the parties? This case, Mulder v. Casho, considered a contract with a conspicuous "as is" provision, but held, despite this
language, that the seller has a statutory duty to put the brakes of an
automobile in "good condition and good working order" before he
delivers the vehicle." 8 For the present, however, the seller is secure
if he interprets the Code provisions to mean what they say. "As is"
or "with all faults," and other similar phrases, will exclude implied
warranties unless the circumstances surrounding the transaction raise
a question about the intention of the parties.
Most vendors who have consulted with counsel regarding their
sales contracts have apparently been advised to use the extact language of the Code. There have been some other phrases used, however, which have been intended to call the buyer's attention to the
lack of implied warranty. The general pharase "no warranties, express
or implied" is apparently not sufficient to exclude all implied warranties since the official comments to section 2-316 have declared
this particular phrase to be anathema. 1 9 Other authorities agree
with this interpretation. 0 There is a conflict over the phrase "accepted in its present condition." Hull-Dobbs, Inc. v. Mallicoat,121
held that such language referred to acceptance, and is not synonomous with "as is," which refers to representations which have
induced acceptance. However, in First National Bank of Elgin v.
Husted,"2 the court stated that the words "in its present condition"
are similar to the words "as is," and have the effect of excluding all
254 F. Supp. 424, 427. The court examined depositions on file and the contract
itself, and noted that the equipment was purchased used.
118 Compare the courts' use of the unconscionable doctrine in U.C.C. § 2-302, discussed
in text, § IV(B) infra.
" 7 Mulder v. Casho, 61 Cal. App. 2d 633, 394 P.2d 545, 39 Cal. Rptr. 705 (1964).
118 Id. at 637, 394 P.2d at 547, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 707. Compare discussion in Shanker,
supra note 5, at 40-41 n.124, where the author argues that a sale of a "truck" means
a "workable truck" and calls it part of the description.
119 U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 1.
120See generally Donovan, supra note 106, at 213; 1 HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL
GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 77 n.59 (1964). See also L & N Sales
Co. v. Little Brown Jug, Inc., 12 Pa. D. & C.2d 469 (1957).

115

121 57 Tenn. App. 100, 105. 415 S.W.2d 344, 345-46, 3 U.C.C. Rep. 1032, 1034 (1966).
122

57 Il. App. 2d 227, 236, 205 N.E.2d 780, 784 (1965).
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implied warranties.' 2 3 There is no clear reconciliation point between
the two cases, except that the Husted court also discussed the buyer's
examination of the goods as having some bearing on the exclusion
of warranties.
The fact that the parties use the word "guarantee" instead of
"warranty" will have no effect on the effectiveness of the disclaimer
as long as the intention of the parties is clear from the facts surrounding the transaction. 124 An interesting point was noted in an early
discussion of the warranty disclaimer provisions: 12 Section 2-316(2)
states, "language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is
sufficient if it states, for example, 'there are no warranties which
extend beyond the description on the face hereof.' " The question
is whether this language, if used, would exclude part of an implied
warranty of merchantability, since "all implied warranties of fitness
... would seem to include fitness for ordinary purposes, and that
is an aspect of the warranty of merchantability. 12 The language of
section 2-316(2) should not be so construed, since it is obvious from
the organization of that section that the draftsmen intended to treat
the warranty of merchantability and the warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose separately.' 27 The recommended language is intended to be illustrative of a proper disclaimer for the latter warranty
only, 128 and the words "fitness for a particular purpose" should be
read into this portion of section 2-316(2) for clarity.
When the seller uses this special language, there is some confusion regarding whether it must be stated conspicuously. 2 1 Section
2-316 requires conspicuous terms to exclude implied warranties when
it discusses them in subsection (3). Professor William Hogan has
concluded that such terms need not be conspicuously stated because
subsection (3) provisions are operative "notwithstanding subsection
(2)," and subsection (3) says nothing about conspicuous terms."'
The cases would seem to support him. In First National Bank of
123Id. See also Tibbitts v. Openshaw, 18 Utah 2d 442, 425 P.2d 160 (1967).
Compare Chamberlain v. Bob Matick Chevrolet, Inc., 4 Conn. Cir. 685, 239 A.2d 42,
4 U.C.C. Rep. 936 (1967), with Ryan v. Aid, Inc., 149 Mont. 358, 427 P.2d 53
(1967).
125 Note, Consumer Protection, supra note 28, at 255.
126 U.C.C. § 2-314 provides in part:
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as:
124

(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used ....
127 See also U.C.C. § 2-316(2), Comment 4.
128 "Unlike the implied warranty of merchantability, implied warranties of fitness for
a particular purpose may be excluded by general language, but only if it is in
writing and conspicuous." U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 4. Therefore, the language
recommended by the Code is general language. See also U.C.C. § 2-316(2).
129 What the courts have held to be conspicuous is discussed in text, § III(A) (3) (a)
infra.
130 Compare Hogan, supra note 27, at 7 n.29 with J. HONNOLD, LAW OF SALES AND
SALES FINANCING 96 (3d ed. 1968).
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Elgin v. Husted,"' the disclaiming language was printed in the same
size type as the rest of the contract, and the provision "accepted in
its present condition" was held to be a valid exclusion. 1 2 Cases decided under pre-Code law likewise support this position. In Claxton
v. Pullman, Inc.' the "as is" provision was held to be a part of
the agreement although it was stated on the reverse side of the
contract. On the other hand, the principle of internal consistency in
statutory construction would indicate that the requirement for conspicuous terms of subsection (2) should be carried over to subsection
(3)."' In addition, since the purpose of section 2-316 is to call the
buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranty, and since the courts
consider all the circumstances surrounding the transaction, it seems
logical to conclude that phrases under subsection (3) should be conspicuous. 13 5 At least that is the surest way to use the language
effectively.
Finally, there is the question of whether the special language
may be oral or must be in writing. Again, subsection (3) says
nothing, while subsection (2) requires a writing to disclaim a
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. 3 6 The same arguments
just presented regarding the requirement of conspicuousness apply
here. No court has ever decided the issue. The safest rule is to
include such language in a writing, and to do so is preferable for
37
evidentiary purposes.
2. Exclusion of All Implied Warranties by Stating Express
Warranties - Exclusion and Integration Clauses
Sellers have long attempted to limit recovery in warranty by
stating one express warranty to the exclusion of all other warranties.
A typical example is stating that the product is guaranteed against
defects in workmanship for one year, and that this warranty is in
lieu of all other warranties express and implied. These "exclusion"
clauses merely amount to disclaimers couched in the form of a
limited and exclusive express warranty.13 8 In fact, it has been
intimated that sellers are anxious to provide some kind of limited
warranty only for the purpose of excluding implied warranties
which could otherwise return to haunt them.'3 9 Prior to the
131 57 Ill. App. 2d 227, 236, 205 N.E.2d 780, 784 (1965).
132M
Id. See also Baselice v. 341 Reid Avenue Corp., 5 U.C.C. Rep. 493 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
1968) (upholding an "as is" provision hidden in paragraph 10 of a lengthy contract).
133 116 Ga. App. 416, 157 S.E.2d 642 (1967).
134 See Donovan, supra note 106, at 213, 215-16 n.16 4 .
135 See Hawkland, supra note 20, at 32.
136 The warranty of merchantability may be excluded orally. U.C.C. § 2-316(2).
137 See Hogan, supra note 27 at 8. See also section VI(D) infra.
138 See Note, Disclaimers, supra note 3, at 329; Duesenberg, supra note 6. at 163.
139 Blackburn, supra note 16, at 173.
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promulgation of the Uniform Commercial Code, it was generally
held that a clause which provided a limited express warranty, and
stated it to be in lieu of all other warranties express and implied,
was an effective disclaimer.1 4 ° However, this theory was eroded on
two fronts. First, the case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc. 141 prompted courts to look carefully at any language directed
at the consumer and to attempt to detect a violation of public
policy. Accordingly, some courts have declared that clauses containing express warranties to the exclusion of all others did not
exclude implied warranties as being against public policy to do
so. 142 Secondly, some courts concluded that there was no reason
to exclude the implied warranties which were not inconsistent with
the express warranty. 143 The Uniform Sales Act adopted this position in section 15(6). If no inconsistency was found, therefore, the
implied warranties remained effective. The Code provisions which
apply to this problem are not specifically directed toward solving
it. Section 2-316 indicates that implied warranties may be excluded
if the parties agree to the exclusion. However, section 2-317 states
certain rules to be followed if warranties are conflicting. The
pertinent language of this section is as follows:
Warranties whether express or implied shall be construed as consistent with each other and as cumulative, but if such construction
is unreasonable the intention of the parties shall determine which
warranty is dominant. In ascertaining that intention the following
rules apply:
(c) Express warranties displace inconsistent implied warranties other than an implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose.

Further, section 2-719 states that the parties may agree upon a
remedy, to the exclusion of all others, which will restrict the cause
1 44
of action for breach of warranty.
140 See, e.g., Shafer v. Reo Motors Inc., 205 F.2d 685 (3d Cir. 1953) ; Guhy v. Nichols
& Sheperd Co., 33 Ky. L. Rep. 257, 109 S.W. 1190 (1908); Hargrove v. Lewis,
313 S.W.2d 594 (Mo. App. 1958) ; Lumbrazo v. Woodruff, 256 N.Y. 92, 175 N.E.
525, modified as to counterclaim, 256 N.Y. 640, 177 N.E. 174 (1931). See also.
Mattson v. General Motors Corp., 9 Mich. App. 473, 157 N.W.2d 4S6 (1968);
Klimate-Pruf Paint & Varnish Co. v. Klein Corp., 1 N.C. App. 431, 161 S.E.2d 747
(1968). For brief discussions of pre-code law see Layer, Sales Warranties Under
the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 Mo. L. REV. 259, 284-85 (1965) ; Note, Consumer
Protection, supra note 28, at 258 n.120; Note, Warranty Disclaimers, supra note 95,
at 399.
1' 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). See text accompanying notes 8-12 supra.
42
1 See Gherna v. Ford Motor Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d 639, 55 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1966).
Haley v. Merit Chevrolet, Inc., 67 Il. App. 2d 19, 214 N.E.2d 347 (1966). See
also Manheim v. Ford Motor Co., 201 So.2d 440 (Fla. 1967); Crown v. Cecil
Holland Ford, Inc., 207 So.2d 67 (Fla. App. 1968).
143 See Sperry Rand Corp. v. Industrial Supply Corp., 337 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1964)
Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Flexible Tubing Corp., 270 F. Supp. 548 (D. Conn. 1967)
Tucson Utility Supplies, Inc. v. Gallagher, 102 Ariz. 499, 433 P.2d 629 (1967).
144See text, § V(B) (2) infra.
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It is possible to interpret a clause which states an express
warranty to the exclusion of all others as falling within either
section. Under section 2-316 the clause may effectively disclaim
implied warranties away in favor of the express warranty. And
under section 2-719, if the remedy prescribed by the parties is
intended to be exclusive, it will be considered the sole remedy
in case of breach. Under section 2-317 the clause may have no
effect because the express warranty, standing alone, is not inconsistent with the implied warranties. Courts which have upheld
such provisions as effective disclaimers have generally done so on
a freedom of contract theory,14 accepting the express warranty in
lieu of the implied warranties. Several cases further note that the
146
enforcement of these clauses in no way offends public policy.
One case reasoned that the legislature was aware of public policy
when it considered the Code, and, if it would offend public policy
to exclude implied warranties in this manner, the legislature would
have obviated the possibility when the Code was adopted.' 4 7 It

is plausible that these exclusion clauses do qualify under section
2-316 to exclude implied warranties of fitness for a particular
purpose. They are always in writing, and, if conspicuous, all of
the requirements to exclude those implied warranties have been
met. 14s But it is difficult to understand how courts conclude that
the language of these clauses would exclude an implied warranty
of merchantability. Section 2-316(2) requires that the language,
unless it falls within subsection (3) (a), must mention "merchantability." Yet a district court in Arrow Transportation Co. v.
Fruehauf Corp., 4' was faced with a breach of a warranty of
merchantability where the seller had expressed a warranty to the
exclusion of all others. The opinion states that the Uniform Commercial Code, "in essence, provides that the parties are free to
contract away any warranties which may be implied by law, the
only requirement being that the disclaimer be clearly stated and
45

See Construction Aggregates Corp. v. Hewitt-Robins, Inc., 404 F.2d 505, 510 (7th
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 921 (1969) ; Cox Motor Car Co. v. Castle, 402
S.W.2d 429, 3 U.C.C. Rep. 397 (Ky. App. 1966).
146See Desando!o v. F & C Tractor & Equip. Co., 211 So.2d 576, 580 (Fla. App. 1968);
Thorman v. Polytemp, Inc., 2 U.C.C. Rep. 772, 774 (Westchester County Ct., N.Y.
1965). But see Hall v. Everett Motors, Inc., 340 Mass. 430, 165 N.E.2d 107
(1960). In Hall, Justice Wilkins enforced a clause creating an express warranty
to the exclusion of implied warranties, and then lamented: "This is not the kind of
an agreement which commends itself to the sense of justice of the court . . . . We
hope that should a similar case arise under the Uniform Commercial Code we shall
not be bound by precedent." Id. at 432, 165 N.E.2d at 109.
147Marshall v. Murray Oldsmobile Co., 207 Va. 972, 978, 154 S.E.2d 140, 144-45
(1967).
148 U.C.C. § 2-316(2).
'19 289 F. Supp. 170 (D. Ore. 1968).
1
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be conspicuous. ' " This is overstating freedom of contract at the
expense of the clear requirements of section 2-316. The language
used in exclusion clauses may not be fairly considered within the
provisions of subsection (3) (a),"' and therefore must contain
the word "merchantability" to exclude that warranty under subsection (2). The better rule seems to be that the warranty of
merchantability survives a clause which states that an express
warranty is given in lieu of all other warranties.' 5 2 In one case the
clause stated that the express warranty was in lieu of "any implied
warranty of merchantability." Nevertheless, the court held in this

case, Walsh v. Ford Motor Co.,' that absent a clear showing of
commercial reasonableness, the exclusion would be stricken as a
matter of law.
Other courts have held that exclusion clauses will not have
the effect of disclaiming implied warranties of fitness for a particular purpose because those implied warranties are not inconsistent with the express warranty, and are therefore saved by section 2-317.154 This, too, is a preferable rule. Although warranties
of fitness for a particular purpose may be disclaimed by general
language of this type under section 2-316, they should be retained
in almost every case under section 2-317.1 Where the seller has
led the buyer to believe that all warranties can be performed while
inserting an exclusion clause into the contract, the seller is estopped
from raising the exclusion clause as a defense.1'; However, if the
seller has stated an express warranty to the exclusion of all implied
warranties, and has done so in good faith not realizing an inconsistency with a warranty of fitness, then section 2-317(c) will retain
0

Id.

at 172-73. See also Cox Motor Car Co. v. Castle, 402 S.W.2d 429, 3 U.C.C. Rep.
397 (Ky. App. 1966); Marshall v. Murray Oldsmobile Co., 207 Va. 972, 154
S.E.2d 140 (1967). In Marshall, the court expresses no opinion on whether the
language would be sufficient to exclude implied warranties under the Code. Id. at
978, 154 S.E.2d at 145.
151 See text accompanying notes 119-20 supra for a discussion of the words "all warranties, express or implied, are excluded."
152 See Neville Chemical Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 249 F. Supp. 649, 5 U.C.C. Rep.
1219 (W.D. Pa. 1968); Marion Power Shovel Co. v. Huntsman, 246 Ark. 149,
437 S.W.2d 784 (1968); Willman v. American Motor Sales Co., 44 Erie Co. L.J.
51, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 100 '(1961). See also Boeing Airplane Co. v. O'Malley, 329 F.2d
585, 593 (8th Cir. 1964) (decided under the 1952 Code) ; Mutual Services of
Highland Park, Inc. v. S.O.S. Plumbing & Sewerage Co., 93 Ill. App. 257, 235 N.E.2d
265 (1968).
1sa 59 Misc. 2d 241, 298 N.Y.S.2d 538, 540 (Sup. Ct. 1969), citing Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
154 See Sutter v. St. Clair Motors, Inc., 44 I1. App. 2d 318, 323, 194 N.E.2d 674, 677
(1963) (court applies reasoning of section 2-317 but refers to section 2-316) ; L. &
N. Sales Co. v. Stuski, 188 Pa. Super, 117, 146 A.2d 154, 157 (1958).
15 U.C.C. § 2-317, Comment 2 states that where the seller has in good faith caused an
inconsistency, the "intention" rules of section 2-317 apply, and they presume the
intention of the parties to be the retention of the implied warranty of fitness.
156U.C.C. § 2-317, Comment 2.
15
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the implied warranty of fitness.' According to the Code provisions,
therefore, the typical exclusion clause may exclude the implied
warranty of fitness if the evidence is clear that such a result was
the exact intention of the parties, so as to overcome the presumed
intention of the parties stated in section 2-317(c).15 Absent a clear
showing that the intention of both parties has been adopted by an
exclusion clause, it should have no effect whatsoever. Where the
exclusion clause states a limited remedy, and provides that this
remedy is intended as the exclusive remedy in case of breach of
contract, the effect may be to exclude any action alleging breach
of implied warranties. This type of clause and its effect are considered in detail later. 59
A related problem is the use of the "integration" or "merger"
clause, stating that the written contract contains all of the agreements between the parties and is intended by the parties as the
final expression of the agreement. The parol evidence rule has a
profound effect on express warranties,16 ° but, alone, it has no
effect at all on implied warranties. Since implied warranties are
generally viewed as arising by operation of law, rather than by
conduct of the parties, the parol evidence rule is irrelevant to
implied warranties.'
Moreover, the parol evidence rule is specifically incorporated into the Code provisions dealing with disclaimer of express warranties, while the provisions relating to
disclaimer of implied warranties do not refer to the rule.'" 2 The
parol evidence rule, then, will not operate as an unbargained-for
disclaimer of implied warranties - it never has. Cases decided
prior to the adoption of the Code have generally held that a provision in a contract that the writing contains all of the agreements
between the parties does not affect implied warranties.' 63 Courts
interpreting the Code provisions have reached the conclusion that
the warranty exists despite the "integration" clause, unless specifically excluded.'
The integration clause may be used, however,
to help prove the intentions of the parties when an exclusion clause
15

7Id.
5 See U.C.C. § 2-317, Comment 3.

1 8
159

See text, § V(B) (1) infra.

160 See text, § I (C) supra.
161 See Note, Warranty Disclaimers, supra note 95, at 400.
162 Compare U.C.C. § 2-316(1) with U.C.C. § 2-316(2) and U.C.C. § 2-316(3). See

also Hogan, supra note 27, at 8-9.
163 See Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959); Frigidinners, Inc. v. Branchtown Gun Club, 176 Pa. Super. 643, 109 A.2d 202 (1955) ;
Hobart Mfg. Co. v. Rodziewicz, 125 Pa. Super. 240, 189 A. 580 (1937) ; White
Co. v. Francis, 95 Pa. Super. 315 (1929). But cf. S.F. Bowser & Co. v. Birmingham,
276 Mass. 289, 177 N.E. 268 (1931).
164
See Duckworth v. Ford Motor Co., 211 F. Supp. 888 (E.D. Pa. 1962); rev'd in
part on other grounds. 320 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1963).
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is present, and together they may have the effect of excluding the
implied warranties. The fact that the buyer has signed an agreement
which states that it represents the entire contract between the
parties tends to show that he is willing to waive all of the prior
negotiations." 5
3. Technical Requirements to Exclude Each Separate Implied
Warranty
The use of recognized "disclaimer" language, such as "with
all faults" or "as is," has the effect of excluding all implied warranties of quality and performance. The Code treats each warranty
separately and prescribes special rules to follow in order to disclaim each warranty."' One troublesome factor is common to language disclaiming the warranty of merchantability and the warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose -in
either case, such language
must be conspicuous."'
a. Conspicuousness

The drafters of the Code apparently felt that some guidance
was necessary to help determine when language was conspicuous
enough to be effective. Accordingly, they drafted section 1-201(10):
'Conspicuous:" A term or clause is conspicuous when it is so
written that a reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought
to have noticed it. A printed heading in capitals (as: NON-NEGOTIABLE BILL OF LADING) is conspicious. Language in the
body of a form is "conspicuous" if it is in larger or other contrasting type or color. But in a telegram any stated term is "conspicuous." Whether a term or clause is "conspicuous" or not is
for decision by the court.
This guidance generally followed pre-Code law which required that a disclaimer clause must be called to the buyer's attention to be valid.'1 6 Section 1-201(10) prescribes the manner in
which a disclaimer clause should be written to be effective. Onto
this the courts have engrafted some tests regarding the location
of such a clause.
A New York court in Minikes v. Admiral Corp.,16 9 had no
trouble in striking a disclaimer which had been written in print
smaller than the print in the rest of the contract.17 0 Similarly, a
165See Thorman v. Polytemp, Inc., 2 U.C.C. Rep. 772 (Westchester County Ct., N.Y.

1965).
16 The seller may have a valid reason for wishing to disclaim one but not the other.
One reason could be the courts' propensity to declare contracts which disclaim all
warranties to be unconscionable. See text, § IV(B) infra.
167 U.C.C. § 2-316(2).
168 See, e.g., Smith v. Regina Mfg. Corp., 396 F.2d 826 (4th Cir. 1968); Mosesian v.

Bagdasarian, 260 Cal. App. 2d 361, 67 Cal. Rptr. 369 (Ct. App. 1968); Ryan v.
Aid, Inc., 149 Mont. 384, 427 P.2d 53 (1967).
169 48 Misc. 2d 1012, 266 N.Y.S.2d 461 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1966).
170See also Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195,
5 U.C.C. Rep. 30 (1968).
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number of courts have refused to uphold a disclaimer printed in
the same color and same size type as the rest of the contract. 7 '
In some cases, the heading to the section of the contract which
contained the warranty was printed in unusual type, but this was
not enough, 172 even where the language in the heading might have
73
hinted that a disclaimer was contained in that section.'
The practice of hiding the disclaimer language in the body of
the contract has been critized. 74 Similarly, placing the disclaimer clause on the back of the contract is undesirable, 1 75 especially if no reference is made on the front of the contract to the
language on the back.'" 6 In Hunt v. Perkins Machinery Co., 1 77 a
disclaimer clause was printed in capital letters on the back of the
contract, under the heading "TERMS AND CONDITIONS." On
the face of the contract in bold-face capital letters was the statement "BOTH THIS ORDER AND ITS ACCEPTANCE ARE
SUBJECT TO THE 'TERMS AND CONDITIONS' STATED IN
THIS ORDER." The court held that the reference on the front of
the contract was not sufficient to direct attention to the otherwise
conspicuous disclaimer language on the back, and the disclaimer
was ineffective.
To satisfy the requirement of conspicuousness, therefore, the
seller should state his disclaimer in a manner prescribed by section
1-201 (10), on the face of the contract, and in a separate paragraph.
b. Language to Exclude the Implied Warranty of
Merchantability
Language disclaiming the implied warranty of merchantability
may be stated orally or in writing.1 7

1

If it is in writing, it must be

Boeing Airplane Co. v. O'Malley, 329 F.2d 585, 593 (8th Cir. 1964); Mack Trucks
of Arkansas, Inc. v. Jet Asphalt & Rock Co., 246 Ark. 99, 437 S.W.2d 459, 463, 6
U.C.C. Rep. 93, 98 (1969) ; Marion Power Shovel Co. v. Huntsman, 246 Ark. 149,
437 S.W.2d 784, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 100 (1969); Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Utley, 439
S.W.2d 57, 59 (Ky. App. 1969); Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp. v. Transportation
Credit Clearing House, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 132, 137 (N.Y. Civil Ct. 1969). S.F.C.
Acceptance Corp. v. Ferree, 39 Pa D. & C.2d 225, 229, 3 U.C.C. Rep. 808, 810
(1966). See also Blackburn, supra note 16, at 179.
172 See Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Utley, 439 S.W.2d 57, 59 (Ky. App. 1969).
173 See Mack Trucks of Arkansas, Inc. v. Jet Asphalt & Rock Co., 246 Ark. 99, 437
S.W.2d 459, 463, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 93, 98 (1969). The warranty section was titled
with the words "Vehicle Warranty." Then followed a section titled "Supplement
to Mack Standard Warranty Applicable to Mack Diesel Engines," in which the
disclaimer was stated. Id.
174 See Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195, 5 U.C.C.
Rep. 30 (1968); Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp. v. Transportation Credit Clearing
House, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 132, 137 (N.Y. Civil Ct. 1969) ; S.F.C. Acceptance Corp. v.
Ferree, 39 Pa. D. & C.2d 225, 3 U.C.C. Rep. 808 (1966).
175 Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Utley, 439 S.W.2d 57, 59 (Ky. App. 1969).
176 See Dailey v. Holiday Distrib. Corp., 260 Iowa 859, 151 N.W.2d 477 (1967).
177 352 Mass. 535, 536, 226 N.E.2d 228, 229 (1967).
178U.C.C. § 2-316(2). See Note, Consumer Protection, supra note 28, at 255; Hogan,
supra note 27, at 7.
'7'
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conspicuous, and if it is oral it must specifically alert the buyer
to the fact that the warranty has been excluded.1 7 The substance
of the clause purporting to disclaim this warranty is suggested by
the Code. Section 2-316(2) states that the language must mention
"merchantability," and, of course, a draftsman will be well advised
to follow this directive. But section 2-316(2) does not say that
the disclaimer will be effective by the mere mention of the word
"merchantability." On the contrary, the purpose behind this section
would seem to indicate that any "legalese" which is not clearly
understood by the buyer will be ineffective.'
The rule, then, if
18
"
taken on its face, is probably unrealistic, ' since it will not warn
anyone but the most sophisticated buyer of the risk it transfers. The
1952 version of the Code proposed that this warranty could only
be excluded by "specific language, ' and a more realistic approach
would insist that this requirement be read into the present section
2-316.
Further, there is an argument, despite the specific language of
the statute, that the word "merchantability" may be omitted and
the disclaimer will still be effective. 11 3 This is based on the fact
that subsection (2) of section 2-316 is made subject to the general
provisions of subsection (3), and the latter does not specifically
require the use of the word to disclaim the warranty. To omit the
word "merchantability" is a hazardous practice that only provides
the courts with a handle on which to rely while declaring the disclaimer inoperative. This was the holding in Neville Chemical Co.
v. Union Carbide Co.,' where the disclaimer was stricken for
failure to specifically recite the word "merchantability."
Therefore, based on the underlying policy that the seller should
adequately apprise the buyer of his risk, an effective disclaimer
179Admiral Oasis Hotel Corp. v. Home Gas Industries, Inc. 68 I11,
App. 2d 297, 306,
216 N.E.2d 282, 286, 3 U.C.C. Rep. 531, 533 (1966). The Admiral case involved
an oral contract which was executed before the Code was effective in Illinois. The
court interpreted section 2-316, however, to be consistent with its proposition that
a buyer would not be bound by the oral disclaimer unless he had been specifically
made aware that such a disclaimer existed. Id.
180 The exclusion of implied warranties is supposedly permitted only when the buyer
is not surprised. See U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 1.
181A conclusion also reached by Professor Morris G. Shanker, who argues that a more
effective disclaimer would be: "These goods are not fit for the ordinary purposes
for which they are normally used and may actually cause you physical harm."
Shanker, supra note 5, at 41, 42.
182Section 2-316 of the 1952 Code provided:
(2) Exclusion or modification of the implied warranty of merchantability or of fitness for a particular purpose must be in specific language
and if the inclusion of such language creates an ambiguity in the contract as
a whole it shall be resolved against the seller ....
183 See Donovan, supra note 106, at 213.
184294 F. Supp. 649, 656, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 1219, 1225 (W.D. Pa. 1968). See also Marion
Power Shovel Co. v. Huntsman, 246 Ark. 149, 437 S.W.2d 784, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 100
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of the warranty of merchantability should at least contain the
following: "there is no warranty of merchantability, and the seller
assumes no responsibility for the quality of the product or for
damage that may be caused by a defect in the product."
c. Language to Exclude the Implied Warranty of Fitness
for a ParticularPurpose
The implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose may
not be disclaimed orally. To be effective, a disclaimer of this
warranty must be in writing and conspicuous. 18 5 Although section
2-316 does not require any specificity of language to disclaim this
warranty, it does suggest that a clause stating, "there are no warrarities which extend beyond the description on the face hereof,"
will be sufficient.' 8 6 This would seem to indicate that other language having the same general meaning would be equally effective.
It should merely inform the buyer that the seller is accepting no
responsibility for any reliance on his skill and judgment, and this
may be done in general terms.'

s

It would be unrealistic to require

any more from the seller, since he is unable to adequately ascertain
what he may have done to cause the buyer to rely on his skill and
judgment, so as to specifically disclaim that effect for each instance.
Nor does the buyer need additional protection. If the seller has
affirmatively commented about the product in such a way as to
encourage the buyer to purchase it for a particular purpose, the
seller may well have made an express warranty by affirmation of
fact. Whatever the buyer has inferred from the transaction should
not be so strenuously protected as to require carefully drafted
language of disclaimer.
B. Exclusion by Conduct

The reasonable expectations of the parties is the principle subject of protection in warranty law, just as in other contract law. 8
All of the facts surrounding the transaction must be considered in
determining the intention of the parties. Often these circumstances
will include certain conduct of the parties which indicate an intention to transfer or to accept the risk of a defective product. If
that intention is apparent from the conduct of the parties, all implied warranties may be excluded.
185 U.C.C. § 2-316(2).

186 See notes 125-27 supra, and accompanying text, for a discussion of this language
as it relates to all implied warranties.
187 U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 4. See also Donovan, supra note 106, at 212.
188 See Hawkland, supra note 20, at 32.
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1. Examination
The buyer may have an opportunity to examine the goods
before he enters the contract. If he has examined the items "as
fully as he desired or has refused to examine the goods there is
no implied warranty with regard to defects which an examination
ought in the circumstances to have revealed to him . . . -8 The
policy behind this rule is simple. If the buyer notices the defect and
waives it, or fails to notice it through his own fault after having
ample opportunity to discover it, then the buyer should be estopped
from asserting the defect as a breach of warranty when he is
injured. However, it may be argued that a buyer would not assume
that a professional seller will have no further responsibility for
the goods merely because of his examination of the product.'9 0
But the buyer may have a duty to inquire into the extent of the
seller's further responsibility regarding the defect, and, of course,
if the seller gives assurances as to these matters, the buyer is pro-

tected by an express warranty. 1 '
The requirement that a buyer "examine" the goods constitutes
a modification of prior law, which merely required an "inspection." 19 ' The "examination" refers to the nature of the responsibility
assumed at the time the contract is made, while "inspection" refers
to activity before acceptance or any other time after the contract
is made. 193 The buyer's observations which may be said to form
part of the bargain constitute the operative disclaimer of implied
warranties here.
However, the buyer may be estopped from asserting a breach
of warranty where he has had an opportunity to examine the goods
and refuses."0 4 One court seems to have held that merely making
the goods available to inspection will provide the opportunity
9
The comments to section
necessary to exclude the warranties."'
9
2-316 directly refute this proposition, ' and the better rule is that
lsU.C.C. § 2-316(3)(b).

19 Shanker, supra note 5, at 42. The author argues that the buyer should be held to a
waiver only if he knows that the defective good will likely lead to the harm of which
he complains. "For example, a buyer may be aware that a screw is missing on a
machine. He may not have sufficient engineering sophistication to be aware that the
machine will fly apart under operation just because of the missing screw. If so, the
buyer ought not be denied all recovery for injuries caused him by the flying parts."
Id.
191 See Hawkland, supra note 20, at 32-33.
92
1
See Donovan, supra note 106, at 216; Note, Consumer Protection, supra note 28, at
256-57 ; Ezer, supra note 27, at 317.
193 U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 8.
194 U.C.C. § 2-316(3) (b). See also Hawkland, supra note 20, at 33.
19 Refrigeration Discount Corp. v. Crouse, 79 York L.R. 31, 2 U.C.C. Rep. 986 (Pa.
Ct. C.P. York County 1965).
196 U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 8.
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the buyer's refusal is ineffective unless the seller has made a
demand that the goods be examined' 9 7 and unless the seller has
so demanded, the buyer cannot be said to have refused.' 9 8
If the buyer has either examined, or refused to examine, there
are no implied warranties as to defects which such examination
would have revealed.19 9 However, an implied warranty remains for
latent defects."' 0 The extent of the exclusion by examination will be a
question of fact for a jury to determine, 20 ' and will depend upon
the facts surrounding the examination, the means of examination
which were available, the manner in which it was conducted, and
the professional capacity of the person conducting the examination.20 2 As a practical matter, if the buyer possesses the technical
skill to detect a possible defect in the product, the seller should
demand that he examine it. Of course, this may result in his declining to purchase the product, but it is preferable to lose a sale
rather than expending large sums for consequential damages. There
is also a possibility that the buyer will refuse the demand, or, having
examined it, waive the defect.
2. Course of Dealing, Course of Performance, Usage of Trade
The conduct of the parties in performing previous transactions
may have the effect of excluding an implied warranty. 20 ' If these
prior dealings induce expectations that the buyer, rather than the
seller, is to assume certain risks, then the seller is relieved from
responsibility for those risks.20 4 The Code has followed prior law
on this subject. In Asgrow Seed Co. v. Gulick,2 ° ' the court held that
a valid custom concerning the subject matter of a contract, knowledge of which could be imputed to the parties, is incorporated into
the contract by implication. Thus, the buyers of seed, who had purchased from the seller on prior occasions and should have known
that the seller limited its liability in the invoice and on the container, could not assert a breach of warranty which contravened that
limitation. Of course, the buyer must either have actual knowledge
197See Hawkland, supra note 20, at 33; Note, Consumer Protection, supra note 28, at
256.
198 David Pepper Co. v. Jack Keller Co., 6 U.C.C. Rep. 673 (Dep't of Agriculture 1969).
199 See Appeals of Reeves Soundcraft Corp., 2 U.C.C. Rep. 210 (Armed Services Bd.
of Contract Appeals 1964).
2 0
0 See Leveridge v. Notaras, 433 P.2d 935, 4 U.C.C. Rep. 691 (Okla. 1967).
201 Sylvia Coal Co. v. Mercury Coal & Coke Co., 151 W. Va. 818, 156 S.E.2d 1, 4
U.C.C. Rep. 650 (Va. App. 1967).
202 U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 8. See Note, Consumer Protection, supra note 28, at 256.
203
U.C.C. § 2-316(3) (c). It may also have the effect of creating an express warranty.
See text accompanying note 57 supra.
20 4
See Hawkland, supra note 20, at 33-34.
205 420 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
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of the course of performance or dealing, or be able to be charged
with such knowledge.20 6
IV.

JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION AND LIMITATIONS OF
WARRANTY EXCLUSION

A. Strict Construction
Disclaimers although a part of the contract are not constructive
terms. Instead, they tend to infringe upon protective doctrines
which have been established by the very same courts that must construe the disclaimer.2" 7 These courts are understandably hesitant to
enforce a provision which contractually disrupts the protection
they have developed over many years. Similarly, the aura surrounding the disclaimer is generally unpleasant. It is the rare case
where the buyer has a superior bargaining position. Where the
seller has the superior position, a standard contract is often used,
and the sale may be on a take-it or leave-it basis. Even when the
seller clearly informs the buyers of the intent to disclaim, the buyer's
attention may be directed elsewhere by the excitement of purchase,
and, if he notices the disclaimer, doesn't care - then. Though courts
are loathe to abandon the doctrine of freedom of contract, they
will, in most cases, try to obviate the seller's potential power of
abuse by excluding the disclaimer on any one of a number of
contract principles.2 0 1 Moreover, the court may find a disclaimer
so objectionable as to refuse to enforce it as a matter of "public
policy," 2 9 or "natural justice and good morals.''210
Courts have a tendency to construe disclaimers strictly.2 1 One

court described this tendency as "the commendable judicial feeling
that, whenever possible, a court should enable a buyer to obtain
something for his money.' '212 And that, whenever possible, is what
the courts do. A disclaimer, as a contract term, should be viewed
with an eye toward determining the intent of the parties. Yet, it
has been noted that judicial interpretation of disclaimers often
See Layer, supra note 140, at 284.
See generally Note, Limitations, supra note 4, at 727.
See Prosser, supra note 11, at 46-47.
2091Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 403-04, 161 A.2d 69, 95
(1960).
210
Linn v. Radio Center Delicatessen, Inc., 169 Misc. 879, 880-81, 9 N.Y.S.2d 110,
112 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1939).
211 See generally Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Flexible Tubing Corp., 270 F. Supp. 548, 561
(D. Conn. 1967) ; Admiral Oasis Hotel Corp. v. Home Gas Industries, Inc., 68 Il1.
App. 2d 297, 305, 216 N.E.2d 282, 286 (1965) ; Hogan, supra note 27, at 6, n.24.
212 Berk v. Gordon Johnson Co., 232 F. Supp. 682, 688 (E.D. Mich. 1964), quoting
from Note, Warranties Disclaimers and the Parol Evidence Rule, 53 COLUe. L. REv.
858, 868 (1953).
206

207
208
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ignore this principle.2 13 Some special rules of construction applied
to disclaimers are worth noting: (1) If the disclaimer is "ambiguous," extrinsic evidence may not be supplied in order to
explain it.214 The courts will uphold the principle the disclaimer
sought to exclude rather than to attempt to ascertain the parties'
intent on the issue; (2) One construction employed to avoid the
effect of a disclaimer is by calling a defect in quality a failure of
consideration.21 This, in effect, says that if the disclaimer is
unimpeachable, the bargain is invalid; (3) Although form contracts invariably contain several paragraphs of fine print, the disclaimer provisions are the only ones that are not enforced;216 (4)

One court was quick to restrict the effect of the exclusionary language to some limited part of the liability and then allow recovery
on another related theory. 217
Usually, however, courts will exclude the disclaimer by extracting some defect in the course of bargaining, and explaining
that this irregularity prevented the buyer from agreeing on the
terms. The Uniform Commercial Code permits this analysis by
authorizing the court to determine whether a contract is unconscionable.2 18
B. UnconscionableDisclaimers

Section 2-302 was drafted in the Code in order to reform
outmoded concepts which had been developed by the common law
to protect a buyer from an unbargained contract. 1 9 This section
gave the courts sweeping power to deal with contract provisions
which are unbargained-for. It is as follows:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any
clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it
was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall
be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its
commercial setting, purpose and effects to aid the court in making
the determination.
The comments explained that the purpose of the unconscionability provision is to prevent oppression and unfair surprise.22 °
Warranty Disclaimers,
supra note 95, at 401.
214 See Note, Disclaimers, supra note 3, at 330, citing McPeak v. Boker, 236 Minn. 420,
53 N.W.2d 130 (1952).
215
See Note, Limitations, supra note 4, at 732-33. See also Myers v. Land, 314 Ky. 514,
519, 235 S.W.2d 988, 991 (1950).
218Note, Disclaimers, supra note 3, at 330. See also Note, Limitations, supra note 4, at
727.
213 See generally Note, Limitations, supra note 4, at 726, Note,
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Unquestionably, the public interest and the determination to provide a fair remedy were considered by the drafters when this provision was drawn. Courts have continued to extract these vague
policy considerations from section 2-302.
Deeply rooted in the concept of oppression is the contract of
adhesion. The Henningsen decision22 1 was based partly on the fact
that the buyer had no choice of terms, since all automobile manufacturers were using the same contract. In order for a buyer to
assume the risk of a defective product, as he is required to do by
accepting a disclaimer provision, is it necessary that he have a
choice of whether or not to accept the disclaimer? Theoretically,
more is required than the choice between doing without the
product, and accepting the contract as drafted. "22 Moreover, section
2-316 which prescribes requirements for an effective disclaimer,
does not protect against a contract of adhesion. Therefore a disclaimer provision could easily satisfy the enumerated requirements,
and still be unbargained-for because the product to which it
applies is available from only one source. 223 Furthermore, even
where the classic adhesion contract situation does not exist, consumers ordinarily do not negotiate terms of a contract.22 4 Consequently, the court is presented with an opportunity to inquire
into each of these situations to determine if -considering
the
commercial setting, purpose, and effect-the bargain was oppressive and thereby unconscionable. An automobile warranty disclaimer was recently declared inoperative in Zabriskie Chevrolet,
Inc. v. Smith,'22 because it was not brought to the buyer's attention,
and the court classified it a "contract of adhesion." However, the
courts also have recognized that they must consider the commercial
setting in which the agreement is made, 226 and in Dow Corning
217 Water Works & Industrial Supply Co. v. Wilburn, 437 S.W.2d 951 (Ky.

1968).
U.C.C. § 2-302. See generally Note, Disclaimers,supra note 3, at 330.
219See generally U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment 1; Note, Warranty Disclaimers, supra
note 95, at 403-04.
220 U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment 1.
221 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
222 Compare Note, Disclaimers, supra note 3, at 331, with Boshkoff, supra note 11, at
304-05, where the author argues that freedom of choice may be defined in different
ways. It has been argued that even ordinary contracts of sale are contracts of adhesion,
since they are "presented to consumers under conditions of haste, ignorance, and
compulsion." Note, Disclaimers, supra note 3, at 328.
223 See Note, Warranty Disclaimers, supra note 95, at 399.
224 Note, Disclaimers, supra note 3, at 329. The author notes that "[n]othing in the
small voice of a disclaimer will provoke the consumer into his own program of
insurance, testing, and caution after purchase." Id.
22599 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (1968).
218

M Wilson Trading Corp. v. David Ferguson, Ltd., 23 N.Y.2d 398, 297 N.Y.S.2d 108,
5 U.C.C. Rep. 1213 (1968). See also Donovan, supra note 106, at 217.
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Corp. v. Capitol Aviation, Inc.,2 2 7 a court found the commercial
setting to be controlling in holding that a limitation of damages
was not unconscionable.
A court reviewing a disclaimer provision may find that its
effect works an unfair surprise on the unsuspecting buyer. The
requirement of conspicuousness is found in section 2-316 and is
intended to mitigate against surprise. If the disclaimer was not
conspicuously stated, the court may simply conclude that it does
not satisfy the technical requirements for an effective disclaimer,"s
rather than ruling that it is unconscionable. An element of surprise
is presented when a latent defect causes a product to be worthless,
a situation the courts are not treating uniformly. Where the defect
is latent, so that neither party could be charged with knowledge
that injury may result, it is a question of fact as to whether or not
the waiver of warranties was unconscionable."2
Vlases v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc.,2 3 states that where a latent defect
exists that renders the goods worthless, a disclaimer of responsibility for that defect is manifestly unreasonable. 23 ' However, Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hospital,23 2 stands for the proposition that an
express disclaimer of warranty with respect to a latent defect in
blood which could not be detected and prevented was reasonable
and contractually valid.
The theory behind the unconscionability clause and the concern
of public policy obviously have a number of fundamental elements
in common. Accordingly, it's not surprising that the courts are
less than precise when using these concepts. Arguments have been
made that certain attempts to exclude the implied warranty of
merchantability should be interpreted as prima facie unconscionable,
since the seller is abdicating his professional responsibilities by so
disclaiming them.233 There is some merit to this proposition, especially since certain attempts to limit damages for personal injuries
are accorded the status of "prima facie" unconscionability under
section 2-719.234 Presently, however, the warranty of merchantability remains a negotiable issue, at least theoretically, and its
exclusion will be governed by normal rules of unconscionability as
promulgated by the Code. Stated simply, the application of the
=2 411 F.2d 622, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 589 (7th Cir. 1969).
228 See, e.g., Minikes v. Admiral Corp., 48 Misc. 2d 1012, 266 N.Y.S.2d 461 (Dist.
Ct. Nassau County 1966) and text, § III(A) (3) (a) supra.
229 Ford Motor Co. v. Tritt, 244 Ark. 883, 430 S.W.2d 778, 782, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 312,
316 (1968).
230 377 F.2d 846, 4 U.C.C. Rep. 164 (3rd Cir. 1967).
231 Id. at 850, 4 U.C.C. Rep. at 169.
32 96 N.J. Super. 314, 232 A.2d 897, 4 U.C.C. Rep. 561 (1967).
233 Shanker, supra note 5, at 43-44.
234 See text accompanying notes 268-70, infra.
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unconscionability clause to disclaimers depends on the extent to
which the negotiation of the contract and the effect of the disclaimer shocks the conscience of the courts. There is no formula for
coping with the hoary problem of unconscionability. The seller
may avoid the problem of unfair surprise by taking every prescribed precaution to call the buyer's attention to the disclaimer.
However, the problem of oppression, and the extent of which
the courts feel the disclaimer violates public policy, are intangibles which are incapable of reduction to a common denominator.
For these reasons, the seller should avoid overbroad disclaimers
that seek to exclude all potential liability. Further the seller must
show that the bargain is not, in the commercial setting, oppressive
to the buyer. A record of any negotiation of the disclaimer provisions will help to prove that the disclaimer was not oppressively
obtained. As a general principle, the seller should attempt to conduct the transaction as he, if he were a judge, would like to see
it conducted.
C. Disclaimers Not Contemporaneous With the Sale
In order to enforce a disclaimer, a court must be able to find
that the parties have agreed to its effect. Generally, language of
disclaimer is included in the written contract which is executed to
consummate the transaction, and thus, if all other requirements are
met, a court may infer that the parties have agreed to the stated
terms. However, this inference will not be drawn where the disclaimer
is proposed after the sale has been completed and thus, subsequent
language of disclaimer will have no effect on the warranties, which
35
become binding when the contract is signed.
The Code itself covers this point specifically only in one casewhen a security agreement is executed after the parties have agreed
on the sale. Subsection 9-206(2) provides that the Sales article
governs exclusion or modification of warranties when a security
agreement is involved, and a comment to that section indicates that
a buyer will not inadvertently abandon his warranties by a "no
warranties" term in the security agreement when warranties have
already been created under the sales arrangement.23" Futhermore,
pre-Code decisions recognized that an attempt to disclaim warranties on or after delivery by language on an invoice, receipt, or
other notice, is ineffective. 23 For example, in Tiger Motor Co.,
235 See

Note, Consumer Protection, supra note 28, at 257.
U.C.C. § 9-206, Comment 3. For a discussion of the earlier version of this section
regarding this issue, see Donovan, supra note 106, at 213-14 n.158.
23
7 See Trane Co. v. Gilbert, 73 Cal. Rptr. 279 (Ct. App. 1968) ; Admiral Oasis Hotel
Corp. v. Home Gas Industries, Inc., 68 I11. App. 2d 297, 216 N.E.2d 282 (1965)
(implying that a similar result would be obtained under section 2-316).
36
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Inc. v. McMurtry2 . the court held a disclaimer of warranties in
an "Owner's Manual" ineffective to exclude express or implied
warranties where the manual was given to the buyer when the
automobile was delivered.2 9 Of course, if the buyer has agreed
to the disclaimer, and the later written disclaimer merely confirms
the agreement between the parties, he should not be allowed to
escape its effect by alleging it was delivered after the sale had
been consummated.
V.

MODIFICATION OR LIMITATION OF DAMAGES AND
REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF WARRANTY

It may appear apparent from the foregoing that the chances
for a seller successfully running the obstacle course of disclaimer
are reasonably slim. If his disclaimer is impeccably drafted he
runs the risk of being unable to market the product.24 ° If he
attempts to impose a disclaimer which raises only slight anxiety
in the buyer, it may not be legally sufficient to apprise him of
the risk.24 1 A seller facing such a dilemma may well consider
minimizing the effect of an ineffective disclaimer. This he is permitted to do, within limits, by sections 2-718 and 2-719 of the
42

Code.1

A. Liquidated Damages

The parties to a sale may agree on an amount of damages
which reasonably anticipates harm which may be caused by the
breach. Section 2-718 provides:
(1) Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in
the agreement but only at an amount which is reasonable in the
light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach,
the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy. A term
fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as a penalty.

Of course, this provision is most applicable in a commercial
setting. 4 3 It would be an unusual transaction for a sale to a con238 224 So. 2d 638, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 608 (Ala. 1969).
239See also Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195, 5
U.C.C. Rep. 30 (1968).
240 See Note, Contract Draftsmanship Under Article Two of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 564, at 594-95 (1964).

241 See Hawkland, supra note 20, at 29.
242 These sections are carefully intertwined with warranty disclaimers by reference to
them in section 2-316(4). It is almost as if the draftsmen of section 2-316 were
remarking with tongue-in-cheek that the disclaimer provisions which precede this
reference were too confusing to be followed with consistent success.
243 Murray, The Consumer and the Code. A Cross-Sectional View, 23 U. MIAMI L. REV.
11, 36 (1968).
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sumer to contain a liquidated damage provision, and, even if such
a provision were included, it would be doubtful that it was a
product of agreement of the parties. 44
"Reasonableness" of the agreed damages is the test of validity
of this portion of the agreement, and apparently each of the three
tests enunciated in subsection 2-718(1) must be met or the
damages clause will be ineffective. 4 5 Therefore, no convenient
or feasible alternative remedy can exist, and circumstances surrounding the transaction must indicate that it will be difficult to
prove the amount of loss. These two elements of reasonableness
really constitute the central purpose of a liquidated damages provision. Dean Hawkland argues that in the absence of these factors,
the liquidated damages clause will be superseded by general
remedies, because subsection 2-719(2) directs that result when a
limited remedy fails of its essential purpose.246 In addition to these
elements, the estimated damages must reasonably approximate the
actual harm expected by the breach. If unreasonably large liquidated
damages are stated, the clause is void as a penalty. 4 T It is doubtful
that a seller who is seeking to minimize his liability for breach
of warranty will agree to an unreasonably large liquidated damages
provision. However, should he attempt to stipulate an unreasonably
small amount, the clause could be considered to be unconscionable
and stricken for that reason. 48 A circuit court of appeals in Dow
Corning Corp. v. Capitol Aviation, Inc.,2 49 held that an agreement
which limited the purchaser's remedy for failure or delay in the
delivery of a plane to the return of its deposit was not unconscionably small in light of the experimental product and flexible
nature of the transaction. Apparently, a court will evaluate the
damage provision in the context of its commercial setting to decide whether or not the clause is reasonable.
The seller may, and should, attempt to estimate potential
damages which may follow from the sale of the product and the
amount used in a liquidated damage provision should approximate
that estimate. The fact that the estimate was made, and that the
liquidated damage provision was based on the estimate, will assist
the seller in proving the reasonableness of the provision.
In such a case, it may be stricken as unconscionable under section 2-302, since it is a
provision in a contract of adhesion. See text, § IV(B) supra.
2SSee
Hawkland, supra note 20, at 38, 39. See also U.C.C. § 2-718, Comment 1.
246 Hawkland, supra note 20, at 39. See also Denkin v. Sterner, 10 Pa. D. & C.2d 230,
1 U.C.C. Rep. 173 '(1956).
244

4

2 7U.C.C.

§

2-718(1).

248 U.C.C. § 2-718, Comment 1. See also Murray, supra note 243, at 36.
249411 F.2d 622, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 589 (7th Cir. 1969).
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B. Limitation of Remedy
The more frequent method used by a seller to minimize his
responsibility for warranty problems is the contractual limitation
or modification of remedies for the breach. Section 2-719 governs
this manipulation:
(1) Subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this
section and of the preceding section on liquidation and limitation

of damages,
(a)

the agreement may provide for remedies in addition to

or in substitution for those provided in this Article and may limit
or alter the measure of damages recoverable under this Article,
as by limiting the buyer's remedies to return of the goods and
repayment of the price or to repair and replacement of non-conforming goods or parts; and
(b) resort to a remedy as provided is optional unless the
remedy is expressly agreed to be exclusive, in which case it is the
sole remedy.
(2) Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to
fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in

this act.
(3) Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the
limitation or exclusio nis unconscionable. Limitation of consequential
damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods
is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of damages where
the loss is commercial is not.
1. Restricted Remedies
A majority of the clauses which are drafted in reliance on
this section follow the illustration provided therein and limit the
buyer's options to returning the goods for repair or replacement
or to obtaining a refund of the purchase price. 250 Apparently,
however, the parties are left free to shape any remedies they may
agree upon, provided there are at least minimum adequate remedies
available. 2 5 ' The latter phrase should signify to the perceptive
reader that this provision, like all others which may affect the
consumer, will be subjected to the most thorough judicial scrutiny.
Courts have several options available by which they may disapprove
of stipulated remedies: (1) the court may find that it was not
intended to be an "exclusive" remedy; (2) even if intended as
exclusive, it may "fail of its essential purpose;" and (3) it may be
unconscionable.
The special remedies which the parties incorporate into their
agreement exist merely as additions to normal contract remedies,
unless it is expressly agreed that the stated remedies are exclusive.252
250U.C.C. § 2-719(1)(a). See Blackburn, supra note 16, at 179; Note, Warranty
Disclaimers, supra note 95, at 407.
§ 2-719, Comment 1.
252
See U.C.C. § 2-719, Comment 2.
251 U.C.C.
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Thus, if the parties agree that the buyer may return the goods for
free repair and replacement, that is only an option which the buyer
may add to his arsenal of remedies, unless that remedy is stated
to be exclusive of all others. 2 3 In an early case interpreting the
Code,2" 4 the court held that the requirement of exclusivity had
been satisfied when the seller provided free replacement of defective parts and stated that "this warranty is in lieu of any and
all other warranties stated or inferred, and of all other obligations
on the part of the manufacturer." In Dow Corning Corp. v.
Capitol Aviation, Inc.,25 the court determined that the remedy
provided was intended to be the only recourse by surveying the
circumstances surrounding the transaction, and the court noted
that this result obtains despite the fact that the clause in the
contract did not say the remedy contained therein is exclusive.
Despite this decision, a seller would be well advised to clearly
state that the remedy prescribed is intended to be exclusive.
Even if the parties have stated their intention to accept the
stated remedy as "exclusive," a court may overlook that intention
if the remedy fails "of its essential purpose. '"256 In such a case, the
right to pursue normal contract remedies is resorted to the buyer.2 5
Basically, this provision gives the court opportunity to determine
whether or not the remedy devised earlier is reasonable, in light
of the circumstances surrounding the transaction at the time of
the breach. 258 Therefore, even though the buyer may have agreed
to the limited remedy and at that time it was reasonable, if the
circumstances at the time of breach show that the buyer would
not have a fair remedy, the court may declare that the remedy has
failed of its essential purpose. A simple example is one in which
the parties agree that the exclusive remedy will be to return the
goods and the price will be refunded. If the goods are destroyed
because of inherent defects, they obviously cannot be returned, and
the remedy has failed of its essential purpose. In Wilson Trading
Corp. v. David Ferguson, Ltd.,2 59 the contract provided that no
claims pertaining to defects in the yarn being sold would be
2 1d. See generally Note, Contract Draftsmanship, supra note 240 at 595; Murray,

supra note 243 at 37; Note, Warranty Disclaimers, supra note 95, at 407. "The
seller's liability shall be limited to repair and replacement of goods or parts defective in materials or workmanship. This shall be the buyer's sole and exclusive
remedy whether in contract, tort or otherwise." Id. Can the buyer's right to a remedy
in tort be restricted in this manner? See Shanker, supra note 5 at 40, 43.
254 Evans Mfg. Corp. v. Wolosin, 47 Pa. Luz. Leg. Reg. 238, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 193 (Pa.
Ct. C.P. Luzerne County 1957).
255411 F.2d 622, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 589 (7th Cir. 1969).
256 U.C.C. § 2-719(2).
257 1d.

28 See Hawkland, supra note 20, at 42.
-923 N.Y.2d 398, 297 N.Y.S.2d 108, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 1213 (1968).
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allowed if made after weaving, knitting, or processing, or more
than 10 days after receipt of shipment. The defect in the yarn
could not be discovered until after the yarn had been processed
and the finished product had been washed. The court held that
the prescribed limitation failed of its essential purpose because
it prevented all remedies. 6 ° This result might be avoided by
providing two exclusive remedies at the outset, one to operate
as an alternative should the other fail. This makes it considerably
more difficult for a court to declare that the prescribed remedies
are unreasonable.2 1 1 In the Wilson case, then, besides the time
limitation, the contract should have provided that "if the defect
is latent and cannot be discovered within the prescribed time, the
buyer's sole and exclusive remedy shall be return of the purchase
price."
Finally, although the remedy is exclusive, and may still be
performed as provided, it could be unconscionable. In such a case,
262
a court may strike it and proceed as though it never existed.
According to a New York supreme court, speaking in Walsh v.
Ford Motor Co.,263 the test of whether the prescribed remedy must
be stricken as a matter of law, is the absence of factual evidence
that the limitation was commercially reasonable and fair, rather
than oppressive and surprising to a purchaser. 64 In this case, the
purchaser had been injured when his new automobile went out
of control due to defects in the throttle linkage, and the seller
had limited its responsibility to repair and replacement of defective
parts.2 5 On the other hand, Dow Corning Corp. v. Capitol Aviation, Inc.266 found that there was nothing unreasonable in restricting the buyer's rights to cancellation of the contract and
return of the deposit considering the circumstances surrounding
the transaction. 2 67 A limited remedy must provide adequate redress
in the context of the transaction, and must not surprise the pur26

0Id., at 404, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 112-13, 5 U.C.C. Rep. at 1217. See also Neville Chemical

261

Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 249 F. Supp. 649, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 1219 (W.D. Pa. 1968).
See generally Note, ContractDraftsmanship,supra note 240, at 596.

262 U.C.C. § 2-719, Comment 1.

263 59 Misc. 2d 241, 298 N.Y.S.2d 538, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 56 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
Id. 298 N.Y.S.2d at 539-40.
265 See also Haley v. Merit Chevrolet, Inc., 67 Ill. App. 2d 19, 214 N.E.2d 347 (1966)
(pre-Code law). But see Cox Motor Car Co. v. Castle, 402 S.W.2d 429, 3 U.C.C.
Rep. 397 (Ky. 1966); Bassman v. Manhattan Dodge Sales, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 128
(Sup. Ct. 1968).
266411 F.2d 622, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 589 (7th Cir. 1969).
267See also Wilson Trading Corp. v. David Ferguson, Ltd., 23 N.Y.2d 398, 297
N.Y.S.2d 108, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 1213 (1968). "Whether a contract or any clause of
the contract is unconscionable is a matter for the court to decide against the background of the contract's commerical setting, purpose, and effect ....Id. at 403-04,
297 N.Y.S.2d at 112, 5 U.C.C. Rep. at 1216.
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chaser. If the remedy fails to meet either criteria, it may be
considered unconscionable.
Limitation of Damages
Besides prescribing the type of remedy that the buyer may
pursue in case of breach, the seller may seek to limit his responsibility for consequential damages arising from the breach. This
is permitted in subsection 2-719(3), except insofar as the limitation
is unconscionable. That section goes on to provide that a limitation
on consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of
consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable. This provision is
necessarily interrelated with the restriction of remedies, since the
purpose of the latter is to minimize all damages, including consequential damages for personal injury.2 68 Arguably, the fact that
such a limitation is "prima facie" unconscionable is not intended
269
to mean that the limitation is always invalid without exception.
"Prima facie" should mean no more than "presumptively," and if
the seller could show that the limitation is neither surprising nor
oppressive, the limitation should be enforced. Construed in this
manner, the provision merely accomplishes a transfer of the burden
of proof. However, if this issue will be raised when a consumer
has suffered personal injury from a defective product, it will be
extremely difficult to prove that the limitation is fair. One commentator concludes that, as a practical matter, sellers attempt to
limit their damages, but realistically recognize consequential damage
270
liability as a possibility.
Since limitation of consequential damages is permitted in a
commercial setting, subject only to normal rules of unconscionability, 271 it is important to distinguish between consumer goods
2.

and those used in a commercial setting. Subsection 2-719(3)

pro-

vides that effect in the case of "consumer goods," which are defined
as goods which are "used or bought for use primarily for personal,
family or household purposes .... ",272 The question which this
provision leaves unanswered is: Does the language refer (1) only
to goods which are being used as consumer goods when the injury
occurs or (2) to goods destined for use as consumer goods? There
268See Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 59 Misc. 2d 241, 298 N.Y.S.2d 538, 6 U.C.C. Rep.

56 (Sup. Ct. 1969). Defendant, answering a claim of breach of warranty, pleaded a
clause in the contract which excluded all implied warranties and limited liability to
replacement or repair of defective or damaged parts. The court said, "[ilf the
pleaded defense is intended to exclude plaintiff from recovering damages for his
personal injury, such limitation is prima facie unconscionable .
Id., 298 N.Y.S.2d
at 539, 6 U.C.C. Rep. at 57.
269
See Note, Contract Draftsmanship, supra note 240 at 598-99.
27 0
1

Id. at 599.

2 See U.C.C. §§ 2-302, 2-719(3). See text, § IV(B) supra.
272U.C.C. § 9-109(1).
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is a strong argument that the language refers to goods destined to
become consumer goods, because that would place the responsibility
for the defect where it belongs -on
the manufacturer. 7 If that
is the case, a manufacturer could not create a limitation of consequential damages for personal injuries as to a dealer or intermediary who had been injured himself or had suffered a liability
as a result of a consumer's injury. A court considered this issue in
Ford Motor Co. v. Tritt,27 4 though it did not define "consumer
goods" so as to resolve this point. The court did, however, hold
that the manufacturer's limitation was unconscionable, even in a
commercial setting, because of the same policy reasons advanced
above. Certainly, however, a reasonable construction requires that
the goods are being used as consumer goods when the injury occurs.
Otherwise, there would have been no reason to specifically designate "consumer goods" in this section. Thus, an employee of an
intermediate seller who is injured by a product may be the victim
of one of these limitations since the goods are "inventory" at the
time the injury occurred. 7 Similarly, a truck driver who is injured
while making deliveries for his employer will be affected by a
limitation of damages clause since the truck is "equipment" in
this case. 76 However, a court may determine that the limitation is
unconscionable even in a commercial setting,2" and whether or
not such a limitation is unconscionable is a question of fact.27 One
court, having difficulty establishing unconscionability, decided that
the seller's intention to limit his liability for consequential damages
27
was not clearly stated, and therefore allowed these damages. 1
In Water Works & Industrial Supply Co. v. Wilburn2 80 the court
said that the limitation of consequential damages ("no claim for
labor or damages will be allowed") 28 ' applied only to damages
relating to the express warranty, and that it had no effect on
damages resulting from a breach of an implied warranty. It does
not appear, therefore, that courts are anxious to give the limitation
See generally Note, Contract Draftsmanship, supra note 240, at 598. But see Note,
Warranty Disclaimers, supra note 95, at 406.
274 244 Ark. 883, 430 S.W.2d 778, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 312'(1968).
275 See Note, Warranty Disclaimers, supra note 95, at 405. "Inventory" and "consumer
foods" are mutually exclusive. Compare U.C.C. 9-109(1) with U.C.C. § 9-109(4).
276 See U.C.C. § 9-109(2).
277
See Ford Motor Co. v. Tritt, 244 Ark. 883, 430 S.W.2d 778, 782, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 312,
316 (1968).
278 Granite Worsted Mills, Inc. v. Aaronson Cowen, Ltd., 29 App. Div. 2d 303, 287
N.Y.S.2d 765, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 98 (App. Div. 1968).
279 Henry v. W.S. Reichenbach & Son, Inc., 45 Pa. D. & C.2d 17, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 985
(1968).
280437 S.W.2d 951 (Ky. 1968).
281 id. at 955.
273
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of damage clauses their full effect, even where personal injury to
consumer is not involved.
Despite this indication, and even though the Code specifically
refuses to enforce limitations on personal injury damages in the
case of consumer goods, there is enough confusion surrounding
this point that the seller should include such a limitation in his
contract. Such a clause should state that the seller is not responsible
for consequential damages resulting from a defect in the product
"on any theory whatsoever."
VI.

GENERAL RULES OF DRAFTSMANSHIP

A draftsman faced with the problem of preparing an effective
disclaimer has the difficult task of playing the roles of the diplomat
and field general simultaneously. The challenge is to prepare a
disclaimer which will clearly state the seller's position while not
destroying the marketability of the product by creating damaging
anxiety in potential buyers. Also, this language must measure up to
a court's criteria of "fair remedy," "reasonableness," and "conscionability."
A. Define the Risk
It is important from the outset to define the subject matter
of the disclaimer. The seller should exhaust all possibilities for
determining the quality of the product, the probability of a defect,
and the adequacy of safety precautions which may be employed
before the product is ever marketed. 28 2 Certain risks cannot be
eliminated from the transaction, but if the seller exhausts available
methods of risk determination, the risk which he assumes may be
more accurately estimated. Similarily, the seller should research
the potential damages which may result if a defect is not discovered
or if the disclaimer is held ineffective. As expected, risk will very
from product to product. For instance, raw materials carry the
potential for damages for a loss of profit, should they be defective,
whereas a finished product carries with it the potential high
damages associated with personal injury. 283 A disclaimer should
be directed to that risk which cannot economically or feasibly be
prevented. The seller should consider the possibility of improving
his quality control system, or of obtaining insurance to cover
proximate damages, rather than relying on a disclaimer to eliminate
these risks. The important point here is that the disclaimer should
be directed only to the unavoidable risk, and should not be ex282 See generally Blackburn, supra note 16, at 181.
283See generally Duesenberg, supra note 6, at 164.
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tended to include other risks which may be eliminated by other
means. If the disclaimer attempts to cover all risks inherent in
the product, it runs the risk of being unconscionable by being overbroad. A carefully-worded specific disclaimer which defines a
limited risk and excludes responsibility for that risk alone will
certainly receive more favorable judicial response.
B. Negotiate the Disclaimer
A seller should spend some time with the buyer discussing
the warranties and the manner in which the seller would like to
limit them. At this time, the seller should be prepared to make
concessions, if necessary, to get the buyer to agree to the terms.
This is normally done as a matter of course between a commercial
buyer and seller, and often overriding agreements are drafted for
repeat customers which defines the warranty liability applicable
to each

individual transaction. 284 However, in most consumer

transactions it is rarely accomplished in any meaningful sense.
No longer can a seller simply rely upon his "form" for
automatic protection, 28" and the negotiations surrounding the
transaction are becoming increasingly important. In one case,
involving the sale of an automobile, the salesman discussed the
disclaimer with the buyer, and clearly pointed out that the car
would be sold without warranty at the price the buyer requested.
The court discussed these negotiations as support for upholding the
disclaimer.2 86 Price negotiations surrounding disclaimer of warranty
liability are extremely effective. A buyer will remember that he
thought the price was too high at first, and that he was pleased
when the seller reduced it. This will help the seller show that
the reason for the reduction was a restriction on warranty liability,
and, without the warranty responsibility, the seller could offer the
product at a lower price. In turn, this will aid the court in defining
the quid pro quo for the waiver of warranty protection. Therefore,
the seller should, whenever possible, negotiate the price with
reference to the warranty liability, and impress upon the buyer
the reason for the price reduction.2"
C. Clarify the Agreement
The agreement between the parties will be carefully analyzed
by a court if a question as to warranty liability arises, and it is to
See Resnick, Conflicting Boiler Plate - Effect of the Uniform Commerical Code,
18 Bus. LAW. 401, at 406 (1963).
285 Blackburn, supra note 16, at 181.
286 Chamberlain v. Bob Matick Chevrolet, Inc., 4 Conn. Cir. 685, 239 A.2d 42 (1967).
287 See Blackburn, supra note 16, at 181.
284
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the seller's advantage to have the contract terms clearly stated.
Ambiquities in a contract are construed against their author, and
this is especially true when the ambiguous phrase is meant to
disclaim warranties.28 It should be apparent from the entire agreement precisely what limitations were placed on the warranties. The
seller should pay particular attention to the language used, especially as to what terms actually constitute the contract and where
and how they are placed within the contract.
The language used in such clauses should have a plain meaning
and that is the meaning which should be intended. Then the seller
may at least argue that if the buyer saw the clause he knew what
it meant. Arguably, this becomes a matter of semantics, but it may
mean the difference between a valid and an ineffective disclaimer.
For express warranties, where modification is possible, the
modifying language should be succinctly stated, and should make
the buyer's responsibilities obvious. Thus, it is preferable to say
that the copper brewing vat will not corrode if it is "washed daily"
than to say that it will not corrode "provided an adequate maintenance program is adopted." In addition, the language of modification should immediately follow the warranty language, so that
no confusion exists as to whether or not the disclaiming language
is meant to alter the warranty.2" 9 To disclaim implied warranties
the seller would be well advised to use the exact language specified
in the Code - "as is," or "with all faults." Variations on this
language should be discouraged. For example, the words "no
warranties express or implied" will probably not have a disclaiming
effect, and the phrase "in its present condition" has questionable
validity. To further clarify the agreement the seller may wish to
use other specific language indicating that no warranties exist in
addition to the explicit language suggested by the Code. This is
desirable as long as the additional language does not serve to hide
the Code words, and thereby reduce their effectiveness in notifying
the buyer of the lack of warranty protection.
In all cases of written disclaimers, particular care should be
taken to make the language conspicuous. This requires stating the
words in a certain manner and locating the phrase in a certain place.
As to manner, the direction provided by section 1-201(10) has
been approved by the courts. Therefore, print the words of disclaimer in capital letters, and wherever possible, in a different color.
Then locate this clause on the face of the contract in a separate
paragraph as it may not be safely placed on the back.
2
"

See Note, Strict Products Liability, supre note 33, at 919-20.

289 See Hogan, supra note 27, at 7.
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Related to conspicuousness is the concept of severability of
clauses. Any language of disclaimer should be physically separated
from language limiting remedies, or restricting the agreement to the
written contract, or other similar terms. The purpose for this is
that the invalidity of one clause will not affect the others. If a
court finds the disclaimer provision unacceptable, it will not declare
the other language limiting warranty liability inoperative simply
because the terms were placed together in the same paragraph.
Similarily, if the clauses are physically separated, a court does not
have to make a determination that they are separable.
Finally, the seller should attempt to define the limits of the
agreement wherever possible. If the contract clearly states that
what is contained therein is intended to be the complete and final
agreement between the parties, a court is less likely to look beyond
the agreement to extend the limits of negotiation. Thus, the "integration" or "merger" clause should be used whenever possible so
that the interpretation of the agreement is, as much as possible,
restricted to the four corners of the contract. Moreover, such a
clause may have an indirect disclaiming effect for express warranties by excluding those warranties made prior to the signing of
the contract. As to implied warranties, one of these clauses will
help to prove the buyer's intent to waive everything but the rights
explicitly stated in the contract.
D. Preparethe Evidence
Since a major concern surrounding warranty disclaimers is
whether they are bargained-for or surprising to the purchaser, the
seller should anticipate the possibility of a warranty dispute and
accumulate evidence which would support his disclaimer, and show
that the purchaser was fully aware of its inclusion at the time of
the transaction. One way in which this may be accomplished is for
the seller to request that the buyer sign his name under the paragraph disclaiming warranties, in addition to subscribing the contract in the normal fashion.2 9 ° He could even request that the buyer
write on the contract in "his own handwriting": "I understand
that there are no warranties with this product." Or he may require
the buyer's signature on a separate piece of paper which identifies
the product and states the disclaimer. Furthermore, the seller could
take a picture of the used car with the words "AS IS" painted
conspicuously on the windshield. Why not even have the buyer
stand next to the car when the picture is taken? Another possibility
is having two salesmen present when warranty provisions are dis29

See Griffin v. H.L. Peterson Co., 427 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
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cussed. Similarily, in transactions where the buyer is able to competently evaluate the character and quality of the goods, a checklist
could be prepared on which the buyer acknowledges examination
of parts of the product by signing his initials. In short, be prepared
to prove that the buyer was, or should have been, aware of the
limitations on his protection. Once a court is convinced that the
buyer assented to the terms of a disclaimer, a major obstacle has
been hurdled.
CONCLUSION

By way of disclaimer, the conclusions which have been reached
herein are not intended to be the last word regarding the exclusion
or modification of warranties. In fact, if anything is certain from
an analysis of the law of disclaimers, it is that the judicial scrutiny
remains the most difficult hurdle. It should be apparent, however,
that the Uniform Commercial Code permits the seller some degree
of control over the hazards he risks in running his disclaimer by
the bench. A carefully drafted provision which meets all the
technical requirements, and which is called to the buyer's attention
and understood by him, will successfully exclude or modify warranty
liability. The seller's dilemma is reaching the delicate balance of
adequately apprising the buyer of his risks while still persuading
him to purchase the product. This burden is not insurmountable,
but it does force the seller to carefully plan the negotiations to
tailor an agreement to fit the transaction - following the technical
requirements of the Code - and to forthrightly define the limits
of his responsibility so that the buyer understands the limits of his
protection.
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NOTE
EUGENIC STERILIZATIONA SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS
INTRODUCTION

E

is a concept of improving human stock through the
regulation of heredity. Positive eugenics would accomplish this
by encouraging reproduction of those with favorable traits; negative
eugenics, such as sterilization, would discourage or prohibit the reproduction of those with unfavorable traits.
Crude attempts to apply basic eugenic principles have been
made since very early times. For example, the Spartans of ancient
Greece permitted their sickly children to die, and they slaughtered
their more intelligent slaves in order to insure control by the ruling
elite.' Sir Francis Galton originated the modern concept of eugenics
in the latter part of the 19th century as a result of a study of the
pedigrees of various eminent persons of his time. His discovery that
desirable mental traits and other qualities frequently were shared by
persons of common lineage led him to conclude that human abilities
were in large part determined by ancestry. Galton coined the word
"eugenics" from the Greek word eugenes meaning "well born" and
did much to publicize the possible advantages of applied eugenics
during the latter decades of the 19th century. 2
Other studies suggested, from a different point of view, that
heredity appeared to be an important determinant of human development. Unlike the notables studied by Galton, later investigators
traced the pedigrees of genetically inferior families, the legendary
"Jukes" and the "Kallikaks," and found among them descendants
with an extraordinary number of undesirable traits, suggesting mental or behavioral abnormalities or inadequacies, e.g., feeblemindedness, criminality, pauperism, and sexual immorality. These studies,
even more than those of Galton, served to fuel the growing eugenics
3
movement.
UGENICS

*A glossary of pertinent medical terms appends this note.
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Contemporaneous with Galton's original study were the investigations of Gregor Mendel, who demonstrated how simple hereditary
characteristics were transmitted.4 When his work came to the world's
attention near the turn of the century, Mendel's scientific data was
immediately hailed by the eugenicists as the explanation for the
theories formulated by recent studies of human populations and as
a scientific justification for a program of eugenic control.' The final
development still needed to make it possible to legislate eugenics
was the perfection of procedures for the regulation of procreation.6
This was achieved with the development of simple and effective
surgical techniques for the sterilization of human beings.7
With all the legal requirements thus apparently satisfied, the
discovered "eugenic principles" were soon codified into laws to
provide for sterilization of undesirable persons having defects such
as mental retardation, mental disease, epilepsy, and a variety of
other conditions - the assumption being made that all such defects
had some genetic basis. The first sterilization law was successfully
enacted in the State of Indiana in 1907.' In 1922, a Model Eugenical
Sterilization Law was proposed that would have subjected the following classes of persons to sterilization:
(1) Feeble-minded; (2) Insane (including the psychopothic);
(3) Criminalistic (including the delinquent and wayward);
(4) Epileptic; (5) Inebriate (including drug-habitues); (6)
Diseased (including the tuberculous, the syphilitic, the leprous,
and others with chronic infections and legally segregable disease);
(7) Blind (including those with seriously impaired vision); (8)
Deaf (including those with seriously impaired hearing); (9)
Deformed (including the crippled); and (10) Dependent (including orphans, ne'er-do'wells, the homeless, tramps and
paupers) .9
In succeeding years laws were passed by many of our states which
either incorporated provisions directly from, or were inspired by,
this proposal. During the period from 1907 to the present, a ma-

jority of the states had at one time or another adopted sterilization
4 E.

GARDNER, PRINCIPLES OF GENETICS ch. 1 (1964); W. JOHNSON et al., BIOLOGY

598-99 (1966).
5
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LAws (1960)
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OF EUGENIC STERILIZATION

7 In the human male, sterilization can be accomplished by a vasectomy and in the
female, by a salpingectomy. The vasectomy involves a simple scrotal incision severing
the vas deferns which conducts sperm from the testes to the urethra of the penis.
In a salpingectomy, a considerably more complicated procedure, the operation requires
an abdominal incision and the cutting and tying of the fallopian tubes. Neither of
these procedures is hazardous under proper surgical conditions nor does either interfere with the desire for sexual intercourse or with its gratification. See F. LINDMAN
& D. MCINTYRE, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 183 (1961).
8Note The Individual and the Involuntary Sterilization Laws, 1966, 31 ALBANY
L. REv. 97 (1967).
9 H. LAUGHLIN, EUGENICAL STERILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 446-47 (1922).
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laws. At present, 25 states still retain eugenic sterilization statutes;
of these 22 are compulsory.' 0 Recently some of the laws have been
mitigated by the provision of consent requirements, but such requirements are frequently subject to administrative discretion tantamount
to the rejection of consent.
It was not until the landmark case of Buck v. Bell" that federal
authority and acquiescence was placed solidly behind the eugenic
movement. In the Buck case, a Virginia court had held that the
state's sterilization law was valid under both the Virginia and United
States Constitutions. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court,
the law in question was found to be a reasonable regulation under
the police power of the state and not to be violative of either the
due process or the equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. 2 Justice Holmes' affirming comment in the Biuck case, "Three
1
generations of imbeciles are enough," has become legendary.
The period of the 1920's, when the Buck case was decided and
model sterilization laws were being proposed, represented a high
water mark in the enthusiasm for eugenic sterilization as a proper
expression of governmental authority. This optimism, however, soon
subsided as legal and constitutional doubts began to appear and as
new scientific evidence was marshalled to refute most of the eugenicists' basic scientific premises. Today, some of the original laws
have been repealed, and others are infrequently enforced.' 4 Yet, the
fact that some sterilizations continue to be performed' 5 and that, in
any event, the threat remains of possible sterilization being imposed,
even though there is questionable scientific value in such procedures,
makes this a topic of continuing timeliness and interest. Numerous
legal, medical, and sociological reviews have been published on the
10

ALA. CODE tit. 45 § 243 (1958); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-531 to 36-540
(1956); CAL. CODE ANN. WELF. & INST'NS § 6624 (Supp. 1969); CONN. GEN.
STAT. REV. § 17-19 (1969) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 §§ 5701 to 5705 (Supp.
1968); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 99-1301 to 99-1319 (1967); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§
66-801 to 66-812 (Supp. 1969); IND. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-1601 to 22-1618 (1964);
IOWA CODE §§ 145.1 to 145.22 (Supp. 1969) ; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.34 §§
2461 to 2468 (1964); MICH. STAT, ANN. §§ 14.381 to 14.390 (1969); MINN.
STAT. §§ 256.07 to 256.10 (1959); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 6957 to 6964 (1952);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 83-501 to 83-508 (1966); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 174:1
to 174:14 (1964) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-36 to 35-57 (1966); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
43A §§ 341 to 346 (1951); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 436-010 to 436-150 (1967);
tit.
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 32-671 to 32-680 (1962); S.D. CODE §§ 27-11-1 to 27-11-6
(mentally ill),§§ 27-17-1 to 27-17-34 (retarded) (Supp. 1967) ; UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 64-10.1 to 64-10.14 (1968); VT. STAT. ANN.§§ 18-8701 to 18-8704 (1968);
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 37.1-156 to 37.1-171 (Supp. 1968); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§
16-10-1 to 16-10-7 (1969) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 46.12 (1957). The Connecticut,

Minnesota and Vermont laws are voluntary in nature.
11274 U.S. 200 (1927).
12 Id.

at 207-08.

13Id. at 207.
14 Ferster, Elimination the Unfit-Is Sterilization the Answer?. 27 OHIO ST. L.J. 591,
613 (1966).
15Id. at 600-01, 613.
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subject, most of them unfavorable in their appraisal. 6 The basic
criticisms have been that eugenic sterilization does not accomplish
its stated objective of "human betterment," and, at the same time,
it interferes with important freedoms either expressly guaranteed
by the United States Constitution or brought within its ambit by
judicial construction. 7
I.

SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND

The essence of the argument against the sterilization laws is that
they are of little value in achieving their specific goal of overall
eugenic improvement. The main thrust of this argument rests on
the following considerations: (1) genetic etiologies for many of
the mental defects and deficiencies to which the laws apply have
not been established; (2) the procedures now used reach only a
small fraction of those with defective hereditary factors; and (3)
hereditary factors are not a static but a changing phenomenon.
Before proceeding to the elaboration of the scientific arguments
that militate against the eugenic laws, a short excursion into the
fields of genetics and biochemistry may be helpful to a general understanding of the problems involved.
A. Classical Genetics
Gregor Mendel's experiments demonstrated that the characteristics of organisms were transmitted to offspring by a random assortment and recombination of pairs of hereditary units.' 8 These units
remain intact and unchanged throughout the reproductive process,
as demonstrated by the fact that a hereditary trait transmitted but
completely hidden in one offspring can reappear in later generations in a completely undiluted and unchanged form.' 9 The hereditary units, later designated as "genes," are found in the nuclei of
all cells, aggregated into elongated, rod-like "chromosomes. "20
The specific area of a chromosome that determines any specific
trait can be termed a "gene." Each gene on the chromosome ultimately governs a specific biological function or characteristic. For
16 See, e.g., AMA STUDY, supra note 5; LINDMAN & MCINTYRE, supra note 7; M.
WOODSIDE, STERILIZATION IN NORTH CAROLINA (1950); Bligh, Sterilization and

Mental Retardation, 51 A.B.A.J. 1059 (1965); Ferster, supra note 14; Kindregan,
Sixty Years of Compulsory Eugenic Sterilization: "Three Generations of Imbeciles"
and the Constitution of the United States, 43 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 123 (1966);

Comment, Compulsory Eugenic Sterilization: For Wom Does Bell Toll? 6 DuQUESNE UNIV. L. REV. 145 (1967-68) ; Note, Compulsary Sterlization of Criminals
-Perversion in the Law; Perversion of the Law, 15 SYRACUSE L. REV. 738 (1964).
17 See, e.g., AMA STUDY, supra note 5, at 9-11; LINDMAN & MCINTYRE, supra note 7,
at 187-90, Comment, supra note 16 passim.
18 GARDNER, supra note 4, at 15.

19 Id.
201. ASiMOV, THE GENETIC CODE 17-18 (1962); GARDNER, supra note 4 passim.
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example, one aspect of blood-clotting in man is determined by a
specific region (gene) in one of the chromosomes. Typically, the
structure of this region will confer the property of normal bloodclotting. However, if an alternative structure for this same chromosomal region is present, most typically in a human male, 2 1 the person
suffers from the disease known as hemophilia, in which blood-clotting
occurs slowly if at all.2 2
Chromosomes normally occur in functional pairs which contain
the same or similar genetic material. In the human body cell, 46
chromosomes occur in 23 pairs. The genes occupying the same locus
or position on such pairs of chromosomes and controlling the heredity
of a particular characteristic are termed "alleles," which is simply
the designation of alternative forms of the same gene. When both
genes of the pair are alike, the gentic complement (i.e., the genotype) is described as "homozygous" and when unlike, as "heterozygous. ' ' 23 If the two alleles would tend to yield different expressions of a genetic characteristic, one of them is frequently dominant
over the other and the dominant gene determines the entire external
expression of that characteristic (i.e., the phenotype). The recessive
gene remains unexpressed but can reappear in later offspring if
24
paired with another recessive allele.
In the total reproductive process, the paired choromosomes and
their allelic genes are separated during the complex sequence of
events termed "meiosis." The net result of meiosis is that potential
sex cells are produced which have just half the number of chromosomes as are present in the somatic cells. Each sex contributes one
such sex cell or gamete during fertilization, a sperm cell from the
father and an egg cell from the mother..2 5 The result is the reattainment of the normal chromosome number and allelic complements in
the new individual.
The favorite example of eye color, although a rank over-simplification. is illustrative of the operation of simple gene combinations.
Let us assume that the observed characteristic of eye color is governed by a single pair of alleles, one of them controlling the characteristic for brown eyes and the other allele conferring blue eyes.
21 The example of a human male is used because the male happens to posses only a

22

single gene site for the hemophilic defect. This accounts for the fact that men are
more commonly affected by hemophilia than are women. In the female two gene
sites are present and the occurrence of the phenotypic disease requires the occupation of both sites by defective genes. This is statistically less probable than the
case for a single site. The occurrence of a single defective gene paired with a normal
one results in a defect carrier, who, although outwardly normal, can transmit the
hemophilic disease to her male children. See GARDNER, rupra note 4, at 107-08.
D. BONNER, HEREDITY 15 (1961).

23 GARDNER, supra note

4 passim: H. KALMUS, GENEIICS 244-58 (1964).

24 GARDNER, supra note 4, at 15-17.
5Id.
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Based on a consideration of population genetics, the brown-eyed
phenotype is found to occur in a characteristic proportion which
indicates the brown-eyed allele to be dominant over the blue. 6 It
follows, therefore, that if an individual is to possess blue eyes, both
genes must be of the blue-eyed allele, while an individual with a
genotype consisting of either a combination of blue and brown or
of paired brown alleles is phenotypically brown-eyed.
B. Biochemical Genetics
Until recently little was known of the precise chemical structure
of the genetic apparatus or of the mechanisms by which genetic
information is physiologically expressed. The elucidation by Watson
and Crick of the structure of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), the
presumptive major component of genes and chromosomes, provided
a considerable impetus to genetic-biochemical understanding. 27 The
Watson-Crick Model consists of two chains of complex molecules
called "nucleotides" twisted about each other in a regular helix.
The sequential arrangement of four different "nitrogen bases" which
are a part of these nucleotides is the key to the genetic information
contained in the chromosome (the "genetic code"). It is this genetic
code which is translated into possible physiological characteristics,
the phenotype of the individual.2 8
DNA molecules do not enter directly into the synthesis of materiais which are necessary for cellular and bodily processes. The
genetic information of the code is first transferred to molecules of
ribonucleic acid (RNA). With a structure similar to that of a single
strand of DNA, RNA is an intermediate in the conversion of the
genetic information to biochemical products.29 DNA is the master
code, while RNA is the working pattern (template) from which
materials necessary for cellular and bodily processes are synthesized.
The RNA working patterns, in turn, order the specific arrangement of amino acids in proteins. These protein substances are the
enzymes which regulate the body's basic physiological processes.3 0
Typically large and structurally complex, the protein-enzymes are
2

A. MONTAGU, HUMAN HEREDITY 244-46 (1963).

27AsiMov, supra note 20; GARDNER, supra note 4; H. VAN PEENEN, BIOCHEMICAL
GENETICS (1966);

J.

WATSON, MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE GENE (1965).

28 WATSON, supra note 27.
29 RNA is actually of several kinds: Messenger RNA carries the code from DNA to
the ribosome where protein is synthesized. Transfer RNA brings up amino acids
and matches them to the code on the messenger RNA. Ribosomal RNA functions
as a "jig" which holds the messenger RNA while transfer RNA brings up amino
acids to form the developing protein molecule. See P. HARTMAN & S. SUSKIND,
GENE ACTION 30 (1965) ; Holley, The Nucleolide Sequence of Nucleic Acid, 214
SCIENTIFIC AM., Feb. 1966, at 30-39.
30 WATSON, supra note 27, at 88, 172.
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aggregations of amino acids, 81 each of which is represented by one
or more code groups on the DNA and RNA chains.8 The genetic
endowment encoded in the DNA is translated into physiological
manifestations through the agency of these protein-enzyme intermediates.33
The genetic code, although amazingly durable for its complexity,
is nevertheless subject to change or "mutation. ' 3 4 Mutations can be
produced by high energy radiations such as cosmic rays and ordinary
medical X-rays, 35 or by milder agents such as ultraviolet radiation
and certain reactive chemicals. 36 Increasing evidence has been found
that many chemical substances taken into the body can be mutagenic,
for example, the hallucinogenic drug LSD 3 7 and even substances
found in ordinary foods, such as caffeine, 38 the artificial sweeteners
cyclamate3 9 or cyclohexylamine, 4 ° and a host of other commonly
used foods and chemicals. 4
Mutations may occur in body cells or in germ cells. In the latter
case, a permanent change occurs in the hereditary endowment that
is transmitted to potential offspring. In most cases, such changes
are detrimental rather than beneficial, but it is the occasional beneficial mutation that is the raw material for nature's evolutionary
process."
II.

SCIENTIFIC APPRAISAL OF EUGENIC STERILIZATION

An analysis of the scientific value of legalized eugenic sterilization must consider and answer the following questions: (1) are the
observed defects which sterilization aims to eliminate related to
31 Phillips, The Three-dimensional Structure of an Enzyme Molecule, SCIENTIFIC AM.,

Nov. 1966, at 78-90.
s Each amino acid is represented by a particular triplet of nitrogen bases termed a
"codon." With four nitrogen bases, 64 codons are possible, several of which may
represent a single amino acid. Some codons have been found to perform the specific
function of chain termination, that is, to indicate when the end of the protein molecule has been reached. See Holley, supra note 29; Yanofsky, Gene Structure and
Protein Structure, SCIENTIFIC AM., May 1967, at 80-94.
33See JOHNSON et al., supra note 4, at 652-55; Beckwith, Regulation of the Lac
Operon, 156 Sci. 597-604 (1967).
34 WATSON, supra note 27, at 287.
3SKALMUS, supra note 23, at 123-35; Pollard, The Biological Action of Ionizing
Radiation, 57 AM. SCIENTIST 206-36 '(1969); Puck, Radiation and the Human Cell,
SCIENTIFIC AM., Apr. 1960, at 142-53.
36

D. COHEN, THE BIOLOGICAL ROLE OF THE NUCLEIC ACIDS (1965);

MONTAGU,

supra note 26, at 334.
37 Sanders, Chemical Mutagens, CHEM. & ENG. NEWS, May 19, 1969 (part 1), at 50;
June 2, 1969 (part 2), at 54, 57-59.
3 Sanders, part 2, supra note 37, at 60-61.
39
Id. at 61-62.
40
Id. at 62.
41 Sanders, parts 1 & 2, supra note 37.
42 GARDNER, supra note 4, at 174-80.
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genetic causes?; (2) is the sterilization of individuals with abnormal
phenotypes an efficient means of eliminating gene defects?; and
(3) of what importance are mutations to the eugenic scheme? These
are the topics to be considered in this section. In addition, to be
treated separately, is the recent evidence indicating the relationship
of the chromosome complement to antisocial behavior.
A. Are the Observed Defects Related to Genetic Causes?
1. General Survey of Mental Abnormalities
The defects to which sterilization laws have been addressed
are physical as well as mental; however, we will concern ourselves
here primarily with conditions which have some emotional, mental,
or behavioral significance since these are typically the bases for legal
sterilization at the present time.
The clear establishment of genetic etiologies for mental or
physical defects is of paramount importance to a rational eugenic
program. Defects can be the result of heredity alone, but they can
also be caused or aggravated by conditions existing during the prenatal period or by an accident at birth, as well as by disease organisms
or stresses encountered during youth or adult life. For example, it is
estimated that of birth defects, only about 20 percent can be blamed
primarily on heredity, the rest being attributable to environmental
factors or to a combination of environment and heredity.4"
Two broad categories of mental abnormalities are recognized:
mental deficiency (retardation) and mental defect or illness (psychoses and neuroses in their various forms). Mental retardation is
frequently of a nonspecific type (the low IQ individual), generally
recognized as being hereditary, but with little or no understanding
of specific modes or patterns of transmission. Mental deficiencies
traceable to a particular genetic or physiological factor, such as
that accompanying uncontrolled phenylketonuria (PKU),'4 galacto-

semia, 45 or cretinism 46 are more fully understood, if only because
there is knowledge that these have a specific organic cause. These
diseases are probably the result of single gene defects, although
cretinism is considered by many to be only a dietary disorder. The
47
mental and physical deficiency of Down's Syndrome (mongolism)
is, in contrast, relatable to a chromosomal anomaly, i.e., an extra
chromosome, rather than a simple gene defect.
43 Apgar, What Every Mother-to-Be Should Know. TODAY'S HEALTH. May 1966, at 16.
44 MONTAGU, supra note 26, at 174-76.
45

H.

SUTTON,

GENES, ENZYMES AND INHERITED DISEASES

46Jd. at 105-06.
47 MONTAGU, supra note 26, at 89-91.
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So far as mental defect is concerned, certain types of mental
disorders formerly characterized simply as "insanity" are known
to be entirely environmental in origin. For example, in the tertiary
stages of syphilis some of the tissue of the brain is destroyed by the
invading spirochete organisms. This leads to mental deterioration
and the characteritic mental condition known as paresis. Without
question, heredity does not play any part in the etiology of this
48
disease; it is a condition attributable to microbial pathogens.
Although evidence has been adduced that certain of the psychoses may involve a "genetic factor" (which we shall discuss later),
in general the psychotic and neurotic illnesses have been considered
developmental or environmental in origin or are simply termed "functional," because no organic cause can be identified. 9 Moreover,
sociopathy or psychopathy and, until recently, so-called "criminal
behavior" could not be definitely related to genetic origins." However, evidence has now been presented which associates certain types
of antisocial or criminal behavior with the presence of supernumerary
sex chromosomes in affected individuals. These developments will
be discussed in a later subsection.
2. Genetic Evidence of Defect
Dramatic evidence of genogenic factors is provided by two
rare forms of mental illness - amaurotic family idiocy and Huntington's chorea - which are important for our purpose in that they are
rather clearly characterized as following a single gene, Mendelian
mode of inheritance.5 Single gene recessive traits were shown by
Mendel to occur among offspring in a 3:1 ratio of the dominant
(in this case, normal) phenotype and the expressed recessive trait.
In studies of 59 families with a history of the recessive trait, amaurotic
idiocy, 413 offspring were studied of whom 115 were idiots, yielding
approximately the 3: 1 ratio of unaffected individuals. 5 Huntington's
chorea is governed by a dominant gene, frequently with delayed
expression of the overt disorder.5 The disease follows the expected
Mendelian ratio for dominant traits.
Of greater practical significance is the possibility that a genetic
cause might be found in the more common psychoses, particularly
schizophrenia. Among such diseases, however, Mendelian inheritance
48

A. WINCHESTER, HEREDITY AND YOUR LIFE 281 (1960).
READINGS IN LAW AND PSYCHIATRY

49 Rubin, Psychiatric Illness, in

E. Ferster, & J. Rubin eds. 1968).
50 MONTAGU, supra note 26, at 156-63, 370.
51A. MASLOW & B. MI-rELMANN, PRINCIPLES
(1951).
52
Id.
5 Id.
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46-49 (R. Allen,
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has not been demonstrated, although there is evidence that a gene
may confer a predisposition to the disease whose actual expression
may then be governed by environmental factors (i.e., stress) to which
54
the susceptible individual is exposed.
The major work on the genogenic origin of psychoses has been
done with schizophrenia, which is characterized by disturbances in
reality relationships and fragmentation of the ego. Kallman examined 691 pairs of identical (monozygotic) and fraternal (dizygotic)
twins, one or both of whom were schizophrenic, and determined the
concordance rate (i.e., the percentage of similar development) in
each case.5 5 He compared these results and also the concordance rate
in identical twins living in different environments. From these studies
of twins and their relationships with other family members, Kallman
was able to show that the incidence of schizophrenia was directly
related to the closeness in family relationship.56
This data indicates the presence of a strong genetic factor in
the development of schizophrenia. However, the effect of environment is not ruled out, as suggested by the small but definite concordance rate for marital partners and by data, not shown in the
table, of a lower concordance among separated versus nonseparated
monozygotic twins-77.6 percent against 91.5 percent. 7 The "genetic
factor" implied by these studies, rather than signifying ordinary Mendelian inheritance, means that genetically predisposed individuals
can develop schizophrenia under proper environmental conditions.
That is, if exposed to the same environmental stresses as "normal"
persons, predisposed individuals will tend to develop schizophrenia,
where others would remain relatively unaffected. 58 It has also been
noted that development of the schizophrenic state is influenced in
many instances by the physical condition of the individual. For example, when one identical twin develops schizophrenia and the other
MId. at 120-21.
55Kallman, The Genetic Theory of Schizophrenia, in READINGS IN LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 56-60 (R. Allen, E. Ferster, & J. Rubin, eds. 1968) ; MASLOW & MrrELMANN, supra note 51, at 119.
56 Kallman, supra note 55, at 58.
Relationship to Schizophrenic Twin Index Cases
Incidence of Schizophrenia in Percentage
Husbands
and Wives

Stepsiblings

Halfsiblings

Parents

Full
siblings

Dizygotic
cotwins

Monozygotic
cotwins

2.1%

1.8%

7.0%

9.2%

14.3%

14.7%

85.8%

57 MASLOW & MITTELMANN, supra note 51, at 120.

58 It should be noted that one of the assumptions made in the twin studies-that identical and fraternal twin pairs each enjoy a common environment-is questioned by
some pspchologists. For example, a recent study by Smith of dietary habits supports
the notion that there is a difference in the overall environment of the two types of
twins, which will, in turn, influence intra-pair differences. Smith, A Comparison of
Socio-environmental Factors in Monozygotic and Dizygotic Twins, Testing an Assumption, in METHODS AND GOALS IN HUMAN BEHAVIOR GENETICS 45-61 (S. Vandenberg ed. 1965).
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does not, the affected twin is usually weaker physically and of lower
weight. Furthermore, when the general health of the weaker twin
improves, the schizophrenic symptoms frequently disappear, and the
individual may resume a normal life.5 9
In their attempts to discover a physiological basis for schizophrenia, some workers in the field have attributed the disorder to
an adrenal gland functional disturbance, in which an insufficient
amount of corticoid hormone is secreted to cope with conditions of
stress.6 0 Others have noted the ability to produce a schizophrenic-like
symptomatology with drugs such as mescaline and lysergic acid and
have suggested that the disease may be due to the presence of abnormal substances with properties similar to these drugs. 6' Perhaps
the most impressive physiological results, however, are those obtained by Heath, who, by injecting volunteers with the substance
taraxein (obtained from the blood of schizophrenic patients), was
able to induce a variety of schizophrenic-like symptoms - catatonic
reactions, paranoia, disorganization, and depersonalization. 2 The
onset of symptoms was described as gradual, reaching a peak between 15 and 40 minutes following the injection and then subsiding.
Heath considers the symptoms resulting from the taraxein injection
to be more specifically schizophrenic in nature than those resulting
from mescaline or lysergic acid, which he considers more characteristic of toxic psychoses.
The significance to a genogenic argument of these possible
physiological etiologies may seem obscure, but it should be recognized that, except for toxic, pathologic, or traumatic conditions,
physiology is fundamentally a reflection of genetic endowment. That
is, genes and chromosomes are the essential synthetic sources of those
biochemical substances (enzymes) that regulate all physiological processes. Thus, genetic and physiological evidence are presumptively
related and usually converge on a single organic cause.
The twin study technique has also been applied to manic-depressive psychosis, a disease characterized by marked emotional
oscillation from manic to depressive states. Studies of twins concerning manic-depressive psychotics, although less extensive and convincing than those with schizophrenics, indicate a probable genetic
predisposition for manic-depressive psychosis. 63 Concordance among
monozygotic twins may run as high as 90 percent or more."
59 MONTAGU, supra note 26, at 154.
60

J.

COLEMAN, ABNORMAL

PSYCHOLOGY AND MODERN

el ld.
62
id. at 276.
63d. at 121.
64

MONTAGU, supra note 26, at 154.

LIFE 275

(1956).
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Involutional psychosis is the remaining important mental illness
with which twin study research has been conducted. This disorder is
characterized chiefly by depression, often in association with symptoms of insomnia, guilt, anxiety, and delusions. Concordance in
identical twins has been found to be about 61 percent, but the
genetic mechanism is obscure. 5
Epilepsy is a neurologic disorder the variation of which suggest a
variety of causes; however, gene deficiencies are undoubtedly involved in many cases. Some authorities, although insisting that the
overt disease is not inheritable, feel that a predisposition to the disorder may be inherited. 6 Reasonably convincing evidence for genetic
predisposition is provided, again by twin studies, which shows concordance among identical twins at a rate of 66 percent.6 7 It appears
that a number of recessive genes are involved in epileptic vulnerability.
We may summarize this section by noting that a genetic causation
can be demonstrated for certain mental abnormalities but, by far,
not for all. Those conditions that exhibit Mendelian inheritance, such
as amaurotic idiocy and Huntington's chorea, have an evident genetic
origin. On the other hand, a genogensis of the classical, functional
psychoses - schizophrenia and manic-depressive psychosis - is more
speculative and such a concept has not yet replaced the still vital
developmental and environmental theories on which these diseases
are postulated.
B. Is the Sterilization of those with Abnormal Phenotypes an Efficient Means of Eliminating Gene Defects?
If we were to go so far as to assume a genetic cause for all
abnormalities to which sterilization laws are directed, we are still
faced with the crucial question: Can sterilization of the affected
persons wipe out the defect or deficiency? To answer this question
we must examine more closely the implications of phenotypic expression of defects versus genotypic incidence of gene errors.
Typically, abnormal and especially lethal characteristics are
genetically recessive in nature (or dominant with so called "reduced
penetrance")."8 This is to be expected simply from considerations
of selection and survivability; dominant defects are rapidly extinguished, but recessive defects can persist in unexpressed genotypes.
Because they are recessive, therefore, a considerable number of defective genes may be and are secreted among the many genes- the
65Id.
66
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gene pool - carried by the population. Thus, it has been estimated
that an average person will carry some eight defective recessive
genes.6 9 The net result is that almost everyone is a carrier of one
or more defects. The probability of a random mating involving two
particular defective alleles is usually quite low and, even then, the
probability is only one-in-four of begetting a homozygous offspring.
Moreover, the probability of an expressed defect should be even
smaller if the homozygous state confers only a predisposition to a
disease that requires an adverse environment for overt expression.
For these reasons, defects are maintained in the heterozygous
state for generation after generation in a relatively stable ratio of
defect carriers to those who physically manifest the defect. Of
greatest significance is the fact that carriers of defects are much
more numerous than those who happen to express those defects.
As an example, the carrier of albinism is almost 300 times more
frequent than the albino himself.71 Moreover, the rarer the disease,
the greater the disproportion between the frequency of carriers and
of affected persons. 7 ' Again, this data applies to fully expressed
traits, and when there is only a predisposition to expression which
requires environmental elaboration, the ratios between carries and
expressed defectives would be greater than for simple Mendelian
inheritance.
Since the number of those who are affected is always quite small
in relation to those who are carriers, one is led inescapably to the
conclusion that sterilization of expressed defectives reaches only a
minute fraction of the defects circulating in the gene pool. Because
of this, homozygous sterilization to eliminate hereditary defects
69Id. at 316-17.
70S. REED, PARENTHOOD AND HEREDITY 29-30 (1963).

71Population genetics (for a single gene site with two "alleles") are based on a
deceptively simple expression, (p+q)2 = p 2 +2pqq 2 , attributable to G. Hardy
and W. Weinberg. In the expression, p and q are probabilities of occurrence of
particular genes ("alleles") and p 2 , 2pq and q2 are probabilities of occurrence of
individuals carrying different gene combinations (i.e., genotypes). The equation is
based on the concept that the proportion of two allelic genes remains constant in
a breeding population. The formula may be applied to compute the probability of
the occurrence of genotypes of those alleles if the frequency of one member of the
allelic pair is known. See GARDNER, supra note 4, at 307-12.
72REED, supra note 70, at 31.
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appears, quite frankly, to be a totally vain exercise. For example,
if 1 percent of the general population were affected by a simple
recessive abnormal condition and these people were all sterilized,
it would require four generations or a span of about one hundred
years to reduce their number to 0.5 percent, and seven generations
73
or 175-200 years to reduce their number to 0.25 percent.
C. Of What Importance are Mutations to the Genetic Scheme?
The immediate answer to this question is that mutations reinforce
the case against eugenic sterilization. Abnormal genes are constantly
being generated as a result of gene mutations. These may be caused
by such mutagenic agents as radiation, chemicals, and food substances, as noted earlier. Because of mutations, therefore, it will
never be possible to achieve a gene pool free of defective genes
except by some as yet unknown process of eliminating defective genes
at a faster pace than the mutation rate.
D. Chromosome Number versus Criminality
Until very recently, the association of criminality or "antisocial
behavior" with genetic makeup was highly questionable.7 4 However,
evidence as now been adduced implicating an abnormal condition
of the sex chromosomes - the XYY syndrome - with antisocial
behavior.7 5 The normal male possesses an XY complement of sex
chromosomes and the normal female, an XX complement. 6 The
XYY individual thus possesses an extra male-determining chromosome, hence the designation "supermales."
The link between XYY and antisocial behavior was first indicated about four years ago in Scotland, when researchers discovered
a remarkably high incidence - about 3 percent- of this rare condition among patients of a maximum security hospital for the
mentally ill and retarded.7 7 Further surveys in English and American
institutions have corroborated the high incidence of patients pos78
sessing this chromosome abnormality.
The results of the various XYY surveys indicate a strong positive
correlation between antisocial behavior and XYY incidence, the
correlation increasing significantly with increased stature of individuals sampled.7 ' The XYY's identified in these surveys evidence
73 MONTAGU, supra note 26, at 302-03.
74Id. at 156-63.
75See Burke, The "XYY Syndrome": Genetics, Behavior and the Law, 46 DENVER
L.J. 261 (1969).
76 GARDNER, supra note 4, ch. 8.
77 Crime Chromosome; genetic abnormality explains criminal behavior, 91 Sci. NEWS
258 (1967).
78Burke, supra note 75.
79 Id.
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varying degrees of antisocial and disorganized behavior. The affected individuals typically suffer from personality disorders and
are extremely immature, unstable, impulsive, and overly aggressive,
and many are also mentally retarded. 80 Objective findings among
at least some of the XYY's include significant differences in parts of
the electrocardiogram,," abnormal electroencephalograms, 8 2 and, in
a few cases, high hormone levels.8 3
Recently, pleas have been entered by a number of accused
criminals alleging their XYY condition as grounds of insanity. In
Australia and in France such a plea has met with some success in
gaining acquittal or more lenient sentencing in murder cases. 8 4 On
the other hand, in a California kidnapping and rape case, a trial
court ruled that the XYY syndrome was not sufficient to establish
that the defendant was legally insane.85 A similar plea made on
appeal in the Richard Speck murder case is yet to be decided. 8 6
Whether XYY males are really psychiatrically different from
other men remains to be shown. Some of the institutionalized XYY's
have come from broken homes and poor environments, and those
experiences could account for their criminal records and antisocial
behavior.8" Nevertheless, very few XYY's are found to have relatives
with actual psychological or criminal records.8 8 The fact that many
XYY's are unusually tall could also account for their adjustment
problems. 89 At present, medical opinion is divided on the significance
of the XYY relationship to criminality. ° However, at least one
prominent medical worker in the field, D. S. Borgaonkar of Johns
Hopkins University, feels there is a valid association of the XYY syndrome with behavioral, though not necessarily criminal, problems. 1
Notwithstanding the apparent relationship of the XYY syndrome to antisocial behavior or criminality, the crucial issue relating
to the instant sterilization controversy is whether a condition such
80Sci. NEWS, supra note 77.
81 Borgaonkar et al., The YY Syndrome, LANCET, Aug. 24, 1968, at 461 ; Price, The
Electrocardiogram in Males with Extra Y Chromosomes, LANCET, May 25, 1968,
at 1106 (letter to the editor).
82 Cowie & Kahn, XYY Constitution in Pre-PubertalChild, BRIT. MED. J., Mar. 23,
1968, at 748 (1968) ; Mintzer et al., The XYY Syndrome, J. PEDIATRICS, Apr., 1968,
at 572; Welch et al., Psychopathy, Mental Deficiency, Aggressiveness and the XYY
Syndrome, 214 NATURE 500 (1967).
8
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84Criminal Law: Question of Y, TIME, Oct. 25, 1968, at 76.
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as this is predictably transmissible. Thus, although a genetic etiology
has been suggested by the statistical data, the eugenic value of
sterilization depends, in the ultimate, on whether the incidence of
the abnormality can be altered by a eugenic program.
There appears to be some evidence of a familial tendency to
nondisjunction of chromosomes, that is, a predisposition to form
the anomalous gametes which appear to be the necessary intermediates of XYY generation.9 2 Yet, in a least one reported case, the
abnormality was definitely not transmitted. Thus, an Oregon XYY
individual fathered six sons, all of whom had the normal XY
pattern. 8 We must conclude then that the evidence as of the
moment is not yet conclusive of transmissibility, and this would
indicate that a rational basis for effective eugenic sterilization has
not been established.
The behavioral patterns of the so-called sociopaths or psychopaths bear at least some similarities to the behavior observed among
XYY's. Cleckley, in a lengthy list of the characteristics of the
sociopath, indicates such traits as: untruthfulness and insincerity,
lack of remorse or shame, inadequately motivated antisocial behavior, and unresponsiveness in general interpersonal relations. 4
These behavioral traits appear to bear some resemblance to those
exhibited by the XYY, though, on the other hand, the sociopath
may be a more "normal" individual in his ability to display a superficial charm, possession of at least adequate intelligence, and absence
of delusions and other irrational thinking. Nevertheless, since classification and analysis of the sociopath remains somewhat of a mystery,
it would be of interest to pursue a chromosomal analysis to determine whether this baffling symptomatology may not spring from
such an organic cause.
E. Summary of the Scientific Appraisal
The specific scientific conclusions regarding eugenic sterlization
may be summarized as follows: (1) sterilization of persons with nonheritable conditions does not achieve a eugenic purpose; (2) a
sterilization program is of limited value if it fails to recognize the
significance of defect carriers; and (3) allowance must be made
for the impact of natural and induced mutations in creating genetic
defects.
Based on these conclusions, the present laws for eugenic sterilization of the mentally defective or deficient (or of physical defec92 Hauschka, Hasson, Goldstein, Koepf & Sanberg, An XYY Man with Progeny Indicating Familial Tendency to Non-Disjunction, 14 AM. J. HUMAN GENETICS 22
(1962).
93 Genetics: Of Chromosomes and Crime, TIME, May 3, 1968, at 41.
94H. CLECKLEY, THE MASK OF SANITY 362-64 (1964).
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tives) are in most cases unsound. Genetic etiologies have usually
not been established with reasonable medical certainty. Furthermore,
the sterilization process, as applied only to individuals with expressed
defects, is woefully inefficient in eliminating defective genes. Finally, the elimination of defective genes may, in fact, be a practical
impossibility in view of the fact of genetic mutation.
It should be clear, then, that present sterilization practices are
not a rational means of attaining the governmental purpose asserted
as their justification,"5 and laws pertaining to sterilization should
be struck down as an invalid exercise of the police power." The
policy implications of the scientific analysis should also be clear. 7
However, as already indicated, the objections that may be made
to eugenic sterilization which embrace legal, moral, and sociological
issues are adequately treated elsewhere." The scientific analysis
has clearly shown that sterilization of potential parents of socially
inadequate offspring will not eliminate the problem -contrary
to
the assumptions upon which Buck v. Bell 9 was decided.

III.

THE PROSPECTS FOR AN ENLIGHTENED EUGENICS PROGRAM

If sterilization is not a rational means for attaining an arguably
legitimate state purpose, what alternative courses of action exist for
a more enlightened brand of eugenics? First, it must be recognized
that eugenics is not primarily a legal problem; rather, it is a medical
and scientific problem. Thus, eugenic sterilization should be supplanted by the utilization of treatment and prevention.

Traditionally psychiatric treatment of the functional psychoses
and neuroses'" 0 should, of course, continue. Moreover, efforts must
be made to extend the coverage of psychiatric therapy, to make it
more efficient in terms of increasing the number of patients who

can be treated by each practitioner and to reduce the treatment period
95 The purpose of governmental regulation is typified by the Model Eugenic Sterilization Law; see note 9, supra and accompanying text.
9 The "substantive due process" test alluded to was stated in Bates v. Little Rock,

361 U.S. 516, 525 (1960):
Where there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the State
may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling....
When it is shown that state action threatens significantly to impinge upon
constitutionally protected freedom it becomes the duty of this Court to

determine whether the action bears a reasonable relationship to the achievement of the governmental purpose asserted as its justification.
See also, Comment, 46 DENVER L.J. 482 (1969).

97 See authorities cited, note 16, supra.
98 Id.
99274 U.S. 200 (1927).
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for each patient. Increasing use of group therapy and supplementation of traditional psychoanalytic techniques with medical and
physical treatments1"' are trends which should be encouraged. Where
mental disorders are traceable directly to physiological causes, traditional medical and dietary treatment as a program of prevention
will be of primary importance.
It is of interest to consider in more detail some of the specific
problem areas and the types of solutions that may be sought in the
attainment of a rational eugenic program. The following topical
areas will be explored: (1) recent developments in medical treatment and prevention; (2) identification of defect carriers, therapeutic abortions, and genetic counseling; (3) genetic engineering;
and (4) psychiatry and psychology-the continuing need for
therapy.
A. Recent Developments in Treatment and Prevention
With the increased understanding of emotional and physical
disease processes and origins, development has been away from
generalized descriptions and treatments to ever more specific classifications and techniques. Thus, much of the melange of poorly
characterized entities has gradually yielded to an isolation of specific
causes and treatments. Such development has been especially rapid
in the case of certain mental deficiencies which have been identified
with metabolic disturbances arising either from genetic or dietary
causes. Often treatment can be instituted which avoids entirely the
mental and physical damage that formerly would have reduced the
patient to a level of incompetance.
An example of recent development in circumventing the effects
of hereditary deficiency is the prevention of mental retardation from
phenylketonuria (PKU)."12 This condition is one in which the
body lacks the enzyme required to effect a transformation between
the two amino acids, phenylalanine and tyrosine. Both of these
materials are essential ingredients in the synthesis of human protein.
it is not the lack of tyrosine that is determining, however, since this
can be obtained from other sources. Rather, it is the excess of
phenylalanine and its toxic by-products that cause damage. The
disease can be controlled by restricting the intake of phenylalanine
to just that consumed in essential protein build-up. Therapy must
begin as early as possible; if delayed until the patient is two or
three years old, only slight benefits are derived from the therapy.
Thus, delayed control may yield a final IQ of perhaps 40, only a
modest increase over an IQ of 25 obtainable with no treatment.
101 Overholser, supra note 100, at 15.
102 SUTTON, supra note 45, at 105-06.
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Fortunately, it is possible to detect the metabolic disorder by relatively simple test procedures.
The importance of early PKU detection has been recognized
by the enactment in a majority of the states, including Colorado, of
laws pertaining to the screening of infants for this disease.' The
Colorado statute requires that all newborn infants be tested by
appropriate procedures for phenylketonuria and other metabolic
defects in order to prevent mental retardation. 0
Mongolism (Down's syndrome) 105 is a genetically related
entity characterized by severe mental retardation and stunted physical
appearance. Reduction in incidence of this condition may be controlled through family planning since the probability of occurrence
of the disease among offspring increases markedly with age of the
mother.1"' If mothers will complete child-bearing at a relatively
early age, i.e., at about age 40, it has been estimated that incidence
of the disease could be reduced by about 30 percent.' 0 7 Mongolism
has recently been associated with the presence of an extra chromosome in the victim's somatic cells. Unlike the XYY condition, the
disease involves one of the autosomes ("nonsex" chromosomes).
The additional chromosome apparently results from nondisjunction
during formation of the ovum in the female. The significance of
the extra chromosome in the causation of Down's syndrome is not
clear, but genetic factors which relate to inadequate secretions of
endocrine hormones appear to be an important causal element.
Mongolism may also be caused by the transmission of specific
chromosomal abnormalities known to be present in one of the
parents, as when a chromosome pair is joined to form a unit which
cannot undergo the normal disjunction that occurs during gamete
formation.' 08
B. Identification of Defect Carriers; Therapeutic Abortions; and
Genetic Counseling
The treatments for genetic defects so far described are advantageous to the individual in controlling his disease, but they provide
03

1
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no cure for the underlying gene defect. Thus, the phenotype is
changed but the genotype persists. Such procedures have a dysgenic
effect in that they tend to preserve deleterious genes by permitting
those who possess them to mature to such an age that they can
marry and procreate. Medical questions are raised as to the wisdom
of degrading the gene pool in this way. However, the trend appears
to be strongly in the direction of saving the genetically defective,
and at least one argument favoring the practice is that the means
10 9
to provide supportive treatment will continue to improve.
What measures can counter this trend? Some hope is offered
by our growing ability to identify heterozygous carriers of defective
genes. It is already possible to identify carriers of phenylketonuria n °
and those predisposed to epilepsy,"' and, quite recently, a procedure has been developed to detect carriers of the cystic fibrosis
12
defect.'
Another area of great promise is the development of the
technique of intrauterine test of a fetus suspected of carrying a
genetic defect. A sample of fluid drawn from the uterus may be
tested for chromosome defects or the sex determined as part of an
analysis in which a sex-linked defect is suspected. In the event a
defective fetus is identified, a therapeutic abortion could be ordered,
at least in those states whose laws permit abortions in such cir3
cumstances.'1
The ability to identify genetic carriers should become increasingly more common, and the use of prenatal tests of the fetus may
become relatively routine. With the availability of such techniques,
a workable and efficient eugenic program becomes possible for the
first time. Many of the objections to traditional negative eugenics
would be mitigated, not only because rights and freedoms would
not be arbitrarily limited, but because of the possibility of actual
improvement in the human stock. Either through counseling or legal
sanctions, a substantial reduction could be achieved in the frequency
distribution of defective genes and in their expressed disorders."'
As an adjunct to the program of carrier identification, widespread public education in genetic matters will become a necessity.
Public enlightenment may be all that is required for general acceptance of limited, voluntary reproductive control where the presence
supra note 26, at 304-05.
at 175-76; REED, supra note 70, at 85.
JOHNSON et al., supra note 4, at 334.
MCCALL's, Apr. 7, 1969, at 66.
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of deleterious genes can be clearly demonstrated and the risks of
defective births reasonably well estimated.
A major vehicle for the dissemination of genetic information
is the growing number of genetic counseling clinics that have been
established, largely in association with universities and medical
centers."' Such clinics provide genetic counseling services and information to parents of genetically defective children or to prospective
parents fearful of harboring unexpressed genetic defects. Also, the
concept of genetic counseling has received support from the National Foundation-March of Dimes, which publishes a directory
16
of available services.'
C. Genetic Engineering
We have discussed how the body may be supplied with metabolic intermediates in cases where the genetic apparatus is incapable
of effecting their synthesis. The speculations of some geneticists
suggest that such procedures are likely, in the future, to be replaced
by the more effective technique of correcting the deficiency at the
genetic level and thereby restoring the body to full function. This
possibility has been suggested recently by a well-known geneticist,
R. L. Sinsheimer," 7 who proposes the use of selected viruses to
introduce bits of DNA into the cells which they invade. This would
permit supplementing damaged or blocked DNA structure; thus,
insulin synthesis could be reactivated in a diabetic, making continuous insulin treatment unnecessary. When and if emotional illnesses are found to be gene-based, the possible extension of such
theorizing to the correction of mental disorders must be considered.
D. Psychiatry and Psychology -

the Continuing Need for Therapy

The emphasis which has been placed on the prevention of
genetically defective births and on treatment at a physiological level
of diseases which frequently have behavioral and emotional significance is not intended to disparage the continuing efforts of the
psychiatrist, psychoanalyst, and clinical psychologist. The need for
psychiatry and the allied fields will obviously continue.
The therapy provided by the psychiatrist for the largely functional disorders represents the major, and frequently the only, means
of treating these conditions. Such treatment should be, if anything,
expanded and made available to all those who can benefit from it.
But in view of the limitations on the availability of psychiatric and
115REED, supra note 70, at 1-5.
8

11 H.

LYNcmc,

INTERNATIONAL DiRECTORY oF GENETIC SERVICES (1969).

117Sinsheimer, The Prospect

(Spring 1969).

for Designed Genetic Change, 57 Am. SCIENTISr 134

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 46

related care and the fact that treatment of the functional psychoses
requires prolonged therapy, every effort which successfully identifies a mental or behavioral entity as genetic or physiological in
origin and thereby eliminates it from the concern of the psychiatrist
and frees him to concentrate more completely on those in need of
his special training should be encouraged in every way possible.
Those individuals who are genetic or physiological defectives can
then be assisted by more conventional medical techniques.
An example of the benefits that are possible from psychological therapy applied to a pre-existing, apparently functional
psychosis- that of infantile autism- was recently published."'
Autistic children exhibit a pattern of complete withdrawal from
their surroundings. Though the hope has been expressed that perhaps
autism may turn out, like cretinism or PKU, to involve an easily
remediable metabolic disturbance, in the meantime, the use of
conditioning therapy has had at least some success in breaking the
trance-like behavior pattern of the autistic child. The therapy abates
the worst of the symptoms and permits the child to make use of
the special schools available to other handicapped children.
CONCLUSION

On the basis of scientific evidence alone, if not for legal,
moral, or sociological reasons, the concept of a legalized eugenic
sterilization of the mentally defective or deficient (or of physical
defectives) is in most cases unsound. Present scientific knowledge
suggests a more effectual, rational, and humane policy by which
the same end might be achieved.
The place of eugenic sterilization should properly be filled by
an intensified program of treatment and prevention. Major advances
have already been made in the understanding of physiological causes
with consequent development of procedures for treatment and control of many abnormalities. Prevention has been aided by the growing availability of genetic counseling services, which have been a
factor in promoting awareness of the genetic role in birth defects
and in encouraging selective childbearing. Moreover, the increasing
ability to identify carriers, and the development of the technique
of prenatal testing provide means of reducing even further the
fortuitous aspects of parenthood. Ultimately, there is the hope of
prevention at the genetic level by repair of the genetic fabric itself.
William R. MatousJ,"9
118 Mental Illness: The Trance Children, TIME, Aug. 1, 1969, at 56.
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120

Adrenal Gland. A body situated in the upper tissue of each kidney;
it is a gland of internal secretion producing hormones essential
to life.
Allele. One of two or more contrasting genes situated at the same
position in homologous chromosomes which determine alternative
characters in inheritance.
Amaurotic. Pertaining to one affected with amaurosis, a condition
marked by complete loss of vision, especially that in which there
is no evidence of pathologic condition in the eye. Amaurotic Family
Amino Acid. The building blocks of which proteins are made; a
large group of organic compounds marked by the presence of both
an amino (NH 2 ) and a carboxyl (COOH) group.
Autosome. Any of the chromosomes other than the sex (designated
X for female and Y for male) chromosomes.
Biochemistry. The chemistry of living things and vital processes;
the science of the chemical changes accompanying the vital functions of plants and animals.
Catatonic Reaction. The state of catatonia is characterized by immobility with muscular rigidity or inflexibility and at times by
excitability; virtually always a symptom of schizophrenia.
Corticoid. Any one of a specific group of organic compounds
termed steroids emanating from the outer layer or cortex of the
adrenal gland.
Cretinism. A chronic condition attributable to a lack of thyroid
secretion and characterized by impaired physical and mental development accompanied by degeneration of the bones and soft
parts and by lowered basal metabolism.
Dizygotic. In reference to twins, those individuals originating from
two discrete eggs individually fertilized.
Down's Syndrome. Mongolism; named after the English physician
J. L. H. Down.
Electrocardiogram. A graphic tracing of the electric current produced by the contraction of the heart muscle; gives important
information concerning the spread of excitation to the different
chambers of the heart.
120

Sources used to compile glossary were:
ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY (24th ed. 1965).
E. J. GARDNER, PRINCIPLES OF GENETICS, glossary (1964).
READINGS IN LAW AND PSYCHIATRY, appendix, A Psychiatric Glossary (R. Allen,
E. Ferster, & J. Rubin eds. 1968).
TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY (10th ed. 1968).
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Electroencephalogram. A graphic tracing of the electric current
developed in the brain.
Enzyme. An organic compound, frequently a protein, capable of
accelerating or producing by catalytic action some chemical change
for which it is often specific.
Epilepsy. An episodic disturbance of consciousness during which
generalized convulsions may occur.
Etiology. The study or theory of the causation of any disease; the
sum of knowledge regarding such causes.
Galactosemia. A hereditary disorder of carbohydrate metabolism,
characterized by vomiting, diarrhea, jaundice, poor weight gain,
and malnutrition in early infancy.
Gamete. A male or female reproductive cell, the sperm or egg cell.
Gene. A hypothetical biologic unit of heredity, self-reproducing and
located in a definite position (locus) on a particular chromosome;
there are specific points on the chromosomes for genes governing
each characteristic.
Genetics. The study of heredity and its variation; the science that
accounts for natural differences and resemblances among organisms related by descent.
Genogenic. Originating from genes, having a genetic cause.
Genotype. The fundamental hereditary constitution or gene assortment of an individual.
Germ Cell. A reproductive cell capable, when mature, of being
fertilized and reproducing an entire organism.
Heredity. The innate capacity of an individual to develop traits and
characteristics possessed by his ancestors; such is dependent upon
the presence of genes in the chromosomes of the parents from
which the individual develops.
Heterozygous. Possessing different alleles in regard to a given
character.
Homozygous. Possessing an identical pair of alleles in regard to
a given character or to all characters.
Hormone. A chemical substance produced in the body which is
conveyed through the blood to a certain organ of the body upon
which it has a specific effect, such as stimulating it to increased
functional activity.
Huntington's Chorea. A chronic condition of ceaseless occurrence
of a wide variety of rapid, jerky but well coordinated movements
performed involuntarily.
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Idiocy. The term for a group of related familial diseases marked by
dementia (irrecoverable deteriorative mental state), impaired vision,
and defect in fat metabolism.
Infantile Autism. A term used in child psychiatry referring to
babies who remain aloof from relationships with others but usually
without evidence of intellectual impairment; the child responds
chiefly to inner thoughts, does not relate to his environment, is
immature, and often appears retarded.
Meiosis. A special method of cell division occurring in maturation
of the sex cells by means of which the nucleus of each sex cell
receives half the number of chromosomes characteristic of the
other cells of the body.
Microbe. A minute organism, especially protozoa, fungi, and
bacteria.
Mongolism. Now called Down's syndrome or disease; a variety
of congenital mental retardation characterized by severe intellectual defect, abnormal body development, and a fold of skin over
the inner angles of the eyes giving a "mongoloid" appearance; the
condition results from the presence in the individual's cells of an
extra small chromosome.
Monozygotic. In reference to twins, those individuals originating
from the cleavage of a single fertilized egg.
Mutation. A permanent, transmissible change in the characters of
an offspring from those of its parents; a change in form, quality, or
some other characteristic.
Mutagenic. Inducing genetic mutation.
Neurosis. Emotional maladaptations due to unresolved unconscious
conflicts; one of the two major categories of emotional illness, the
other being "psychosis"; usually less severe than psychosis with
minimal loss of contact with reality; thinking and judgment may
be impaired; such an illness represents the attempted resolution
of unconscious emotional conflicts in a manner that handicaps the
effectiveness of a person in living.
Nucleotide. A compound formed of phosphoric acid, a sugar, and
a base (purine or pyrimidine), all of which constitute the structural
unit of nucleic acid.
Paranoia. Rare psychotic disorder which develops slowly and becomes chronic; characterized by an intricate and internally logical
system of persecutory and/or grandiose delusions; the system stands
by itself and does not interfere with the remainder of the personality.
Paresis. Weakness of organic origin; incomplete paralysis; the term
is frequently applied to the sequelae of syphilitic infection.
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Pathogen. A microorganism or substance capable of producing
disease.
Phenotype. The outward, visible expression of the hereditary constitution of an organism.
Phenylketonuria. A congenital faulty metabolism of the amino acid
phenylalanine resulting in abnormal chemicals which interfere with
brain development; often associated with mental defects (phenylpyruvic oligophrenia) ; transmitted genetically and treatable by diet
when detected in infancy.
Physiology. The science of the functions of cells, tissues, and organs
of the living organism.
Protein. A group of complex organic, nitrogenous compounds, essentially combinations of amino acids, which are essential constituents of all living cells.
Psychopathy. Any mental disease, especially one characterized by
defective character or personality.
Psychosis. A major mental disorder of organic and/or emotional
origin in which there is a departure from normal patterns of
thinking, feeling, and acting; commonly characterized by loss of
contact with reality, distortion of perception, regressive behavior
and attitudes, diminished control of elementary impulses and desires,
abnormal mental content including delusions and hallucinations;
chronic and generalized personality deterioration may occur.
Schizophrenia. A severe emotional disorder of psychotic depth
characteristically marked by a retreat from reality with delusion
formation, hallucinations, emotional disharmony, and regressive
behavior.
Sociopathy. Connoting a pathological attitude toward society.
Somatic. Pertaining to nonreproductive cells or tissues.
Spirochete. A spiral shaped bacterium.
Sterilization. The process of rendering barren.
Syphilis. An infectious venereal disease leading to many structural
and cutaneous lesions, due to the bacterium Tfeponema pallidum,
transmitted by direct contact.

BOOK REVIEW
EVERYMAN'S CONSTITUTION
By

HOWARD

J.

GRAHAM

Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1968. Pp. xiv, 631.
$12.95

F

OR 35 years, Howard Jay Graham has labored to provide his
countrymen with a more accurate view of the purposes and scope
of the 14th amendment of the United States Constitution. In this
collection of his essays, students of the Constitution can, for the first
time, fully grasp both the magnitude of his task and his extraordinary
achievement in laying bare truths which decades of mistaken scholarship have obscured.
The title of this collection, Everyman's Constitution, yields a key
to Graham's approach to constitutional interpretation. Decrying
"lawyer's history," which he regards as based on an overemphasis
of verbalisms and an excessive concentration on appellate decisions,
he stresses the dominant currents of thought which entered into our
constitutional heritage through the 14th amendment. For Graham
it is the stock of Lockean and Jeffersonian inspired natural rights
ideas, as articulated by the anti-slavery forces of the nation, which
dominated the thinking of the amendment's framers. These ideas
give us the most accurate insight into the purposes of the guarantees
of section one of the 14th amendment - privileges or immunities of
United States citizens, due process of law, and equal protection of
the laws.
Graham demonstrates in convincing fashion that the interpretation given the amendment by the United States Supreme Court from
the time of its adoption in 1868 until Brown v. Board of Education'
in 1954 was grossly erroneous. Provisions which were intended to
make newly emancipated blacks full fledged citizens, possessed of
the same rights as white American citizens, and free from all forms
of public discrimination by private or public agencies, were constricted into the narrowest possible compass. After stating in the
SlaughterhouseCases2 that the purposes of the 14th amendment were
the "freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment
1347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 Butchers' Benevolent Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter-House

Co., 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
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of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made freeman and
citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised
unlimited dominion over him," 3 the Supreme Court proceeded in that
very opinion to draw a sharp distinction between state and national
citizenship, ignoring the framers' basic conception of a very broad
scheme of rights enjoyed by all United States citizens. By reducing the
privileges and immunities clause to a virtual nullity in Slaughterhouse.
the Court left due process and equal protection to carry the burden.
In the Civil Rights Cases,4 the Court then destroyed the fifth section
of the amendment, authorizing Congress to enforce the amendment's
other sections, by holding invalid the Civil Rights Act of 1875,5
which had sought to protect accommodation and other public rights
of blacks. According to the Court, Congress had power only to set
aside discriminatory state acts.' This was a conclusion wholly at
variance with the framers' intentions. Finally, by upholding classifications based on race under the deceptive guise of "separate but equal
facilities," the Court in Plessy v. Ferguson7 gave judicial sanction to
the very type of discrimination that the post-war. amendments were
intended to prevent. The great political compromise of 1877 saw
the Court moving in step with the Congress and President Hayes to
bury the past and appease the South at the expense of black citizens,
who, decade by decade, had seen their dream of a better life
smashed by new political and social forces, and sanctified by judicial
writ. It is one of the magnificent ironies of our constitutional history
that amendments designed to wipe out slavery, the least American
of institutions, could so easily meet destruction at the hands of
"realists," both on and off the Court.
Another grand theme in Graham's studies is his explanation
and clarification of the development of economic due process in the
post-war era. For several decades it was alleged and widely believed
that the framers of the post-war amendments had conspired to protect
the growing corporate enterprises of the nation, and that this objective
had been more prominent in their thinking than giving any real
assistance to black citizens. This false conclusion derived from the
celebrated argument of Roscoe Conkling - a prominent ex-Senator
and member, in 1860, of the joint committee of Congress which
drafted the 14th amendment - on behalf of the railroad in County
of San Mateo v. Southern Pacific R.R.' In that case Conkling pro3

1d. at 71.

4United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
5

Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335.
United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
7 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
8 116 U.S. 138 (1885).
6
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duced, for the first time, the manuscript journal of the committee,
and, as Graham concludes, "by means of extensive quotations and
pointed comment [Conkling] conveyed the impression that he and
his colleagues in drafting the due process and equal protection clauses
intentionally used the word 'person' in order to include corporations."' By 1886 the Supreme Court accepted the proposition without
argument. Graham shows that Conkling was incorrect, or, to be
blunt, had deceived the Court by misusing the journal. In a masterful
and intensive examination of pre-war legal writings and decisions,
the author shows that due process and equal protection concepts as
generalized expressions for protecting persons and property were
well-recognized and fed into the post-war streams of thought without
the existence of any Congressional "conspiracy" in the drafting of
the 14th amendment. Corporations, as legal persons, or as legal
representatives of shareholders, could assert as naturally as individual
litigants the guarantees against arbitrary governmental action- i.e.,
due process or equal protection rights - in a nation so deeply
devoted to the business ethic as is the United States. What seemingly
gave support to the conspiracy theory was the fact that the decline
in legal support for black citizens was paralleled by the elevation of
economic due process in the period 1890-1936.
This brief summary is wholly inadequate in conveying the
breadth and richness of Graham's research. He is indeed, as Leonard
W. Levy states in a highly perceptive forward, "surely the greatest
authority on the history of the amendment. He is its Maitland, and
perhaps our foremost living historian of American constitutional law
as well."' Among the most engaging features of this work, are the
introductory and appended statements which the author supplies for
each essay. They furnish a running account of his intellectual pilgrimage which commenced in the 1930's, and they allow him to take
account of later research. What is striking is the high degree of
accuracy of all of his original investigations, the meticulous attention
to factual evidence, and his ability to prove or disprove hypotheses
by using rigorous methods of analysis.
But there is more to Mr. Graham's work than historical detection
of the highest quality. He is deeply devoted to the highest values in
American life, past and present. He sees legal, social, and political
events not as discrete examples of human success and failure, but as
reflections of the very nature of a people and their culture. He
rejoices when good triumphs and is saddened by the victories of
immoral or thoughtless men. Who else could take the subject of
frontier tax titles and in two chapters (11, 12) bring vividly alive
9 H. GRAHAM, EVERYMAN'S CONSTITUTION 30 (1968).

10 Id. at vii.
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the rich and varied strands of economic and social life in nineteenth
century frontier communities. There is even a "hero," - the virtually
forgotten Robert S. Blackwell, whose 1855 treatise on tax titles11
became a bible for lawyers and judges of that era, and contributed
greatly to Judge Thomas M. Cooley's own great treatise'" which
advanced the cause of due process limits on governmental action.
Philosophically, Howard Jay Graham belongs to that group
of historians who see man not as a toy or puppet in the hands of
government or other quasi-public organization, but rather, in the
American tradition, as a potentially noble creature already possessed
of an extensive range of rights, with new ones constantly being
discovered as the conditions of his life and environment change. The
need for imposing due process standards on those conducting the
affairs of large corporations and labor unions is the plea that closes
his book. He would, I am certain, applaud the growing effort to
bring due process into student-institutional relations in our universities. He would, I presume, approve of the Supreme Court's discovering a right of privacy in a Constitution which to Justice Black's
judicial eyes, contained no mention of privacy. It is in this sense that
the Constitution is, and as Graham proclaims must be, "everyman's,"
a living document shaped, and reshaped by each generation in
the hope of strengthening the lives and values of a free people.
William M. Beaney*

11 R. BLACKWELL, TREATISE ON TAX TITLES (1855).
12
T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (1868).

* Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law.
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